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.Piaster William Kilverley (.lllverlegus, Kilverleius, Kilverleye,
Mirweley, Mrwirley, Mulverlaye, Mylleeverley, Myverley, ftyverlaye)
ia a personality who has left nothing behind him except hie works. lie
was apparently a master at Oxford, but no record remains of his
incumbency and we have no certain dates for his life. Both Leland
and Bale place the period of his work in the middle years of the
fourteenth century, during the reign of Edward III. (Bale Scriptoves
I 434, Leland Collectanea iv.65). There is no other confirmation of
this and Br. laden thinks it more likely that he worked and wrote at
the beginning of the fifteenth century, apparently because the manu¬
script copies of his works that we possess are collected together with
those of other philosophers of this period. (Saden, Biographical
register, Vol.2, p.12B4). It will be difficult to give a chronological
context to the philosophical content of his work, until the works of
supposed contemporaries have been edited. There is no doubt that his
exposition of universalis and his terminology have resemblances to the
ideas and words contained in John Tarteys' "Universalis". However
Silverley's work does have certain ideosyncracies which suggest to
me a more extreme Realist position. However trie "Universalis" appears
to be an elementary introduction to the complexities of universale
arid it would be perhaps unwise to develop this sort of inference, until
his other works have been examined. We may assume that his works,
especially the "Universalia", enjoyed a certain vogue in the later
fifteenth century? there are eight extant copies of the "Universalis"
and record of at least one more. This would probably be due to the
relative simplicity of the work. Unlike Tarteys* "Universalis",
Milverley's treatise is not unduly cluttered by complex doubts and
questions and proceeds in a fairly straight-forward manner, following
Porphyry's familiar text, but not as a commentary, and explaining in
the introduction in a relatively simple way the concepts that the
Introduction.
reader will need in the body of the text. The doubts and questions
set out at the end are not difficult either: they combine logical and
metaphysical exercises without attempting any developments which the
beginner ai^it find too taxing.
Kilverley'e works are:
(i) Sophiaraata in determinations sua et responsionea ad distinotiones
(eiusdeeCr) de Incipit, Worcester Cathedral MS.F.118, fos.64-78v,
which responaiones possibly refer to art.7, fos.13-14 of the same
MS: Be Incipit secundum usum Oxon.
(ii) Univeraalia "pro superficial! notitia quinque universal!us"
British Museum liarleian MS. 2178* art.2.
Worcester Cathedral MS. Q. 54» fos.3-llv.
Oriel College MS.55* art.i, foe.1-4.
New College MS.289» art.6, fos.50-63»
Magdalene College, Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.2, fos.34-37.
Magdalene College, Oxford, MS,latin 162, los.1-4.
Bodleian Library, Bodleian MS,676 (S.C. 2595)» foa.
134r-147v.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS.103, art.4, fos.32v-40v
(iii) Commentary on Gilbert de la Pore'e, de sex principiis, "intentio
auctoris in hoc libello".
Oriel College MS.35# art.6, foa.134-152.
Magdalene College, Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.5, foa.67-86.
Worcester Cathedral KS.Q.34, fos.1l6-l67v.
Laabeth Palace KS.393» fos.143b-184.
British Museum, Harleian MS.2178, art.6.
Bodleian Library, Hawlinson MS.677, art.11.
iii
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(iv) de lnceptione "quidlibet seam esse".
Few College MS.289» art.9, fos.71-81.
"quidlibet incipit esse quod sor"
Corpus Christ! College, Oxford MS.116,1ol«5*
(v) de differentia "nulla differunt"
New College MS.2B9* art.10, foe.81-90.
(vi) de ecientia "scitua est, non conec!turn"
Sew College MS.289, art.11, fos.90-99*
Tanner (Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibemica, p.528) gives the following
further manuscripts*
New College MS 289 de proposition© "in materia de
propositions" (previously mentioned by Hale)
Corpus Christ! College Oxford MS 103, de differentia,
de sclentia, de qualitate.
Of these the Corpus Christ! manuscripts de differentia, de scientia,
are not given in Coxe*s Catalogue, the manuscript "de qualitate" is
given, but is ascribed following Bishop ^ale, to John Chilaark (Coxe,
Vol.11, p.36, Corpus Christi MS.289, art.5, fos.41-60). The Hew
manuscript "de propoaitione" is not given by Coxe either, but the
Worcester Cathedral Library Catalogue mentions an article "de prop¬
ositions" following Milverley's Sophismata (Worcester Cathedral
MS.F.118, art.26,fos.79-83)* It is neither catalogued as anonymous
nor is it explicitly attributed to Kilverley. Finally the index to the
MS.F118 mentions a text which was never actually included in the
manuscript t "'.uattuor materiae Milverley".
Record of a further copy of the Univeraalia, "universalis Milverley
et Burleius super Forphiru® et predic&*«enta", 2° fo' "sicut album"
appears in an inventory of books of Canterbury College Oxford, made in
1501 by the retiring Warden, Thomas Chaundler, the same man apparently,
whose name appears after the explicit of the hew College copy of
Hilverley's "Universalia". (lantin, Canterbury College, Volil, p.25»
Introduction.
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item 238). The boo. does not however appear in the inventory made
in the same year by the new incumbent Robert Holynborne upon entering
office.
TEXTS
The edition of Kilverley's "Universalia" was made on the basis of
the following manuscripts (the sigla are put in front).
A. Magdalene College Oxford MS.latin 47» fos.34-37» "universalis
abbreviate, compendiose compilata). Parchment "in quarto minor!",
single column with broad margin left for copious notes and section
headings, English hand, clear and regular, according to Coxe a
fourteenth century work (Coxe, Vol.11, p.26).
B. odleian Library MS.2595* fos.134.
Parchment, single column with marginal notes, illuminated capitals,
diagram of the tree of Porphyry (fol.147v), English hand, often
unclear or smudged, written in the 15th century in England by John
Buxhale, whose name appears in the explicit as "B".
C. Corpus Christi College Oxford MS.103, art.4, 32v-40v.
Parchment "in quarto minori", single column, florid English hand,
some intricately ornate ascenders, possibly later additions,
illuminations of capitals of chapter headings missing, large spaces
left, written in 15th century.
D. Worcester Cathedral Library MS.Q.54* foa.3r-10v.
Parchment, single column, illuminated capitals, marginal notes,
English hand, usually clear, but inexpertly blotched or erased in
places, written in the 15th century.
E. New College, MS.289» art.6, foa.58*-62r.
Paper, "in quarto minori", single column, marginal notes, English
hand, often irregular and unclear, approximately i of fol.58 torn
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away, hole in fol.60, written in 15th century, name Thomas
Chawndler appears in different hand alter explicit.
The other manuscripts, British Museum Harleian MS.2178, art.2,
Magdalene College, Oxford latin MS 162 and Oriel College MS, art I,
I was unable to use for lack of time.
'She manuscripts fall into two groups, A and B, and C,B and E. Of
these two groups A and E are the most reliable manuscripts, representing
two slightly different traditions. A recommends itself chiefly because
of the clarity of the handwriting. The text is not without mistakes,
but these are usually minor. B is almost certainly a copy of A, a copy
which is often quite unreliable. The copier was, one would imagine,
a student, because he has attempted to give interpretations of readings,
of which he is unsure, which betray a philosophical rather than
paleographical ineptitude. He has also made two major additions to
the text, which we must assume are his own, as they occur in none of
the other manuscripts.
E is discovered to be a quite reliable text, once the problem of
the handwriting has been overcome. The missing part of fol.58 means
that if from Chapter 1x2,1.13 to Chapter 1:4*1.43 £ alone receives no
mention in the apparatus, it is *o be assumed that that part of the
text is visaing in E.
B is a copy of E or of a precursor of E. It is on the whole
reliable and has apparently received later additions by a scribe who
iiad another copy of the MS before him. It is less full than E, but
more legible.
C, although quite legible, contains a large number of inaccurate




So in compiling the edition I have prefered A and E. Where
these differ I have chosen the l)/h tradition, unless the sense of the
passage seems to demand that A be adopted* C has been used to support
the D/E tradition, if necessary, B n&s been used as a source of
amusing inaccuracies and interesting; interpolations alone*
John Tarteva
Tarteya ('fartaius, Tartas, Tartays, Tartous) is again a character
of who® very little is actually known* Re was a master at Oxford,
who according to Bishop Bale "per plurea annos in Balliolensi collegio
studuisse dicitur" (hale part ii, pp.94-95)» by Wood's testimony
during the reigns of Henry IV and V (Wood, Lib.II, p.75)» Hie
Universalis is a more complex vorx than that of Kilverley. Rather
than set out concepts before t&c&ling the exposition of the five
predicablee, he sets out and elaborates upon concepts as he goes
along. As a result his work contains very many more questions and
answers than does Kilverley's. There are a number of differences, the
most striking being the a,. sence of the notion r>f comamnicability which
Kilverley makes central to his work* Tarteys covers a larger area of
logic and metaphysics than does Kilverley and the work is less of an
introduction to Porphyry than an account of typical problems raised
by it.
We possess today very few of Tarteya* works. Bishop Bale ascribes
several tracts on logic to hir.i (i) Suomulae logicales, (ii) huestiones
naturales, (iii) Suppositiones, (iv) Obligationes, (v) ProbAetata,
(vi) Consequentiae, all without incipits and all formerly in Balliol
College Library.
The works we have today are J
(i) Froblemata correspodens libello Jorphirii, "Problemata
correspondens libello Porphirii est hoc, Utrum universalia
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ad aliquen aensuss"
Magdalene College Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.1, foa.2-34
lambeth Palace MS.393, art.7.
(ii) JD« figuris "utrum omnes figure artificiales et natur&les"
Laabeth Palace MS. 393, art.3.
(iii) Universalia "cum univeraalium cognitio ut dicitur Porphirius"
British Museum, Harleian KS. 2178, art.?, fos.
100v-107r.
(iv) Materia de »odis "...tur enim fere accident&les*
Pew College MS.289, art.12, fos.99-107.
(v) Sophisna de equivocia "bulla sunt equivoca. Quod sojhiama sic
factum".
New College MS.289, art.21.
TK'XT
It was obviously not possible to make anything other than a trans¬
cription of the "Universalis". The manuscript is of the 1 th century
on parchment, in double columns, some 27 columns long, approximately
45 lines per column. The hand is legible, but the manuscript itself
is faded in parts. The text is corrupt in some places and some quest¬
ions appear without answers and some answers without questions. The
division of the work into chapters is as a result not as self-evident
as is the case with Kilverley's work.
MILVERLEY'S UNIVEHSALS V11:
IKTRODUCT ION TO TOE TEXT
Han is a rational animal. For the Aealist philosophers of
the middle ages this definition constituted the starting point of
all philosophical enquiry, Han finds himself in a world of particular
sensible entities continually coming into existence and passing from
existence. These entities are subject to continual change and man's
perception of them is also in a state of flux, due to for instance
c B: ;es in perspective and changes in the intensity of light. How
then can man come to possess any certain knowledge of his world?
Hie Realists answered that he could do so because he is rational,
that is he is capable of abstractive thought. This process of
abstraction is one of composition and division, that is, of formally
dividing what is presented to the senses as a material concrete unit,
fixing ones thought upon sane particular aspect of that entity and
ignoring all other aspects, and of constructing from aspects that
display siiailarites formal unitary entities, which unlike the material
entities of the world are not liable to flux, Hor is man's recognition
or intellection of such formal units liable to change, unless he by
an act of free will reconstitutes them. Thus man superimposes upon
the labile sensible world a world of entities, which form a stable basis
for discursive. This therefore is the basis of human knowledge#
Yet does not the fact that men are consistently able to recognise
the same formal units in many things in different situations imply that
these entities have some reality themselves? The medieval Realists
certainly thought that this was so. The conceptual entities we construct
from material things are signs for entities a parte rei, in the real
order, and these things are universale, existing in material things,
if they are essential to them ^and inhering in than, if they are accident¬
al to them. The universality of such things is comprised in the fact
they, as formal units, are to be found in many naterial units# The
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universal stands as a higher-order entity (auperiua) in relation to
many lower-order entities (inferiors). The notion of "higher-order"
and "lower-order" may be conceived in two waye. Something may be said
to be of a higher order than something else, if it is better known
(notius) than that other thing, or may be simply prior to that thing
in the real order, that is, as its cause. If one asserts that a
universal is only better known than its inferiors, that is, that the
formal relationship of universality is merely conceptual, then one is
adopting a Conceptuallot position. If one states that a universal
is both prior to and better known than its inferiors, yet dependent
upon them in some way (but not as a "causaturn" to its "causa"), then
one is close to a moderate Bealist position, Td assert that universale
are prior to and better known than their inferiors and yet are themselves
independent of the existence of their inferiors is to move towards
an extreme Realist position. In all three cases the psychologioal
question of what is involved in being better known than something
is raised. In the latter two cases, the metaphysical question of
whether a formal entity is prior to a material unit is raised. So
the question of universals can be seen to be relevant both tc 'sychology
and to metaphysics.
However to the moderate Realist the universal is in some way
real and the most important question regarding universals is how
our expression of universal relationships and the corresponding
understanding of such relationships matches the reality of such
relationships. That such expressions or predications match some reality
is the concern of Logic. Predication in this sense may be both a real
relation (a parte rei) where something is predicated of another
thing, that is, exists in it or inheres in it, or it may be a verbal
realtion of a e bject and a predicate (a parte terminorum). In both
cases tiniversals are of paramount Importance, whether in the
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metaphysical sense of universalia a parte rei or as universalis a parte
terminorura (general terms). The main problem of the moderate Realist
position, which I think is also seen in Milverley's Universalis, is
that of whether all such general terms signify real universale• The
moderate Realist would see no difficulty in as.erting that M man" sign¬
ifies a real universal man or that "white" in sane sense signifies a
universal whiteness. Bat terms of what Ockham would call secondary
imposition pose problems, for instance, genus species accident, etc.
If they are to signify real universale, then either they must do so
in some indirect fashion, or the reality of the entities so signified
eannot be Categorial or substantial, but in some sense transcendental.
If we reject both these answers, then we are forced to assume that
some general terms signify conceptual entities end if some, then why
do not all general terms do so?
Metaphysics then tells us what sort of entities exist and more especially
what the nature of universal entities is. Logic tells us what sorts
of relations there may be between entities and more especially the
sorts of relations holding between superiors and inferiors. However
Logic way be prescriptive as well as descriptive and in this sense
it la prior to all sciences. For if sciences bear upon the material
world and if we may only know (intelligere) the material world
indirectly, by knowing universale, then any science must presuppose
the general notion of universality or of the one-to-many relation.
Logic is the study of such relations, thuo logic is prior to all
science. And if Logic ia prior to all science, the study of universale
is the first concern of LogicI for which reason Porphyry's Isagogue
was studied before the Orgaron, despite the warnings of manjr wise
men of the folly of such an undertaking by the inexperienced.
CHAFTER 1:1 Priao notandus xi
Milverley divides universale into three classes, the causational
universal, the representational universal and the real or predicable
universal. This division has correlates in an earlier division made
by St. Thomas and a contemporaneous division made by Wyclif. St.
Thomas sets out the ways in which an entity may be related to many
others* in causando (where one thing is the cause of many others)*
in cognoscendo (the intellect, which say be applied to many things),
in repraesentando (a concept, which may refer to many things), in
significando (a word, which may signify many things), in essendo (an
entity, which may exist in many tilings) and in praedicando (the same
entity as it may be asserted of many things). 1). These modes are
reduced to three, in causando, in repraesentando and in essendo:
however St. Thomas considers that Logic is only properly concerned
with the last relationship, of metaphysical or logical universality.
Wyclif gives a very similar classification of a universale causation®,
as for instance God or the celestial bodies, a universale represent¬
ation®, a spoken or written term or an intention of the mind which
signifies many things in the real order and a universale communication®
which is communicated to many supposlta. 2).
There seems however to be a distinction between what St. Thomas
on the one hand and what Wyclif and Milverley on the other consider
to be primarily signified by a universale repraesentatione. St.
Thomas takes the view that the representational universal signifies
many different things in the real order, for instance the term "man"
primarily signifies an individual man or the su of all men (that is
can be given personal supposition). Wyclif and Milverley stress that
such a universale term primarily signifies toe universal man, a
universal a parte rei or secondary substance, and the term is to be
l). Flassmann pp.225-227. 2). Wyclif De Logica I p.8.
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used primarily in simple supposition. 5). However a general term
may be accidental, for example "genus". According to .Tilverley and
Wyclif, such a tena would signify a real universal, as well as
individual genera, which universal would however be neither a primary
nor a secondary substance.
-1 liverley however differs again from St. Thomas and Wyclif in
writing of the universale praedicatione or universale communications.
Wyclif speaks of such a universal as being predicable of or communicable
to many individuals. 4). Mllverley states that a universale
praedicatione is communicable to many essences, "quia est realiter
ilia". In doing so Milverley seems to depart from the usual mediaeval
exposition of Aristotelian teaching on the nature of universale. To
St. Thomas a universal (unum versus alia: i.e. respiciens alia) is a
thing which is or can be in many things really. It is also predicable
of many things, hence the short definition of universal "unum in
multla et de multis". As predicable of an individual thing, the
universal is said to constitute in whole or in part the essence of
the thing so predicated. It would not however make very good sense to
an Aristotelian to state that the universal "homo communis" is commun¬
icated to the essence of man, umanitas, as Kilverley would have it.
Milverley*a equation of "coramunicabile" and "aptum natum commun-
icari" is a point made in most mediaeval logical texts. Simply to
state that a universal is something "quod cosamunicatur" or something
"eoimnunic&tua" would be to ignore the possibility that a universal
may at any particular time have only one suppoeitus or no supposita
3). Milverley Universalia C.1,1 11.5-7:"tale universale ...
significat universale re&le", Wyclif Be Logica I p.8, l.15ff«*"®t
dicuntur universalis repreaentatione, quia principaliter et primarie
representant universalia a parte rei". 4)« Wyclif ibidem p.8, 1*7
"et sic natura hu^ana comaranicatur omnibus individuis speciei htssanae,
quai inest omni horaini, quod sit hamo".
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at all. The universal relation of one to many would obviously be
absent at this period in time, so the definition of universal takes
into account the fact that at another instant in time individuals
sight appear to which the universal could be communicated and thus the
one-to-^eany relationship would be restored. So we must allow the
universal the ability to enter into a one-to-many relationship, that
is we must allow it eoamunicafcility. However because the one-to-many
relationship is not necessary, in that one term of the relation is
many contingent beings, Kilverley can state that communinability is
much the same as a property (propriatas) of universal being.
The explanation given as to why universale are said to be
communicated to many essences still does not resolve the earlier
difficulty, vis. that Wycllf and others assert that universale are
communicable of things. Mediaeval Catholic thought held the soul,
like God, to be an indivisible. The Trinity, like the soul, therefore
cannot have three essences, but only one essence. In this seise the
intellective soul is not a universale praedicatione, although both
the soul and the Divine are universalia causatione, following the
Thornistic division of universale given earlier. One suspects that
Kilverley here has attempted to reconcile his Metaphysics with
doctrinal strictures, but in doing so denies that universalia
praedicatione are communicated to material individuals. Universals
may indeed be communicated to essences, but if they are not also
communicated to the individuals, in which these essences exist,
Kilverley has formed a Metaphysics without a physical basis.
CKAFTKK 1:2 Secundo notandum
Here Milverley discusses the ways in which "universale reals sive
praedicatione" may be used and the problem of the node of existence
of universal accidents again arises* ** would be beat to iiret
mention Milverley's division of universals into universale per se and
universale per accidens. The distinction seems to correspond to the
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Aristotelian differentiation of those universale whioh are secondary
substances and those which are not. Universalis per se seem to
correspond to the genera and species of substance, universalis per
accidens to the genera and species of accident. Universalis per
accidens, as is later apparent, seen to have no place allocated to
them in the order of Beingi they are what Kilverley calls composites
of a universal per se and one of its accidental attributes. It is
with the universale per accidens in mind that we must approach the
first use of "universale reals" that is "ut actualiter concipitur".
This universal, we are told, is mind-dependent, in that as a concept,
it is formed by the mind. The individual man "JJocrates" is an unin¬
telligible, that io, it is in a state of potency or contingency, and
as such is knowable only by experience. The concept "man", formed by
the mind, is actualiaed and necessary, and would seem in Kilverley's
view to correspond to sone real universal per se. hut there are also
concepts which are accidental, for example "hoc commune album" (the
universal white thing). This is also mind-dependent, which could
merely mean that the mind forms the actualieation "white thing", but
which could also mean that such a universal has no correspondence to
a real entity outside the mind. It is difficult to know whether
Milverley holds the latter view. For it to be clear that he did so,
one would expect him to give "hoc commune album" or something like it
as an example of the way in which such a universal is expressed, in
the same way that he gives "humanitae" and "homo communis" as examples
_ . ,, . ., , .ter two meanings of universaleof the ways in which we express the late
reale.
Secondly, universale reale is used to mean the nature in which
something having the property of cossnunicability exists, which is
signified by a term like "homo" or "hus&anitae". This is apparently
what Kilverley calls the material essence of a thing. This essence
XV
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ie substantial and particular and it is also in this sense that
Milveriey's notion that universals per se are ccsmaunicated to essences
is perhaps to be understood, although I am not sure where the dividing
line between substance and Milverley'a material essence falls, if
indeed there is one.
Thirdly, by universale reale is meant the entity which is itself
conaaunicable, either taken simply or together with its coramunicability,
which latter Milverley terms a "corapositium per accidens". Milverley
regards this form of universal as extra-rental and non-substantial.
This non-substantiality of the universal could mean that it is a
secondary substance and Milverley admits that a universal of this sort
can be a universal per se. But it could mean that such a universal
is a universal per scolders, that is, is neither a secondary nor a
priitar:' subetance, Milverley does not go as far as to state this, he
merely states that this universal is a corapositusi per accidens and the
communicability of tie universal is apparently what gives this
cocapositum its accidental nature. He has earlier said that communic-
ability is rather like a property (proprietas) of the universal, in
the way that risibility is a property (propriura) of man. But the
property "risibility" is, as will be seen, immediately posterior to
the universal mart, that is, its necessary and sufficient condition
for being is the existence of a man. The Aristotelians thought that
secondary substances (that is universale? per se) were related to
primary substances (material entities) by virtue of their coraraunic-
ability. We certainly could have no immediate knowledge of secondary
substances, if the individuals to which they are communicated did not
exist. So in this sense coamunicability is essential, not accidental
to universals, because it enters into the definition of universale
reale, via. a universal is something which is communicable to many
others. If however our knowledge of universals is itself contingent
Introduction.
and universale constitute an order of real and necessary beings beyond
the material reality we experience, then communicability is something
"quod adest et abest praetor subiecti corruption® % a sere accident.
But then universale per se would be in souse sense transcendental and
»ight at some time be unknowable, at least as far as we are concerned
now (quoad nos).
ChAPTKh It3 Tertla notanda
The discussion of predication is first taken with respect to the
necessary conditions for t..e meaningful relation of universal and
particular. The later discussion of the predicates sets out the
sufficient conditions for the same. In practice all meaningful
predication will be by universal of particular or by accident of
subject, that is, will be formal predication. The examination of
essential predication is intended to establish a way of identifying
and refuting meaningless predication, as will become clear in the
first three of the questions raised at the end of the treatise.
Predication a parte rei relates to relations in the real order.
That one thing is predicated a parte rei of another implies that the
one is really aa essential feature of the other or that the one is
really an accident of the other. Predication a parte terrainorua
relates to the conceptual order of to grammatical copulation, where
one term is related by a copula, lilfe "ast", to another? this
copulation must be taken as designating directly or indirectly a real
relation between entities a parte rei, the directness of the
signification being determined by the siode of supposition of terms in
the predication a parte teminorum.
Predication a parte rei secundum essentia#, seeir.s to mark a
considerable development upon what St. Thomas calls material
predication: "cum praedicatum et subiectum re quidem aunt unum et idea,
attamen rat lone disti.iguuntur seaeque mutuo excludunt, e.g. animal itaa
est rationalitas". This is explained ae asserting that rationality
and animality are both found in the same material individual (man).
Introduction.
but that these two constitute two formally different individuals.
Milverley'a statement of esse .tial predication is rather different.
"Praedicatio secundum essentia,! est praedicatio, in qua allqua
essentia, quae adaequate est essentia raaterialis subiecti vel
praedicati, est tarn aubiectuc, quaxa praedicatur;, licet non secundum
fomale subiecti vel praedicati". He defines material essence as a
"concretum se habens per modum denominati" and formal character as an
"abstractions se habena per nodum denominantia". A "concretum" is a
term which may express either a thing or its essence. An "abstracts®"
ie a term which expresses the form af a thing alone. The "modum
denominati" or "raoduns denominafcilis" is the grammatical mode of a
substantive which may be qualified by a denomination; adjective. 'Hie
"modum denorinantis" is the grammatical mode of a denominating
adjective,which may qualify a substantive. 5)« Thus in the predicat¬
ion "Socrates est homo communis", the material essence "humanitas" ie
adequately the material essence of the subject; a "concretum se habene
per modus denominati" is also the predicate. However the dissimilarity
lies in the formal characters of the subject and the predicate: these
are expressed by the adjectives "incommunicable" and "communicable"
respectively, which are "abstracta se habentia per modua denominantis",
more fully determining "humanitas" as for example "Socrates" and
"homo communis".
MUverley stresses the importance of the fact that the material
essence should exhaustively constitute the subject or the predicate
term, for instance "humanitas" exhaustively constitutes or defines
Socrates, but "animalitas", "sensibilitas", "corporalitaa" (all of
5). Srfurt (1972): Grammatics Speculativa p.99 and Mullaly: p.xciii
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which belong to the essence of Socrates) do so to an increasingly
smaller extent. In the other example given, "homo est asinus", both
"homo" and "asinue" share the essence "anircalitas", yet this is not
the essence which exhaustively constitutes a man or an ass.
However it is unlikely that we will merely wish to predicate
things in this material sense. Firstly we will be interested in
essences of individuals, other than the adequate material essence, for
example "aniaality" or "corporality" with respect to Socrates. Secondly
we will be interested in the formal relation between the adequate
essence and the other essences of individuals, that is, of contain¬
ment the one within the other, and, which amounts to the same thing,
in the formal relation between the predicate and subject terms of a
predication, that is of communicable universal to particular. T.irdly
we will be interested in predications involving accidental features of
individuals, like the whiteness of Socrates. While none of these
interests will be served by essential predication, all of them will
be served: by formal predication.
Milverley, as is clear from Question 4 of the Universalis,
believes in an order of being, ranging from Being in general to the
material individuals of the world. Being is embraced by all universale
and is present in all individuals. Beneath Being are universale, of
which the most immediate order constitutes Aristotle's Categories,
which are themselves contained within other universale and which are
communicable to a subset of the individuals, in which Being is present.
Thus Being is present in the set comprising all men and all other
individuals, corporalitv is communicated to a subset of Being, which
comprises men and ao:-e other individuals and humanity is communicated
to a subset of this which comproses men alone. A formal essential
predication, e.g. "X is a YB, where X and Y are the names of essences
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taken in personal supposition (that is as standing for the individuals
to which they are communicated, where X and Y are also subsets of Being
embracing these individuals) asserts firstly that all individuals
contained beneath the subset X are contained beneath the subset Y,
secondly that the relation of the subsets X and Y is that of inferior
to superior in the hierarchy of being and thirdly that any individual
having the essence X will also have the essence Y. That is what I
take to be the meaning of Milverley's statement that "formale
praedicati dicitur de subiecto".
Accidental formal predication has two modes, firstly where it
expresses a simple relation between entities and secondly where it
states that an entity has a certain contingent state of being. An
example of the first mode is "homo differt a me". This is what
Xilverley calls praedicatio secundum habitudinem and what Wyclif also
calls predicatio secundum relacionem. 6). Here the predicate term
"differt a me" signifies one member of a relation and limits the
subject term to simple supposition, that is constrains "homo" to
stand for the universal man "homo communis" and not for all individual
men. The formal character of the predicate is "incommunicable" and
tiiis is what restricts the subject to simple supposition.
An example of the second mode is "homo est albus". This is what
Wyclif among others calls predicatio: secundum motum or predicatio
accidentalis. 7). Her© the predicate "est albus" limits the subject
to personal supposition, that is constrains "homo" to stand for its
supposita, all individual men, and not for the universal per se "homo".
TIere the formal nature of "est alfcua" must be taken as the accident
"communicable" ("albus communis* is "albedo") and this means that what
is predicated of the subject a parte texminorum, is taken as the
6). Wyclif De Stats p.54. 7). Wyclif ibidem
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predicate of the individual supposite, of the subject a parte rei. In
Milverley's words, the subject must be regarded as being mobile.
It is in this light that the two rules of predication given must
be understood. Firstly, that predication secundum raotura is not valid,
where the subject term is a term of second intention, that is,
connoting beyond what is signified the formal nature coaaunicability,
because the predicate tem limits the subject to personal supposition
anyway. Secondly, that predication secundum habitudinem is permiss¬
ible where the subject is a universal so expressed, because the
predicate terra limits the subject to simple supposition only,
C AFTER 1t4 Quarto notandum.
Given tlien a multitude of universale per se and per accidens, we
can determine by the strictures of formal predication the manner in
which they relate to individuals and to one another. But it is
possible to place further restrictions on the type of relationship
into which universale can enter and because we can identify certain
groups of strictures which apply to certain types of universale, we are
in a position to offer a classification of universale according to the
manner in which they may meaningfully be predicated. The names we
give to our classes of predicational strictures are the names we give
to our classes of universale, namely, genus, species, difference,
property and accident.
Every universal other than Being itself is predicated in quid or
in quale, A predication in quid defines of partially defines what a
thing is, what its essence is, that is a universal per se. There are
two modes of predication in quid, generic and specific, and two
corresponding types of universal, genus and species. Genus is the name
given to a universal per se which is communicable to an individual,
where one or more lower-order universale per se are also communicable
to the universal. Thus is expresses part of what it is for that
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individual to be what it is. Species ia the name given to a universal
per se, that is directly communicable to its particular instances,
that is, expresses the whole of what it is for those individuals to
be what they are.
Predication in quale is predication by universale per accidens.
It aeacribea what sort of thing an individual is. The relation of the
universal so predicated may be substantial or accidental. If substan¬
tial, the universal so predicated is either simultaneous with the
species of which it is predicated, that is, contained in its definition,
or immediately posterior to it. If the predication is of the first
type, it is called predication in quale per se primo. This occurs
when difference is predicated of species. Here is expressed the
difference between that species and any other species of tie same order,
that is, contained immediately beneath a certain genus. If the
predication is of the second type, it is called predication in quale
per Be secundo, as when piroperty is predicated of species. If ths
predication is in quale accidentally, the predicate is an accident
per accidens and contingently follows the existence of the individuals
of the species, of which it is predicated, that is, the accident "abest
et adest praeter subiecti corruptionaitH.
O'.AFT H 2 Genus
Milverley defines genus as being a universal predicable in quid
of roa y things differing in species. He proceeds to demonstrate the
sufficiency of this definition by showing that it adequately differ¬
entiates genus from the other four types of universal. However he
then goes on to define an analogical genua which is predicated
"secundum maius et minus" of its particulars. Many mediaeval pnilo-
sophers would have taken issue with this. According to Thomiatic
doctrine, universale are only communicable in a unlvocal sense. The
xxii
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Thomist definition of universal demonstrates this:Munum in multis et
de aultia". If however a universal has one relation to one individual
and another to another, then the notion of universal becomes untenable,
for we clearly have a universal "parti® unuas, parti® diversus". Further,
a genus cannot be equivocally predicated, because it is said to be
predicated in quid of an individual, that is, given the predication by
a universal of an individual, we are in a position to state exactly
what it is for this universal to be itself. If we are still not clear
as to what it is that this individual is, but have to ask further
questions, for instance "How do you mean that?", that is a question
relating to the analogy intended in the predication, the predication
is not in quid, nor in fact in quale and the entity so predicated is
neither a genus nor indeed a universal, as Kilverley has hitherto
defined the®. We are dealing Vn the case of the analogical genus
"accident" with a transcendental, like Being itself, which can fce
neither predicated in quid nor in quale, and Milverley himself is
later to forbid the predication of such entities. Furthermore, when
we say that an accident is predicated of something, ve are stating
that a so-and-so is predicated in the manner of an accident per
accidens. If there is more then one manner of predicating an accident,
then there is more than one class of universal accident, hut according
to Kilverley there is only one class of predicable accident per
accideus.
It could be argued here that Milverley is not speaking of
predicable accident but of predicsraental or Categorial accident.
owever he equates the genera generalisains with the Categories. The
genua generalissiaure, as he states it, is the highest order of entity
that may be meaningfully predicated. Aristotle terms the first
Category as substance and the last nine aa accident, but here again,
following ''liverley'a reasoning, the term "Categorial accident" is a
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transcendental and may not be meaningfully predicated of anything
else.
CHArTfcB 3 Species
Kilverley defines species as a universal "sub genere univoce
praedicabile in quid de individuis". He demonstrates the sufficiency
of the definition and proceeds to define infima and subaltern species •
He next poses the question: "If genus and species are each assumed in
the definition of the other, then they are each better known than the
otherff Porphyry's answer is given that they are correlatives, terms
of second intention, and thus each may be assumed in the definition of
the other. Indeed, nothing assumed in the definition of something else
is better known than that thing, unless the definition be of universale
per se and not per accidens. But hoc commune genus and hoc commune
species are universale per accidens. Milverley elaborates the point
further. Understood in personal supposition, the terms "genus" and
"species" refer to particular universale per se and as such cannot be
used as terms in a definition, whereas taken in simple supposition,
they refer to the universalis per accidens, noc commune genus and hoc
commune species.
However there is one further complication, which again raises the
question of whether universalis per accidens are real in the sense that
universalis per se are so. Milverley states that hoc commune genus and
hoc commune species are "simul in natura". Ockham on the other hand,
whilst agreeing that they are correlatives, says that they are "simul
in intellectu" 8), "intentiones in anima distinctae" 9)»
Further, Milverley himself places a restraint on the predication
"The five universale and the universal universal constitute six
universals". One should therefore also deny the predication "These
three genera and the genus of genus are four genera". As Milverley
8). Ockham Fraedicabilia p.J3» 1.16. 9)« Oc»ha® Praedicabilia p.27-1.16.
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explains, the only feature common to a number of genera per se is
Being in general. The genus of genus is not Being in general, unless
it be so in some transcendental sense. Therefore it has no being, as
we understand this. Why then does Kilverley state that hoc commune
genus and hoc commune species are "simul in natura", the real order?
If he supposes them to be transcender.tals, then the relation in which
hoc commune genus stands to particular genera is not one of communicable
entity to particular, as in formal predication, but only analogous to
this. As in the case of the universal universal it is virtually
restricted to essential predication. For, if we can know intellectually
no entity beyond the order of being, that is, beyond Being in general,
then we cannot know by intellectuation transcendental genus or species,
thus we cannot formally predicate them, as Kilverley himself states
(C. IX, 1.23-27)- The only predication possible is essential predic¬
ation, which does not add to our knowledge of things, Nilverley's
arguments themselves reject formal predication of transcendentals,
therefore the term "hoc commune genus" in simple supposition must
designate, as Ockhaa states, a mental concept or otherwise correspond
to the conventional use of a name,
Kilverley finally notes that a universal per se which is a
subaltern genus can stand in simple supposition specifically or
generically, that is, either as taken as a species with respect to
another subaltern genus or infiaa species immediately beneath it, e.g.
"Animal est species huaana", or as taken as a genus with respect to
its individual supposita, e.g. "Animal est genus animalis". Wyclif
notes this distinction, giving as an example of specific simple
supposition "Animal est species specialissima" and as an example of
generic simple supposition "Animal praedicatur", neither of which
examples are particularly helpful 10).
10). Wyclif Be Logica, p.35*
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CHAPTER 4 Difference
Wilverley defines difference as a universal predic&ble per ae
primo in quale of species and goes on to show the sufficiency, in
that it differentiates difference from all other types of universal.
Difference is both constitutive and divisive, divisive of genus and
constitutive of species, that is, with genus constitutes the definition
of a species. In this sense it is prior to species, for as Kilverley
has already stated (C.3, 11,16-18) "wane pooiturn in definitione
alterius est sirapliciter notior definito...in definitione proprie
dicta data de universalis per se". Difference is also convertible
with species, for to state rationality is to imply humanity. Whether
all species per ae and per accidens have convertible differences is
another matter. Species per accider.e (such as rationality) do noti
this would lead to an infinite number of accidental features of
accidental features. All species per se in the predicamental or
Categorial order do have further convertible differences, but we usually
fall to notice them or name them.
It is further argued that rationality, the Immediate of subst¬
antial difference of the species "man", is not convertible with man,
because it is also predicable of angels arid of the soul, which amounts
to a denial of the fact that rationality is the substantial difference
of man. Milverley offers two answers to this problem. Firstly that
rationality is ®et in every instance of man in the material order,
but that this rationality is not the same sort of rationality found
in angels or the intellective soul. Or secondly that angels are
intellectual, not rational, beings, which means that the objects of
their thought are always essential rather than material and that
because of this they are not capable of rational thought, that is,
thought utilising discursive processes of induction and deduction.
Further, the rational soul is not rational per ae, but only for as
long as it exists with the nuraan body! at death, when it is separated
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from the material body, its thought ie also severed fro® the material
plane and it beccxr.es like the angel, an intellectuals, incapable of
discursive rational thought.
Pfilverley finally considers the question of whether a part of a
definition, i.e. genus or difference, has greater extension than or
ie co-extensive with what is defined. Both parts of the disjunction
are admitted, in that "having greater extension than" is taken as
meaning "being prior to" and "being co-extensive with" is taken as
meaning "being convertible with".
CilAFTEK uj Property
silverley defines property as a universal predicable in quale per
ae secundo of species. It is predicated per se secundo rather than per
se prirao (as is a difference), because a property, unlike a difference,
is not prior to or convertible with a species, but posterior to it
and to the existence of its supposita. It is then shown that because
property and difference are only univocally predicable of substantial
species, that is, species per se, they may only be properly predicated
of substances. If they are predicated of species per accidens, this
must be done analogically, which however distorts the notion of
predicability or coomunicability hitherto given, that is, that what
is predicable should be present in all particulars of a species to
the same extent. So the proble® of the exact nature of the universal
per accidens again arises, for, given that we cannot ascribe a
substantial existence to them, we are forced to decide whether they
are transcendental Ideas or merely conceptual entities.
Finally the question is raised as to whether a property (a
universal per accidens) can be asserted of another property. The
answer is that It cannot be, as properties are only in a Category of
Being by virtue of the fact that they are predicable of substances.
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C; "AFTER 6 Oategorlal Accident
Oategorial accident in ita general sense is an entity inhering
in a subject, but not as part of that subject* Such inherence is
subjective. However, although accident in this sense might be
expected to include difference, that is, substantial or immediate
difference, Milverley states that this is not so. The immediate-
difference of man, i.e. that he is rational, is an objective part of
him, in that the universal "rationality", which uniquely defines man,
is a substantial part of him* Yet because this difference implies
a relation between man and non-man, it would seem that to admit
difference as an objective part of the substance of man is to allow
an objective or substantial existence to a relation* This is perhaps
why St* Thomas prefers to say that difference is predicated essentially
and adjectivally "in quale quid", rather than merely "in quale".
Secondly Milverley distinguishes the primary subject in which an
accident inheres and upon which it is immediatel; dependent and the
secondary subject in which it mediately inheres by virtue of its
inherence in the primary subject. For instance, the quantity of
Socrates inheres in the matter of Socrates, which is its primary
subject and only by virtue of this primary inherence does it inhere
in Socrates himself*
CKAFTKR 7 Predicable Accident
Fredicable accident ia defined as a universal predicable of
substance in quale per accidens. According to Milverley, accident
may be absolute or relative. However the definition of "predicable"
is that it ia not only the name given to a class of universale, but
also a particular manner in which such universale are predicated,
which differentiates this class from any other class uf universal*
Further any universal in any predicable class must be predicated in
quale or in quid, otherwise it would still leave the determination of
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what a thing is or what sort of thing it is Incomplete. Therefore
universals must be predicated univocally.
Kilverley, however, tells us that absolute accidents make no
reference in predication other than to the subject and that relative
accidents do refer to something else other than the subject. In his
general account of accidents, Milverley states that accidents inhere
in subjects "non taaquara pars" and that universal difference, that is,
substantial difference, does not do so. 1 do not wish to equate
specific difference with the difference of material individuals, but
it does not seem likely that the difference between Socrates and Plato
can be said to inhere in Socrates or Plato or that this difference
can be predicated of Socrates without being predicated simultaneously
of Plato. Without going any deeper into the problems of relations,
it does seem that Milverley'e account of accident involves not one
but at least two modes of predication and that we have here not one,
but at least two classes of universals per accides. The attempt to
include all such aocidental predioationo under the some heading means
that the predicable accident per acciciens is at one further stage of
abstraction at least than any of the other four predicables.
Milverley goes on to discuss separable and inseparable accidents.
Inseparable accidents are such as may not be absent from the subject
In which they inhere, without that subject ceasing to be what it is.
For instance, a snub-nose is such because it has a certain shape.
Were it to lose that snubnesa, it would probably cease to be a nose
at all. A separable accident is "quod abeat et adest praeter subiecti
corruptionem", that is can be absent from or present in an individual
without prejudicing that individual's continued existence. Some
species of accidents may be said to be both separable and inseparable.
For instance there can be black men, white men, red men, yellow men,
black cats, white cats, etc. and each of the accidents black, white etc.
xxix
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cannot by its absence stop & man or a cat being wnat it is. However
there are black crows but no red, green or pinlf crows, and if a crow
ceased to be black, it is very unlikely that we would consider it to
be a crow at all. So blackness is separable secundum specier., but
inseparable secundum individuum, where the individual is a crow.
CliAFTER 8 Definition
Milverley here gives two modes of definition: one in which the
defined term is a term of first intention and here the definition
given applies to each and every individual contained under the term,
when it is taken in personal supposition, the other in which the term
defined is a term of second intention and the definition applies to
any universe.la contained under the term. And it is in this second
sense that the definitions given of the five predicable are to be
understood.
CHAPTER 9 First Doubt
Kilverley here denies the argument that there is an infinite
succession of universale. For example, the five universale (predic-
ables) are all universal, therefore a sixth universal is communicable
to them} this sixth universal and the five universale are all
universal, therefore a seventh universal is communicable to then..
Milverley states that there is no class of universal which is more
universal than the five classes of predicable, unless it be Being
itself, which is the essence common to all existent individuals, but
which is never predicated of them. So Milverley admits tha* the
predication "The five universale and the universal universal are six
universale" la valid, but only in an essential sense, that is so
long as we are talking of material being, not formal being. In this
sense the universal universal, Being, is communicated to itself, 'teat
is, simply or by identity and to the five predicable classes personally,
as a superior to inferiors. However there can be no formal sense, in
XXX
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which "the five univereals and the universal universal are six
universale" is true. They are universale of different orderei tee
five universale are objects of second intention or of ultimate
abstraction, the universal universal is transcendental.
The second case is similar. "Socrates" and "homo communis" are,
as we have see ., found to have the same material essence, but there is
no formal identity between the two, as the latter connotes a universal
nature, whereas the former does not. To state that "Socrates and
man in general are two men" is false, because they are neither two
material men, nor two formal men. Similarly to predicate "homo"
formally of "homo communis" is to assert an identity between the form
of "homo" (indeterminate) and the form of "homo communis" (communic¬
able), which is not true.
Three further problems are raised. Firstly that universale are
numerically infinite, following boethius* statement that the species
of numbers and figures are infinite. Secondly that the species of
animals are infinite, because the offspring of two animals of two
different species is of a third different species and the offspring of
this animal and of some animal of an other species is of another
species yet. Thirdly that the hu an species is not an infiraa species,
because it has two lower-order species per se contained beneath it,
that is, man in general and woman in general. Therefore no infima
species in the animal which has male and female members is an infima
species.
The reply to the first question is that an infinite number of
species per acciaens is possible, but to the second question, he
replies that species of substances and thus of animals are not
infinite. In the case of animals, the offspring of two animals of
different species would itself be incapable of further reproduction.
Thirdly Milverley replies that men and women are not species per se
Introduction.
in the human species, because a hermaphrodite is both male and female.
CHAPTER 10 Second Doubt
The second question concerns the possibility that the universal
is particular and two arguments are put forward in favour of this view.
Firstly thus: every man runs, but something which is a man, does not
run (namely man in general), therefore it is not true to say that
every man runs. 'Ihis, according to the argument, is supposed to be
an expositorial syllogism. Eut Milverley denies this. An
expositorial syllogism is one in which the middle tens (here "something
which is a man") ha« personal supposition (that is, supposits for an
individual man). Man in general is an individual only in a formal
sense, thus the minor premies should read "something which is formally
a man does not run", in which case it would not only be false, but
the whole syllogism would be invalid, because there would then be no
middle term.
And secondly thus: there are no such things as formal
characteristics of quantity. Milverley quotes the following rule:
given two accidents with opposite denotations, the first of which is
loxmally predicated of some entity taken in its universal sense, and
the second of which is formally predicated of the same entity taken
in its particular sense, then we allow that we may essentially
predicate the second characteristic of the first and the fisst
characteristic of the second. For example, man in general is formally
communicable and indivisible. Man in particular is formally singular
and an indivisible thing is divisible. Thus because a singular entity
may be given the formal characteristics of a universal and a
universal may be denied the formal characteristics of a universal, we
are forced to deny that there is any difference between universal and
particular entities.
Milverley denies this argument. He accepts the rule given, but
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denies that a universal entity may be denied its formal characteristics*
because he denies that a predication like "res quanta est non quanta"
is in any sense a formal predication. He further denies that Socrates
is essentially different from man, but conceaes that he is so formally*
and denies that Socrates is either essentially or formally different
from Socrates.
OHAITKK 11 Third Doubt
F<ilverley next considers whether predications of the form "man
in general runs" are permissible. Two arguments are given to show
that they are. Firstly that universal accidents like "currere" take
common entities as subjects ar.d not singular ones. Thus they
primarily denote such common entities* Therefore the predication
"homo communis currit" primarily signifies man in general running*
because the entity primarily denoted by the predicate is man in general.
Secondly it is argued that "homo currit" signifies that the entity man
in general is running* because (a) "homo" signifies man in general and
(b) "currit" signifies running. And thus the two predications "homo
currit" and "homo communis currit" are convertible, because they both
signify the serne thing.
Milverley answers the first part of the argument by distinguishing
between the two sorts of subject that universal accidents may take.
They take as subjects "quo ad dependentiaa" universal entities and as
subjects "quo ad denominations^" singular entities. Thus It is true
to state that such universal entities take as their subjects universal
entities, but not that they primarily denote such entities, because
«
with, respect to denomination their subjects must be singular entities.
" u" rlG'' ^ in a position to answer the argument. "Currit"
is the sort of predicate that will primarily denote a singular entity,
that is* will imply tx at the subject of the predication in which it
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occurs must be taken in its mobile sens , that is as standing in
personal supposition, and only secondarily denotes a universal entity.
Thus "homo" must signify primarily individual men and only secondarily
ran in general. "Homo communis" however primarily signifies man in
general and "homo communis currit", if it is to be accepted as a valid
predication at all in the light of the rule Kilverley gives in the
chapter on formal predication, will primarily signify man in general
running. Therefore "homo currit" and "homo communis currit" are not
convertible, because the objects of their primary signification differ.
CRATTfR 12 Fourth Doubt
Finally Hilverley raises the question of whether the number of
individuals to which a species is communicated is the measure of its
communicability. If this were so, an infiasa species like the species
of points could be said to be more communicable than certain subaltern
genera like the genus animal. Milverley denies that this is so and
states that the hierarchy of universale in being is constituted
according to the distance between any universal being and individual
being. All species equidistant from individual being are thus equally
communicable. He distinguishes telative eomnmnicability, which is
determined by the number of individuals to which a universal is
communicated at any one time and avsolute communicability, which is
determined by the distance of a universal entity from individual being.
The latter is an iramutable relation, the former is contingent upon
the number of individuals of a species that happen to exist at any one
time.
He allows that all infima species are equally species and equally
communicable and thus the species "species" is communicated univocally
and equally of species in all categories of being. However the species
of species is itself an accidental universal ad is apparently itself
outside the order of being as we know it. Whether or not its comjaunic-
ability is absolute, and if so, how it can be said to relate to indiv¬
idual being, is not resolved.
xxx iv
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bale, J.l Scriptoruaj illuetriiua moioris Brytanniae catalogue (Basel, 1559).
Cox<5, H.O.i Index Codicua K3S in Collegia aulieque Oxoniensibus hodie
adaerv<^toruK, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1632).
/jsden, A.B.l A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford
3 vols. (Oxford, 1997-9).
Leland, J.i Be rebus Britannicia Collectanea, 6 vols. (London, 1774)
.Mullally, J.P.i The Susamlas Logicales of Peter of Spain (Notre Dane,
Indiana 1943).
Ockhan, V.t Lxpoaitionis in libroa artis logioae proeteiunt et Pxpoaitio
s
in librua Porphirii Be Praedicabilibus, ed. E.A.Moody
(New York, 1965)
Pantin, W.A. i Canterbury College, Oxford, 5 vols. (Oxford History Society
Oxford, 1947,1.
Plassaann, H.K.i Die Schule dea h. Thomas v. Aquino, 1er Hdrsaal,
Die Philosophie des h. Thomas, 1er Theilt Logik,
(Soest, 1638).
Tanner, T.i Bibliotheca Britajonico-Hibernica, (London, 1746)
Thomas of Erfurti Graramatica Speculativet An e: tion with translation
and commentary by G.L. Luraill-ilall, (Loudon, 1972).
Wood, A.i Historia et antiquit_tca Univeraitatie Oxoniensie, (Oxford, 1674).
Wyclif, J.i -Tactatus Be Logics., Vol.1, ed. M.H.Baiewicki (London, 1893).
* l " * " , Vol.11, ed. M.H.Bsiewicki (London, 1896).
" i Be liite, ed. H.E.Baiewicki (London, 19^9).






Pro superficial! notitia quinque universalia est primo notandum,
quod triplex est universale, quantum spectat ad propositus. Aliquod
enim est universale causatione, quod est res nsulta causansi et sic
est beus maxime universalis. Aliquod est universale repraesentatione,
5 quod est signuiri multa siyiana, ut iste terminus "homo": et tale universale
non dicitur universale nisi aequivoce, quia aignificat universale
reale: sicut homo pictus non dicitur homo nisi quia si^num veri
hominis. Tertiuir. est universale reale sive praedicatione, quod est
naturu oommunicabilis pluribus eesantiis, ita quod idem sit aicere
10 "conmunicabile" et "aptum natusn cotnrounicari'1, modo quo species
humana communicatur axils suppositis, quia est realiter ilia. Et sic,
si foret aliqua species, cuius non posset esse nisi unicum individuum,
adhuc ilia esset communicabilis, licet non posset coramunicari, siout
in casu: aliquie homo est risibilis, qui non posset riderc, eo quod
15 universalitas vel communicabilitae est quasi proprietas universalis,
sicut risibilitas respectu hominis. Kt additur in description®
"pluribus essentiis", quia a protabili, licet anima intellectiva
singularis sit communicabilis memoriae, ration! et voluntati, tamen
ilia non est formaliter imiveraale, cum ilia tree non sunt tree
20 esoentiae, sed una et eadeia essentia anira&e intellectivae.
Cap. 1,1: 1. est prirao sciendum C, primo est nctandum D, est om.E.
3. enim om.C, est enim B / causans multa B. 4. Bous est aaxiae universale
BD, est Beus maxirae universalis AE, I)eua est raaximus universalis C /
aliquod eat (enim) add.CD. 6. dicitur CD / aequivoce (scilicet) add.CDE /
quia) quod C. '[, sicut) sic C / quia (est) add.A. 8. sed tertium BCD.
9. natura (simplex) add.B / iden) tantum C / dicere ora.BCE. 10. et)
sicut C, id est D / comraunicare C, comuiunicare esse B / modo quo) sicut D.
11. ilia (id est essentialiter ilia) aad.B. 12. foret) esaet AC /
individuum (sicut species Fhoenicis) add.D. 13* ilia ora. C / licet)
qusmvis C. 14# in casu chs.B / aliquie om.D / est) dicitur D /





In acquiring a preliminary knowledge of the five universale, the
first thing to be noted is that the universal is of three types, as far
as we are concerned here. There is a universal of causation, which is
a thing causing many things. There is a universal by representation,
which is a sign signifying many things, for instance the term "man".
Such a sign is not said to be a universal except in an equivocal sense,
in that it signifies a real universal* for example, a painting of a
man cannot be said to be a man except in the sense of being a sign for
a real man. The third type is the real or predicated universal, which
is an entity, that can be communicated to several essences (,in the
sense that it means the same to speak of something being common to and
of something being naturally fitted to being communicated), in the way
that the human species is communicated to its supposita, because in a
real sense it is them. And thus if there were a species of which there
could only be one member, it would still retain its ability to be common,
although it could not be communicated (for example, in the case of a
man, capable of laughter, yet unable to laugh), because universality
or communicabillty is as it were a property of the universal, as
is an ability to laugh of man. The phrase "to several essences"
is added to the description, because it is probable that although
a singular intellective soul is common to memory, reason and will,
it is not however a universal as we should define it, as these three
are not three essences, but one and the same essence of the intellective
soul.
(cont.) / descriptione) definitions C. 18. rationi, memoriae B,
19* ilia om.A / forraaliter universalis D£, universalis formaliter B,
formaliter universale C./ tres post ilia om.A / tree post sunt om.E.





Secundo notandum est quod universale praedicatione aliquando
accipitur pro ipsa natura universali, ut ilia actualiter concipitur
vel est coraprehensibilia ab intellectu. Et sic dependet ab anima, quia
ille coriceptus vel comprehensibilitas dependet ab anima. Et isto modo
^ dicit Commentator Tertio De Anima, quod universale non est complete extra
ar.imam et quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus: et isto
modo intelliguntur quotquot auctoritates sonantes, quod univeraalia non
sunt extra animam.(l) Alio aodo sumitur universale pro ilia natura,
cui inest universalitas et ut sic significatur per terminum concretum
10 priraae intentionis vel per terminum abatractum, ut homo, humanitas.
Sed tertio modo sumitur universale pro ipsa natura, ut est universalis,
aive pro composito per accidens ex natura et universalitate. Et sic
significatur per terrainum secundae intentionis, ut homo communis, species
humana, genus animalis. Kt universale sic dictum, sicut et secundo
15 modo, est complete extra animam. Nullum tamen universale isto tertio
modo est substantia, sed compositum per accidens ex natura et
universalitate, sicut "album" in supposition® simplici coraponitur
ex substantia et albedine. Et de tali universali intelliguutur
quotquot textus sonantes, quod universalia non sunt substantiae.(2)
20 Ex quo patet, quod aliquod est universale per se, scilicet natura
simplex, cui inest universalitas, distinguendo simplex contra
aggregatum per accidens, quale universale oot humanitas. Et aliquod
est universale per accidens, scilicet conpoaitum per accidens ex
natura universali et una proprietate sibi accidental!, ut hoc commune
25 album, hoc commune universale.
C.1,2: 1. est om.CE / aliquando ora.C. 2. accipitur) sumitur C /
ipsa cms.A / universale C / ipsa BC / concipiatur A. 3» vel) ut ilia C,
4. iste B / quia ille — ab anima om.E. 7. sonantes) quae sonant CJDE,
(quae ponunt) add.A. 7-8. quod universale non est extra animam A.
8. ilia) ipsa CI)E. 10. abstractum (primae intentionis) add.A / ut)
prout CE. 11. est universale BC. 12. ex (ilia) add.C / et (ilia)




The second thing to note is that the predicated universal is
sometimes understood as the universal entity, which is conceived or
is comprehensible actually to the intellect. And thus it is dependent
upon the mind. And this is the aeuae that the Commentator intends when
he says in the Third Book of the Be Anioa, that the universal is
not wholly extramental and that the intellect fabricates universality
in things. And in this sense are to be understood a number of author¬
ities who state that universale do not exist outside the mind.
Secondly the universal is used to mean the entity in which a
communicable nature inheres and whiou is thus signified by a concrete
terra of first intention or by an abstract term, e.g. by "man" or
"humanity". However thirdly the universal is used to mean the entity
itaelfwhich is universal, or a composite per accidens of the entity
and universality. And this is thus signified by a terra of second in¬
tention, e.g. "man in ge eral", "the species man", "the genus animal".
And a universal of this and of the second type is wholly extramental.
However no universal of this third type is a substance, but rather
a composite of an entity and universality, in the way that "white thing"
understood in simple supposition is composed of substance and
whiteness. And in respect of this kind of universal are to be
understood a number of texts which state that universals are not sub¬
stances. It is apparent from this that there is a universal per se,
namely a simple entity, in which universality exists (contrasting
simple to aggregate per accidens) and humanity is such a universal.
And there is a universal per accidens, namely a composite per accidens
of a universal entity and a property accidental to it, e.g. white
thing in general, universal in general,
(cont.) 15-16. taaen universale isto modo non est substantia B.
18. albedine) accidente A / universal!) universalitate BC. 22.
aggregaturo) aggregationem A / accidens (ex nature universal! et una pro-
prietate sibi accidentale, ut hoc commune album, hoc commune uni¬




Tertio notanda est distinctio praedicationis. Aliqua enim est
praedicatio a parte rei, aliqua a parte terrainorum. Praedicari a
parte rei est realiter esse, sicut universale praedicatur de suo
inferiori, vel realiter inesse, sicut accidens praedicatur de suo
5 subiecto. Praedicatio a parte terminorum non est praedicatio proprie,
nisi quia ai&ixm praedicationis a parte rei*
Praedicatio a parte rei, quantum pertinet ad propositum ,
est duplex. Aliqua enim est praedicatio secundum esaentiam et aliqua
est praedicatio formalis.
10 Praedicatio secundum essentiara est praedicatio, in qua aliqua
essentia, quae adaequate est essentia material is subiecti vel
praedicati, est tam subiectum quam praedicatum, licet non secundum
formal© subiecti vel praedicati: ut hie: "Socrates est homo communis"!
iota essentia, quae adaequate est essentia subiecti, scilicet humanitas,
15 cat tam subiectum quam praedicatum, sed non secundum formale praedicati,
quod est coramunicabilitaa. Voco autem essentiaa materialman subiecti
vel praedicati concretum se habens per modum denominati, et formale
abatrueturn se habens per modum denooinar.tis. Exemplum in ilia
praedicatione: "bocrates est homo communis"! hotao est essentia
20 materialis et conanunic&bilitas est formale praedicati. Fx quo patet,
quod non est praedicatio secundum essentiam "homo est asinus", licet
eadera essentia sit subiectum et proedicatun, scilicet genus animalis,
q\:ia illud genus non est adaequate material© subiecti nec praedicati.
Praedicatio secundum esoentiam a parte teminorum eat praedicatio
25 primarie aignificans talem praedicationem a parte rei.
C.I,3i 1. aliqua est enim A. 2. rei (et aliqua) add.CD.3. a parte
rei om.A / realiter esse vel realiter inesse A. 3-4. inferiori vel
realiter BD, inferiori realiter A, singular! et realiter C. 5*
proprie praedicatio AC. 6. signum praedicationis ACE, significat
praedicationem B, significat praedicationea 1). 7. pertinet ABD,
spectat C. 8. aliqua enim est AC, aliqua est enia BD, aliqua est
can. enim E / est praedicatio oss.C / praedicatio enim secundum C.
14. ista BCE, ilia AD / est adaequate C / scilicet BCDE, videlicet A,
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3.
The third point to note is a distinction in predication. There is
on one hand predication a parte rei and on the other predication a
parte teiroinorum. To be predicated a parte rei is to exist really,
as when a universal ie predicated of its inferiors, or to really
inhere, as when an accident is predicated of its subject. Predication
a parte terrainorum is not strictly predication unless it be a sign
standing for a predication a parte rei.
Predication a parte rei is for our purposes twofold. One kind is
essential predication and the other formal predication.
Essential predication a parte rei is predication, in which an
essence which exhaustively constitutes the material essence of the
subject or predicate is both subject and predicate, albeit not as far
as the formal nature of the subject or predicate is concerned. For
instance in this case "Socrates is man in general", that essence which
exhaustively constitutes the essence of the subject, namely humanity,
is both subject and predicate, but not with respect to the formal
nature of the predicate, which is coramunicability. Thus I consider the
material essence of the subject or the predicate to be a concrete
thing constituted in the manner of something denominable and the
formal nature to be an abstract thing constituted in the manner of
something which denominates. An example of this predication is "Socrates
is man in general". Man is the material essence and coramunicability the
formal nature of the predicate. From this it is clear that "man is an
ass" is not essential predication, although the same essence is both
subject and predicate, i.e. the genus animal, since this genus does not
exhaustively constitute the material nature of the subject or the
predicate. Essential predication a parte terminorum is predication
primarily signifying a corresponding predication a parte rei.
(*ont.) Socrates ABE, humanitas 6, communicabilitas C. 15. praedicati
ABBE, praedicatura C. 16. quod BCD, quae A / autero AKD, eniai C. 17#
per modum abstractor, et formale denominati B / determinati B / et (voco)
add.C. 18. deterainantis B. 18-19. in ilia praedlcatione A (over)
(cont) in iato praedicato ED, in tali praedicatione C. 19. Socrates
ABD, ut homo C. 19-20, essentia materially subiecti est homo C,
20, est om.C, 21, quod (hoc) add,A, 22, eades essentia ABDE, idem C,
23. scilicet ABDE, quia C.
(7) Cap.I Proemium.
3.
Praedicatio formalis est praedicatio, in qua formale praedicati
dicitur de subiecto: et ilia est duplex. Quia aut formale praedicati
formaliter essentialiter dicitur de subiecto, et sic dicitur praedicatio
formalis essentialis, ut "homo est animal", ubi animalitas formaliter
30 praedicatur de homine. Et generaliter quandocumque per se superius
praedicatur de suo inferior! est praedicatio talis. Aut formale
praedicati pracdioatur formaliter accidentaliter de suo subiecto et
time dicitur praedicatio formalis accidentalis, ut "homo est albus".
Et talis est duplex. Quia aut est ita, quod illud formale praedicati
35 est accidens implicans suum subiectum primum esse per se mobile,
cuiusmodi sunt albedo, nigredo, caliditas et caetera. Et tunc
neganda est huiusmodi praedicatio de universalibuc in terminiu
secundae intentionis vel ultimatae abstractionis: ut negandum est, quod
homo communis currit vel quod humanitas est alba. Vel est ita, quod form-
40 ale praedicati est accidens non implicans suum subiectum primum esse
per se mobile, cuiusmodi sunt causare, differre et caetera. Et talis
dicitur praedicatio secundum habitudinem. Et concedenda est praedicatio
de universalibus in terminis secundae intentionis, ut "homo communis
causat" et "genus animalis differt a me".
45 Praedicatio formalis a parte terminorum est praedicatio signi-
ficans huiusmodi praedicationem a parte rei. Et specialiter contingit
praedicatio formalis accide talis a parte terminorum, quando praedieatur
verbum adiectivum vel nomen adiectivum aignificano accidens adiective
tentum, ut homo ridet, homo est risibiliB. Et additur iste terminus
26. praedicatio BD, om.C, ilia. 27. subiecto (formalis) add.D,
formaliter) add. E / ilia BCDE, talisA. 28. forraaliter (et) add.A /
dicitur de subiecto om.B, de subiecto dicitur G / sic ABD, tunc CE /
praedicatio om.ABC. 28-29. et sic dicitur praedicatio formalis
essentialis om.B. 29. essentialis om.C / ubi ABD, ibi CE. 30*
de homine praedicatur A / generaliter AHDE, communiter C / quando C /
per se 6m.AC. 31* talis praedicatio CD / est praedicatio talis om.E.
32. praedicatur ADE, affirmatur B, dicitur C / suo om.CDE. 33» et
sic dicitur B, et dicitur tunc A, et tunc dicitur CDE / praedicatio om.B,
34. et om.A / talis (praedicatio) add.C / est duplex ACDE, dicitur
dupliciter B / ita est C / praedicati om.ABC. 36. caliditas (frigiditas)
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Formal predication is predication, in which the formal nature of the
predicate is asserted of the subject. And this is of two types.
Either the formal nature of the predicate is formally and essentially
asserted of the subjects and this called formal essential predication,
as for instance "iaan is an animal", where animal ity is formally
predicated of man. And such predication generally occurs whenever a
superior per se is predicated of one of its inferiors. Or the formal
nature of the predicate is predicated formally and accidentally of
its subject and this is called formal accidental predication, e.g.
"man is white". And this is of two types. For either it is such,
where the formal nature of the predicate is an accident implying
that its immediate subject is per se mobile * whiteness, blackness, heat
etc. are of this kind. Such predication of universale expressed as terms
of second intention or of ultimate abstraction should thus be denied:
e.g. it should be denied that man in general runs or that humanity is
white. Or it is such where the formal nature of the predicate is an
accident, which does not imply that its immediate s\ibject is per se
mobile and of this kind are verbs of causing, differing etc.. And
this is called predication according to habitude. And edoh predication
of universals expressed as terms of second intention may be permitted,
e.g. "man in general causes" and "the genus animal differs from me".
Formal predication a parte terminorum is predication signifying
a corresponding predication a parte rei. A particular case is formal
a..cMental predication a parte terminorum, when a paronyaous verb,
adjective or noun signifying a paronymous accident is predicated,
e.g. a man laughs, a man is capable of laughter. And the rhrase
add.C 57. huiusaodi AB1)E, ilia C / de orn.b / in ots.E. J9* *el quod
om.C. 40. est accidens ora.C / primum om.A. 41, differre, cai.sare C /
et c.aetera ADE, om.C, et huiusmodi B. 42. pr&edicatio om.E. 42-45*
et concedendum est in universalibue et in^termlnis aecundae
intentionis C, et concedenda est in terminis seoundae intentionis de
universallbua JO, 43* in terminis om.B / cum tert.inis A. 44* causat (me)
add.B / et om.B. 46-47* praedicatio forsalisaceidentalis a parte
terminoruia est B, 47* praedicatio om.C 48* nomen om.A / vel A3DE, sive C /
significans accidens adiective tentum om.C
(9)
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50 "adiective tenturn1} quia tale adiectivua in neuter© &enere out etantiv&to
prae<iic&tui- de universal i in praedicat lone seeundua essentiam* ut




Quarto notandus pro suffieientia istoruc? quir.que universeHub, quod
sufficient is corura capitur penes modoa praedieandi universalis. Has
si universale citra ens praecic&tur, aut praedicatur do individuo
in quid vel in quale. Si in quid, aut inter ipsuas et individuua est
5 universale per ee medium. Et tunc est genus* sicut anirtal praedicatur
de Socrate, quia inter ,enus animal is et Socrates? est universale per
ae medium, scilicet species humar.a. /.ut inter ipsum et individuals non
eat universale per se medium. Et tunc est species, quia species humana.
Si in quale, aut in quale substantial® et sic eat differentia
10 substantialis, quae praedicatur per se primo de specie, sicut ratio-
nalitas dicitur de hossine. Aut in quale accidentale: et hoc dupliciter.
Quia, aut lllud immediate et convertibiliter coasequitur species
secundum jrr&dus specie!, et sic est proprium, quod praedicatur per
se secundo de specie* sicut risibilitas de nomine. Aut praedicatur in
13 quale accidentals non sic: et sic est scolders per accidens.
Et sic per istos qui-.que aodos patet, quod quir.que sunt modi
universal iua, et quod osne univer sale citra ens consaunissiisuB continetux
sub aliquo illorum, sed ens commune non* ut patet Capitulo He
Specie, quia nec praedicatur in quid nee in quale. Kec propter ilium
20 senaum est ccncedenduai, quod tantun qui que sunt universalis, quia
49-!>0, ut homo ridet — "adiective ten turn" or.Ac. 5* • ut ABBE, sicut C.
0.1,4*1. notandua (est) add.CS / pro — universallum om.B6. 2. eorun
AK, istoruEi quinque uriiversaliuE 3, istorure an ivers, ilium C, ietorum D.
3. aliquod universale BD / universalis E / citra ens om.3 / praedica-
bitur C / in quid de individuo B. 4. aut B / si (autea) add.E / quid
(tunc) ada.it / et (auua) add.O / (inter) lndividuum add.E. 5» tune ABM,
sic C / quia ABBE, sicut I). 7. scilicet specie* human* om.E. 7-B»
X aut inter ipsum individuua universale per se X add.»&.£, (X et sic
est species specialiseiaa sicut species huaana X ) in raoura E.
3. species quia om.C / quia A E, sicut BB. 9. substantiale (aut in
(10)
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"paro..yBsously" is introduced, because a paronvmous adjective
expressed as a neuter noun may be predicated of a universal in essential
predication* for example it is admitted that man in general is something:
capable of laughter, because man in particular is capable of laughter.
The fourth thing to note as far as the sufficiency of these five
universale is concerned ia that their sufficiency is comprised with
reference to the ways of predicating universals. For if any universal
other than Being be predicated, it is predicated either in quid or in
quale of an individual. If it is predicated in quid, then either
there is between this universal and the individual an intermediate
universal per se. And then the predicated universal is a genua* as
for example when animal is predicated of Socrates, since there is an
intermediate universal between the genus animal and Socrates, namely
the species man. Or there may be no such intermediate universal per se
between the universal and the individual* then this is a species, for
instance the species man.
If it is predicated in quale, it is either predicated in quale
substantially* and it is a substantial difference, which is predicated
per se in the first sense, as for example rationality is of man. Or
it is predicated in quale accidentally* and this may be done in two
ways. For either it is immediately and convertibly posterior to the
species, according to the degree of the species* and thus is a property
which is predicated of species per se in the second sense, as is an
ability to laugh of man. Or the universal may be predicated in quale
accidentally, but not in this ways and this is an accident per accidens.
And it ia clear free these five methods of predication that there
are five classes of universal and that every universal except Being in
its most general sense belongs to one of these classes, however Being
in general does not, as is clear fro® the Copter on Specits, as it is
predicated neither in quid nor in quale, feithei* should one admit
following this interpretation that there are only five universala,
(cont#) quale accidentals. Si in quale aubatantiale) add.A. 11.
et om.A. 11. dlcitur AD, praedicatur BE, om.C. 12. illud om.D,
iste E / convertibiliter ACDK, coneequenter B. 13» sic oo.C.
15* non eic ora.C, (de specie) add.ii, (et immediate consequens speciea
secundum gradum speciei) add.ag.B. 16. per quinque illos B / modi BCBE,
species A / 17* universal iun (quidea praedicatur de se secundo de
specie) add.C / et ACBE, aut B / cocrunissimua om.BCBE. 18. istorum G
/ sed ACDE, et B. 19* nec BCDE, nor, A / latum B. 20. sensua ABDE,
secundum C.
Cap.I Froemium
sive exponitur gratia pluralitas sive gratia aliet&tis, patet
manifests faleit&s illiua. Isieo, si esset concedendum, quod tart turn
quinque sunt universalis, quia £antuin quinque sunt tales modi praedicandi
secundum genus, per ideas esset concedendum, quod tan turn duo sunt univ-
25 eraalia, quia tanturn duo sunt asodi praedicandi priai universalis,
scilicet praedicari in quid et in quale, &t si allecetur pro
auctorit&te, quod tanturn quinque sunt universalis, dicitur, quod ilia
exesplativa non habentur in textu Porphirii, Boetii nec Ariatotelis.
Praedicatio per se primo est quando per se superius praedicatur
50 de suo per se inferiori: sicut quando genus vel differentia
praedicatur de sua specie, ut per se homo est animal et rationalis.
Praedicatio per se seeundo est quando praedicatur proprium de eo,
cuius est propria®: ut per se secundo homo est rioibilis. Ex
praedictis infertur, quod ides praedicatur in quid et in quale de
35 divers is s sicut color praedicatur de albedine in quid et in quale de
homine. Et sic idem eat accidens et genus respectu diveraorum: ut
risibilitaa est propriua respectu horainis et species respectu
risibilitatura singularium.
Praedicari in quid est praedicari de aliquo certificando
40 foaefttionen quaerentea "Quid est illud?": sicut animal praedicatur de
homine, quia quaerendo "Quid est homo?" convenienter reapondetur quod
est animal. Praedicari in quale est praedicari de aliquo certiflcando
quaestionem quaerentem "Quale est illudY", sicut qualiter rlsibilitas
et albedo praedicantur de homine. His tamen est notandum quod
43 universale per accidens non praedicatur in quid nisi de entibus per
21. sive ABBE, si C / exponitur AB, exponatur BC', exposition! D /
alietatis (statis) add.C / ratebit BCJ3E, patet.A. 22. asaifeete om.K /
illlus om.CS. 23* modi tales E. 26. praedicari AS, praedicatum B,
praedicare C / in quid et oai.C / et (praedicari) add.SE,(praedicatum)
add.B / allegetar ABS, allegatur CE. 27* auctoritate ABBE, antecedente C.
28. exeiaplativa ACBE, existentia £» 29* primo est om.B. 56. de per ee
suo S / per se om.B / sicut quando ABB. 31 • «t) C. 33* secundo o».B.
(12)
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since whether this statement is interpreted in terms of plurality or
in terras of diversity, the fact that it is false is still manifestly
clear. Indeed, if it were to be admitted that there axe only five
universale because there are only five such methods of predication
with respect to genus, then on this basis it should be granted that
there are only two universale, because there are only two ways of
predicating the first universal, vis. in quid and in quale. And if
one adduces as authoritative the view that there are only five
univers&ls, the reply is that this has no precedent in the text of
Porphyry, Boethiue or Aristotle.
Predication per se in its first sense occurs when a per se
superior is predicated of its inferior, as when a genus or a
difference is predicated of its species> for example man is per se an
animal and rational. Predication per se in ita second sense occurs
when a property is predicated of that of which it is a property,
for example man is per ae secundo able to laugh. It is inferred from
the foregoing that the same thing can be predicated in quid and in
quale of different things, as when colour is predicated of whiteness
in quid and of man in quale. And by the same token, as the same thing
is an accident and a genus in respect of different things, so the same
thing can be both a property and a species in respect of different
things. For example the ability to laugh is a property in respect of
man and a species in respect of particular abilities to laugh.
To be predicated in quid is to be predicated of something
answering the question "What is that thing?", for example animal is
predicated of man, because it is correct to reply to the question
"What is man?" that he is an animal. To be predicated in quale is to
be predicated of something answering the question "What sort of thing
is that?", for example in this way an ability to laugh and whiteness
are predicated of man. however at this point we must note that a
universal per accidens is predicated in quid only of entities per
(cont.) 35* in quid de albedine 1)2. 36. et sic) tunc C / respec tu
diversorum om.CD / ut) sicut D. 37* reapectu oa.C£ / respectu
(diveraorum) add.C. 38. riaibilitatis sinsularia B. 39* praedieare C /
de aliquo pr&edicari B / praedicare C / certif icando) certam aigr.i-
ficando C. 40. quaerenten quaeotionem A / illud) hoc B. 42. praodicore
C / de aliquo osa.ABC. 45* quaeren em) ut C / qualiter) quantitas B.
43—44. aicut de honline) sicut quaerendo "Quails est homo " convonienter
respondetux quod est riaibilia vel albas B. 44. praedicantur) prae-
dicatur / est ora. CD. 45* in quid obuBC.
Cap. II lie Cetiere
accidens : sicut coloratura praedicatur in quid de albo. Conforraiter
sicut: universale per ae non praedicatur in quid niai de entibus per ee.
(Capituluis Secundum)
(DE GHlERl)
Genus est universale praedicabile in quid de raultia difierentibus
in specie. Per pri/tara particular aiffert genus ab individuo. Et per
secundan differt genus a specie opecialiasima, quae non praedicatur
de soultia dilferentibus in specie, et a differentia, proprio et accidente,
5 quae praedicantur in quale et non In quid.
genus dividitur. Aliquod est genus analogum, quod scilicet
praedieatur oecundum ra&gis et minus de suis content is, sicut hoc genus
"accidcna" praedicatur secundum raagis et minus de accidente absoluto
et accidente reapectivo, quia accidens respective; est magis accidens
10 quam accidens absolutum, quia plus inhaerens.
Et aliquod est genua univocum, quod scilicet est univoce
praedicabile de singulis suis inferioribua, ita quod nor. secundum
saagis et minusJ eicut animal aequaliter praedicatur de omnibus
anim&libus, eo quod omnia animalia sunt aequo animalia, licet non
15 aequalia. Et genus univocura dicitur dupliciter. Nam aliquod est genus
univocura, supra quod non est aliquod genus univocum supraveniens,
qualiter quodlibet pruedicamentum cot genus univocu®. Et tale genus
dicitur genua generaliesimum. Et aliquod est genus univecum, supra
quod cot aliquod genua univocum supraveniens, sicut hoe genua animal.
20 Et tale genus vocatur genus oubalternura. Et crane tale genus est forma-
liter tan genus quam species: genus respectu inferioris et species
respectu superioris, sicut animal est genus respectu hominis et species
respectu corporis.
Sicut — albo ora.D / albo) albedine C. 47* sicut} sic B / in
quid om.BD / per ae (et caetera) add.3 / (in quid) add.D. , ^
Cap. II: tn quid ora.B / mult is In rasura, add. eaaera aanu pluribus D.
2. specie (in eo quod tguid) add.3 / et om.BC. 3* secundum (particulam)
add.B / specialisaiaa or.E. 3-4. specie specialissima — in specie)
differentia, proprio et accidente, quae praedicsntur in quale et non
in quid C. 4. aultis oa.B / in.ora.E / et) ac etiaa E / et a differentia
Chap.II Genua (14)
accidens, for exasple "coloured thing" ia pred eated of "white
thing" in quid. Similarly a universal per se is only predicated
in quid of entitles per se.
Chapter Two
Genus
Genus is a universal predicable in quid of many things differing
in species. By the first clause genus is distinguished from the
individual. And by the second genus is distinguished from the
infima species, which is not predicated of many things different
in species, and from difference, property arid accident, which are
predicated in quale and not in quid.
And genus divides itself. There is an analogio genus, namely
which is predicated in quid of its supposita in varying decrees.
For example the genus "accident" is predicated in varying degrees
of absolute and relative accidents, because a relative accident is
more an accident than an absolute accident, because it is more
inherent la a thing.
And there is also a univocal genus, which is namely a genus,
which is univocally prtdicable of each of its inferiors in such a
way that there is no neater or lesser, for example animal is
equally predicable of all animals, because they are all equally
animals, although they are not equal. Univocal genus has two forms.
For there is a univocal genus, which has no other univocal genus
supervening upon it and in this sense each of the Categories is a
univocal genus. And such a genus is called a supreme genus. And
there is a univocal genua which does have another univoc&l genus
supervening upon it, for example the genus animal. And such a genus
is called a subaltern genus. And any genus of this sort is as much
a genus as a species: a genus in respect of an inferior and a species
in respect of a superior, as for instance animal is a genus in respect
of man and a species in respect of body.
(cont.) — accidents) Per terticua particulam differt genus ab accidents,
differentia et proprio B / et a differentia — non in quid) Per tertiaa
differt genus a specie apecialissima, quae non praedicatur de multia
dlfferentibus in specie, ac etiaia a differentia, proprio et accidents,
quae praedicantur in quale et non in quid C / Et ( per tertiase part¬
icular) add.J). 5« quae) quia B. 6. ob.A / scilicet oa.A. 7.
praedicatur (in quid) add.CDE / de aula cor.tentis os.E / hoc genus
oa.ABC / absoluto) reapectivo B. 9. et (de) add.C / accidents om.E /
respective) absoluto B« 11. scilicet ora.AB / genus osa.E. 12* ita quod)
et A /, 13* aequaliter oin.AB. 14. eo quod) quia A / oruiia) singula C.
16, univocua per ae A / univocua ora.AB, genua univocua oa.B / genus
o».C / est (quia quodlibet praed icam en turn est genus univocua) add.B /
eat B. 18. general issimum genus E / et) sed B / univocuni osa.B,
19. supraveniens oas.b / hoc genus ok.B / animalia B / dicitur B.
20. subalterousa (3icut hoc genua anisal) add.B / genus osr.,B,
21. genus s — superioria) respectu specie! inferioris et generis
auperioria C / respectu (specie!) add.BE. 22. respectu (generis)
add.BE,
Cap.Ill De Specie
Ex quibua patet quod ens oeamm iss imi® non est formaliter yenuo,
25 ut dicit Porphirius Capitulo lie Specie, quia non praedicatur in quid,
quia quaerendo "Quid est hoc?", quodcumque de&onstretur, inconvenieno
est responsio dicere, quod est ens.
(Capitulum Pentium)
(DE SPECIE)
Species est universale sub genere univoco praedicabile in quid
de individuia. Per prima® particular differt species a genere
ge erslissimo, et per secunda® a differentia, accidents et proprio.
Et est duplex species. See aliqua species est universale praedicabil©
5 in quid de individuia tanturn. Et vocatur species specialiaeiina, sicut
species humana. Kt a.iiqua species praedicatur in quid tarn de individuis
qua® de speciebus, sicut animal praedicatur tars de homine qua® de
aaino. Et vocatur species subalterns.
Et si obiciatur contra istam description's, quod genus ponitur
10 in definitione specieii igitur est simpliciter nottua specie. Bit
e contra species ponitur in definitione generisi igitur est simpliciter
notior specie. Et per oonsequena eadem sunt siapliciter notiora
seipsis... Dicitur, quod genus et species, ut hie describuntur, stint
res secundae intentionis et sunt duo correlativa, sicut dicit Porphirius.
15 Ideo necesae est utrumque isiorua poni in definitione alteriua. Pec est
illud ger.eraliter veru®, quod omne positum in definitione alterius est
simpllciter notius definito, nisi in definitione propria dicta, data
de universal! per se et non per accidens, quales non sunt istae
duae def icitiones assignatae, quae dantur de hoc- commune genus et hoe
25. dicit) vult B. 26. hoc) hosao B / quodcusque demonstretur BEE,
quicumque demonstretur C, quocucque demonstrate A. 27. dicendo B /
ens (et caetera) add.B.
C.III* 1. de euia individuie B. 2. individuia (vel sic species est
universale univocum non formaliter generaliseiatua praedicabile in
quid de individuis) add.L, (vel sic s, ecies est universale uni¬
vocum non formaliter generalissimua praedicabile in quid de in¬
dividuis) ad. .B / per prima® partem E, per secundaa particular B /
a differentia, accidente et proprio CUE, a proprio, differentia et
accidents B. 4. et) undo A / duplex eat species A / species oa.B.
5. sicut) ut B. 6. et aliqua tan praedicatur de speciebus qua®
individuis B / tarn de speciebus qua® de inuividuis CDE. 7*
Chap.Ill Species
fro® this it is apparent that Being in its most t;e era I sense is
not formally a genus (as Porphyry says in the chapter on Species),
because it is not predicated in quid, because if the question were
asked "What is this?", whatever were indicated, the proper reply
would not be to say that It was a being.
Chapter Three
SPECIES
Species is a universal cosing under a univocal genus and
predicable in quid of individuals. By the first clause species is
distinguished fro® the supreme genus and by the second clause, it is
distinguished from difference, accident and from property. And species
has two forms. One form of species is a universal, which is predicable
in quid of individuals alone. And this i3 called the infiiaa species,
for example the species man. And the other form of species is a
universal, which is predicated in quid both of individuals and of
species, as for example animal is predicated of man as wellas ass.
And this is called a subaltern species.
And if the objection were to be made against this description,
that genus is assumed in the definition of species and is therefore
better known than species, and contrariwise thai sjecies is assumed
in the definition of genua and therefor* is better known than genust
and in consequence that each of these is better known than the other
... The reply is that genus and species as they are described here
are objects of second intention and acre two correlatives, as Porphyry
says. And thua it is necessary to assume each one in the definition
of the other. Nor is it generally true, that everything assuaed in
the definition of something else is better known than the thing
which is defined, unless in a definition properly speaking, which is
given of a universal per ee and not of a universal per accidens.
However the two definitions given here are not of this type, given
as they are of genua
(cont.) 7. sicut) ut B / taa praedicatur B / praedicatur da homine at
de asino CDE. 9* lllaa B, ista® om.C / genua quod B. 11. ponitur) eat B
aimpliciter ora.B. 12. notiua I) / cades) allqua A / aispliciter ora.B.
13* prout E / aunt oai.CE. 14. ut B. 13. illorua CD. 16. iatud C /
altarius obj.CDE. 17. data oei.B. 18. lllae ED. 19. asei natae BE»
aaaignantes A. ora.BC / quae dantur) datae C / per hoc B.
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20 commune species, quae aunt universali& per accidens et non universalis
per ae. Sad in iatis sufficit, quod totalis delinitio ait aliqualiter
notior definito, licet non quaelibet eius pars ait notior definito.
Unde genus notius et priua sua ajeciee in supposition© personal!,
quia hoc eat notius et prius bus specie, deaonstrando "hoc genus animal"
25 et "hoc est genus". Sed genus et species in suppositions sisplici,
id eat, hoc commune et hoc commune species sunt aimul in natura, eo
quod aunt duo correlativa. Unde personaliter intelligendo, species non
debet poni in definitione sui generis, aicut homo non ponitur in
definitions animalis. Bed in suppoeitione simplici aic, quia hoc
30 commune species ponitur in definitions generis communis.
Ulterius notandum, quod terminus communis signifleans genus
subalternuHi potest supjonere in suppositione simplici special! vel
in suppositions siraplici general!. Fxemplura prirai: "Animal eat species
humane." est suppositio simple* specialis. Exsoplum secundii "Animal
35 est genua animalis" est auppositio simplex generalie,
(Capitulum Quartum)
(LB DIFFERENTIA)
Differentia est universale per se priioo praedicabile in quale
de specie. Per primaa particulam diffort differentia a proprio et
accidents, quae non praedicantur per se priiao. Et per secundum
differentia
particular differt^a goners et specie, quae praedicantur in quid.
5 Kt aliqua talis differentia est constitutive apeciei, aicut ilia,
quae ponitur in definitione cum genere ad constitutionem specieis
sicut ratior.alitas cum genere animalia constituit horninem. Et
£0»g1v gt-uuu per as "5 / ert nun sunt univeisalia II. 81—88." i;uud
totalis — eius para) quod quaelibet pats principalis definitionis
sit notior definito, utpote genera et differentia, et non quaelibet
pars C. 22. notius B / eius quaelibet K, 23* prius et notius C /
et prius om.B. 23-24 (in suppositione personali, quia hoc est notior
et prius sua specie) add.ag.b. 2? et "hoc est genus" oeuD, (ideo et
cuetera) adc.C, (igitur et caetera) add.BE / sed) et tamen BCDE.
26. id est (cum) adu.C, 20, sui om.AB. 2$, sic quia om.B. 30, huius
communis geeria BCK, hoc commune genus D. 31, ulterius est notandum
BC / communis om,B. 32, in oa.E / special! om.B, in suppositione
special! B. 33* vel suppositione CE, vel in simplici special! B,
Chap.IV Bifference (18)
and species in their general forms, which are thus universale per
accldens and not per se. As far as these two are concerned, it is
sufficient that the whole definition be somehow known better than
what is defined, although no part of it can be better known than
what is defined. For this reason genus is better known than and
prior to its species in personal supposition, because in the
examples "this genus animal" and "this is a genus" it is better
known than its species. However both genus and species in simple
supposition, that is genus and species in their general for®
have an equal position in the natural order, because they are two
correlatives. Thus when understood in personal supposition, species
should not be assumed in the defintion of its species, just as man
is not assumed in the defintion of animal. But this is quite correct
in simple supposition, as species in its general for® is assumed in
the defintion of genus in general.
A final point to note is that a general terra standing for
a subaltern genus can suppose in simple special or in simple general
supposition. An example of the first case* "Animal Is trie species of
humanity" is simple special supposition. An example in the second case:
"Animal is the genus of animal" is simple general supposition.
Chapter four
MFlfWmCE
Difference is a universal predieable per se in its first sens#
in quale of speeies. By the first clause difference is distinguished
from property and accident, which ore not predicated per se in its
first sense. And by the second clause difference is distinguished fro®
genus and species which are predicated in quid. And one sort of
difference is constitutive in respect of a species, i.e. that one
which i® placed in a defintion with a genus in order to constitute
that species, as for example rationality together with the genus
animal constitutes man. And
(cont.) / (ibi) est add.C. 34-35» ut anisal eat species vel hcoo est
species S / genus animal C / est suppoaitio simple* general is B /
generalis et caetera C.
C.IVi 1. prime om.B. 1-2. de specie in quale ®. 2-3. afc accidents
et proprio B. /. per se priao de specie B / secundan) alias £.
4. differt genus a genere B / differt differentia om.C./ in quid







aliqua eat divisiva, ilia scilicet, per quaa genua dividitur in species*
et in species inferioreex sicut "rationalitas" et "irrationalitas"
10 dividunt animal in hominem c-t brutum. Ex quop&tet quod eadem eat
differentia constitutiva et divisiva reepectu diversoruai alcut
rationalitas est conatitutiva hoffiinie et divisiva animalia,
Et si quaeratur nunquid quaelibet species r abet differentials
convertibilem, dicitur quod :on, quia ilia species, quae eat differentia
13 substantialis, ut rationalitas, non habet ulterioreia differential
convertibilem, quia tunc easet processus in infinitum in differentiia
aubstantialibua, A profcabili taaen, quaelibet species per ae in
aliquo praed icamento ha let differentiae* convert ibi lorn: ut communiter
tamen non hafcemus nam ina talibus differentiia inposita.
20 Et ai O! iciatur quod rationalitae, quae est iromediata differentia
horninis, non convertitur cum horoine, eo quod praedicatur tam de
anima quasi de angelo... Hie dicitur dupliciter, Primo, quod licet
rationalitas coanunis praedicetur de heroine, anise intellectiva et
de angelo, ilia tarnen rationalitas, quae est immediata differentia
25 substantialis hoc*inis, convertitur cum hornine in concreto et est
alterius speciei qua® rationalitas animae intellectivae vel angelix
sic est dare trea species rationalitatum, quarua quaelibet convertitur
cum sua specie, Vel secu do dicitur secundum Sanctum Thomaaea, quod
angeli non sunt rationales, quia non possunt discurrere: sicut nec
30 animae inteliectivae post separationem a materia. Et sic non est
aliqua rationalitas differentia su stantialia nisi horninis, quae
praedicatur per se de hornine et per accidens sive concoaitanter
9. vel species inferiores A / et species in inferiores C. 10. hoc
genus animalis B. 10-11. quod eadem differentia est divieiva et
constitutiva CE. 12, est constitutiva est hort in is B. 13« utrum
quaelibet B. 14. (eibi) convertibilem add.B. 14-15» quia differentia
substantialiter est rationalitas non habet ulterioreia differentia®
sibi eonvertibiles B. 15. utpote C / non habet differentials ulterior-
em se C, 16. (sibi) convertibiles add.B. 18. ut) licet B / cossssuniter
om.B. 19. nomina impostta talibus differentibus A. 20. differentia
ironediata B. 21. non (aimpliclter) co .vertitur add.B. 21-22. taro
praedicatur de hcan ine qua--; de angelo B. 22. Hie dicitur dupliciter)
Huic dicitur B. 23* cossmunis rationalitas AE / rationalitas communis
BC, rationalitas AC / praedicatur B / anima intellectiva, de angelo
(20)
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there is a divisive difference, namely that by which a senue is divided
into on® or more inferior epeeles, as for instance rationality and
irrationality divide ani al into nan and brute. And from this it is
clear that the same thing is a constitutive and divisive difference
in respect of different thingst for example rationality is constitutive
in respect of man and divisive in respect of animal.
And if it were to be asked whether there is a species which has
a difference that is convertible with it, it is replied that there is
not, becuase that species which is itself a substantial difference, like
rationality, does not have a further difference, that is convertible
with it, otherwise there would then be an Infinite regression of
substantial differences. It is however probable that a species per se
which is in one of the Categories will have a difference which is
convertible with it, but these are of such, a kind that we generally
do not give thera names. v
And supposing that the objection were made that rationality,
which is the immediate difference of man dres not convert with man
for this reason that it is predicated both of the soul and of angels
... The answer here is twofold, firstly that although rationality in
its general fore may be predicated of aan, of the intelligent soul
and of angels, nonet;.elesa that rationality which is the immediate
su' stantial difference of mar, converts with man in the real order
and is of a different species from the rationality of the intelligent
soul or of an angel. And thus it is possible to posit three specie.,
of rationality, of which any one reciprocates with its species.
Or a second answer might be given in accordance with St. Thomas that
angels are not rational, because they are incapable of discursive
thought, as are intelligent souls after their separation from matter.
And thus no form of rationality can be a substantial difference,
except the rationality of man, which Is predicated per se of man
and per accidens or by association
 
(21) Cap.IV De Differentia
de aniraa, dummodo materia® unitur, licet non sic praedicatur de eadea
post separationesi. Et sic ilia differentia in praedicatione per se
35 convert!tur cum bomins, licet ex consequent! praedicatur de aniaa
intellective. Pro cuius confirsatione poteat allegari dictum Aristotelis,
Primo De Aniaa, Com ento Sexagesimo Sexto* quod melius est dicere
an imam non intelligere, sed hominera per asiimaas: et sic aniaa non est
per se rational is* sed homo per sua® an imam. Vel melius dicitur,
40 quod ilia rationalitas, quae praedicatur de aniaa, non est aliqua
differentia su stantialls alicuius hominis, aed una potentia animae*
quae vocatur ratio: et sic ilia rationalit&s, quae est differentia
substantialie hoisinis, convertitur cum hoaaine.
Et si obiciatur ex Secundo Posteriorum, quod quaelibet pars
^ definitionis est in plus quam lefinitum et totum in aeque* dicitur
secundum Antiquoa Expositores* quod hoc intelligitur* quod quaelibet
pars definitionis est in plus* id est prius* et toturn in aeque* id
est convertibile. Et sic quaelibet differentia est in plus* id est
prius* quae species. Et in huiua confirmatione dicitur Quarto
50 Topicorum, quod differentia de pluribus aut de aequis quam species
praedicatur. Et exponunt Expositorea, quod quaelibet differentia
praeter ultimam est in plus et ultima* si cum paribus sit notaen
impositua* est in aeque.
33» de ar.ima oouB / licet (quod) add.B / praedieabitur CDE / de eadem
ora.B, de eodea C. 35* ex consequente BD / praedicatur 3. 36. pro cuius
responsionis confimatione 3C« 37. Comment© 3exageaimo Tertio CE.
38. non intelligere (etc.) add.CB / sed homines per an inam C, per
suaa animam E (per) an imam rasura D* homines anima AB. 38-39* et tunc
anima per se non est rationalie B. 39. rationalis per se C / per sua®
animam BC / vel) aed B* et E / dicitur) potest dioi C, est dicere B.
40. ista B / de aifima) de homine B / aliqua om.B. 41. hominis om.CBE
/ una oej.B. 42. sic cm.A, sic) tunc £ / ilia differentia rationalitas
3. 43* cum homine (etc.) add.CD. 44. quod oes.B. 45. est plus quam C.
46. quod hoc infrelligitur AC, quod hoc intelligitur in rasura 1),
hoc sic intelligitur B, quod hoc sic intelligitur E. 47. est plus/
est in plus, id est prius om.B. 48-49. et sic quaelibet differentia
est in plus, id est prius quasi species om.E. 49* quasi species (etc.)
add.AC. 49-53* et in huius — est in aeque om.ABC. 52. ultima (non)
add.E. 53. isposita B / illara et opinions de differentia convertibili
ponit Doctor Subtilis in quaeationibua super Porphirium add.E.
(22)
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of the soul, as long as the latter is still bound to natter, although
it is not so predicated after the soul's separation. And so this
difference, when predicated per se is convertible with man, although
it may as a result be predicated also of the i- tellective soul. In
confirmation of this, Aristotle's remark in the sixty-sixth Chapter
of the First .Book of the De Anisa may be adduced, that is that it
is better not to say that the soul comprehends, but rather that man
does so by virtue of his soul. And thus the soul is not of itself
rational, but man is so by virtue of his soul. Or this might be better
stated, that the rationality which is predicated of the soul is not
a substantial difference, but rather a faculty of the soul, which is
called reason. And thus the rationality which is the substantial
difference of man converts with man.
And if it were to be objected on the basis of the Second Book
of the Posterior Analytics, that any part of a definition has at the
ssune time greater extension than and is completely co-extensive with
what is defined, it may be said according to the Ancient Commentators
that this may be «®derstood aa saying that any part of a definition
has greater extension than, i.e. is prior to, arid is co-extensive with
i.e. converts with what is defined. And thus any difference has
greater extension than, i.e. is prior to, its species. And in con¬
firmation of this, the Fourth Book of the Topics states that a difference
is predicated with greater extension than of with the saae extension
&» its species, .And the Commentators explain that every difference,
except the final definitive one, lias greater extension than the species
it defines and that the final one has the a<mm extension, if its
nam* be given together wit! similar ones.
(Capitulua Quintua)
(BE PHOFHIO)
Fropriua, ut eat quartu® universale, eat universale per se aecundo
praedicabile de specie in quale. Per prima® particular differt
propriusi a differentia et accidents, quae non praedicartur per se
secundo. Et per seconds® particular differt propriura a genere et
5 specie, quae praedic&ntur in quid. Et si petatur qu&re potius
differentia substantialis praedicatur per se priao de specie qua®
propriura, dicitur quod causa est, quia talis differentia eat prior
specie constituens eats definitive. Sed propriura eat poateriua specie
immediate et convertitur conaequens specie® et principia quiditativa
10 speciei. Et ideo praedicatur per se secundo et non aid accidens prout
est quintura universale.
Ubi notandum quod propria® de praedicameuto substantiae praedicatur
aequaliter de eo, cuius eat propriuia, et de singulis contentis sub eo,
sicut orange hoisines sunt aeque risibilis. Sed propria et differentiae
13 substantiales de praedicamentie accidentiua praedicantur secundum ;aagis
et minus in concrete, sicut ilia accidentia in abstracto, ut quia
unua album est alio magis album, ideo una albedo est alia intentior
et sagia disgregativa viaus, et una linia est alia lor.gior. Et ideo
dicit Arietotelis, Septimo Metaphysicae, quod solum de genere substantiae
20 sunt proprie differentia et propriusi. Ex quo patet, quod quantitas
corporea non est propria® respectu substantiae corporeae, cum
quantitas corporea praedicatur de corpore secundum asagis et minus,
cum una substantia sit alia sisgis quanta, sicut quadrupedale qua®
pedale.
1. est universale ora.C. 2. in quale de specie A. 3* *b accident®
et differentia BC. 4. per secunda® A. 5* in quid.et nop.in quale B /
et si petatur causa E. 6. differentia substantia 0 £~'*lus •
7. dicitur causa est B. 7-8. prior est specie BE. 8. eiue deficitlone® B.
9. convertibilis, convertibiliter E / sequens A. 10. et non praedicatur C /
et sic non accidens B. 12.Unde notanduia B, ubi notandua est C / quod
propriua nor. est de praed icemento C. 12-13* essentialiter dicitur de
eo B. 14. ut oranes B / aequaliter riaibilis / sed propriua C. 16. in
abstracto oauCBE. 17. reliquo magis album A / reliqua Intentior A.




Property, the fourth universal, 1b a universal predicable per ae
in its second sense in quale of species. By the first clause, property
in distinguished from difference and accident which are not predicated
per «e in its second sens*. And by the second clause, property is
distinguished from genus and species which are predicated in quid.
And if somebody demanded to know why it is substantial difference,
rather than property, which is predicated per se in its first sense
of species, the reply is t*.at it is so because such a difference
is prior to species and constitutes it definitively, vreeas property
is posterior to any immediate species and converts with the species
and with its essential principles. And thus it is predicated per se
in its second sense and not in the same way as accident, which is
the fifth universal.
At this point it should be noted that a property of something
in the Category of Substance is predicated equal y of that of which it
is a property and of each Individual thing contained beneath itt as for
evample all men are capable of laughter to an equal extent. However
the properties and substantial differences of things in the accidental
Categories are predicated in concreto in varying degrees, as the
accidents do in abstractol for example, because one white thing
is whiter than another, so one whiteness is more intense or more
striking to the eye than another and one line is longer than another.
And thus Aristotle states in the Seventh Book of the Metaphysics
that difference and property may only be strictly ascribed to
individuals of the genus substance. From this it is clear that
physical quantity is not a property of physical substance, since
physical quantity is predicated of a body in varying degrees, for
one physical substance can be of a greater quantity than another,
for example four-footed things as against footed things.
(cont.) Metaphyoicae C* 20. dicuntur propria et difforentiao B. 21.
corpora** om.E 22* da corpora oa.B. 23* quattuor padala A, quadrupedal®
B, quadripedal© CD, quatripe-dale E. 23*24* qua® pedale A CLE, eat ad
pedale B.
Cap,VI Accidens Praedicaisentale
25 Et ai qu&eratur fcusquid proprium habet propriua ulterius, dlcitur
quod Ron, aieut dictum est de differentia substantial!, quod ilia non
i
habet differentia® substantial™ ulterlores. Ex quo p&tet, quod
nulla differentia substanti&lis nec aliquod propriue est per se in
praedic&aento, quia ai aic, tunc haberet differentiae substantiales
JO et propria, sicut aliae species praediceeentales videoto* habere,
(Capitulus Sextuii)
(ACCj.DEKS FRAKD1CAKEKTALE)
Accidens in sua coarnunitate deocriptu® est en® inh&erens, Et sic
est commune tarn ad propriu® quaic ad accidens per accidens, Inhaerere
enim est inesse alicui aubiective, non tamquam pars, scilicet non
coaponencio suum subiectura quantitative, quiditative aut qualitative,
5 sicut albedo in. aeret honini non ccuaponendo ipeum, eo quod nullum accidens
est para lllius, cuius est accidens,
Et si obiciatur, quod rationalities singularis inhaeret horaini, eo quod
non est pars hominls,,. Dicitur, quod ilia ineet howini taisquam pars,
eo quod est lndividuiai alicuius immediate definientis hou,inear,, scilicet
10 rationalities in communi, Et ideo non inhaeret hoc.ini.
Et ai quaeratur de iniiaerentia accidentia, dicitur, quod omne
accidens in aerct ouo oubiecto prirao, a quo dependet per set et non
per inhaerentiaro medlar., Sed accidens inhaeret suo subiecto mediate,
a quo potest separari per inkaerentijun mediam* tamen omnia in: aere tia
15 Ini.aeret per se ipsa®, ne sit processus in infinitum. Verbi gratia*
quantitas hocratio in aeret materia# Socratis, a qua dependet per se,
sed Socratl inest per inhaerentiam mediae, quae in; .aerent la eorrumpitur
2V. dif; erentiam ulteriorera convertibil em A, differentiam ulterioreos BC,
differentiam substantial™ ulteriorom BE. 28. quod nullum proprium nec
differentia subst&ntialis 1), 29« in aliquo praedicamento C, 29-30*
differentials substantial®® ©t proprium B, 30. aliqua B, aliae ACBE.
C.V1: ±r 1. in sua marine coanuni-ete B, in sui comnmnitate BE, In
sua comaunitate A, in sua cooasuiiicabilitate C / et tunc est B.
2, est ora.C / tarn commune ad proprium B. 3* enim oia.B / alicui subiecto B /
non t&siquaa (quaed&m) pars add.B / pars (nec contentura subpositore
sub parte) adcl,B, pars (nec sup;ositore cum partibus) adfi.A / scilicet
om.C / non om,B. 4* quiditative, ^. itatiW* Qualitative B,
Chap.VI Categorial Accident. (26)
And if the question were put whether one property can have a
further lower-order property beneath it, the answer is that it cannot,
as was stated in the case of the substantial difference, viz. that it
has no further lower-order substantial differences beneath it. And
from this it is apparent that no substantial difference or property
is in any Category of itself, for if it was, it would then have
substantial differences said properties itself, as other Categorial
species appear to have.
Chapter Six
CATEGORIAL ACCIDENT
Accident in its general sense is described as an inherent being.
And thus it is common both to property and to accidens per accidena.
For to inhere is to be in something subjectively, not as a part, that
is, not by quantitatively, substantially or qualitatively constituting
its subject, as for example whiteness inheres in man without
constituting man, for the reason that no accident is part of that of
which it is an accident.
And if it were to be objected that a particular rationality
can be said to inhere in a man, for the reason that it forms no
p>art of him, it is replied that it is in fact in a man as a part
of him, because it is a particular instance of something, which
immediately defines man (rationality in general) and therefore is not
inherent in man.
And if the inherence of accidents were to be questioned, the
reply would be that every accident is inherent in its primary
subject, i.e. that from which it depends of itself and not by virtue
of any intermediate inherence. But an accident also inheres in its
intermediate subject, i.e. that from which it may be separated by
an intermediate inherence. However any inherence inhereB of itslef
alone, otherwise there would be an infinite succession of inherences.
For examples the qu^g
uariity of Socrates inheres in the matter of Socrates
(over)
upon whieh it is dependent per se, but exists in Socrates by virtue
of an intermediate iiiierence, which itself decays in proportion
to the decay of Socrates, although the quantity remains afterwards#
(cont.) quantitative, qualitative aut quiditative C, qualitative,
quantitative aut quiditative DE.7. homini om.D. 8. dieatur, quod ilia
non inhaeret homini, eo quod inest B. 10. in communi om.C / homini omfBCDE.
11. dicatur B. 12. ex quo B. 12-14. sed accidens — inhaerentiam
mediam om.BC. 14. a quo potest separari potest E / raediam om.A / cum
omnis C / 15. ne esset processus I). 16. quantitas inhaeret om.Socratis A /
inhaeret Socrati A.
Cap.VII Ce Accident© Pr&edicabili
ad corruptions Kocr&tie, licet qu&utitaa postea sna; eat.
(Capituluffi Septimus)
(EE ACCIBEETE FRAEEICABILl)
Aceidens, prout est quintua universale, sic describitur. Accidena
est universale praeiieabile de substantia in quale per accidens.
Et capitur "per accidens", ut distinguitur contra "per se". Per
ultimata particulan distinguitux accidens a gen ere et specie, quae
5 praedicantur in quid. Et per istam particulam "per accidens" difPert
accidens a differentia et proprio, quae praedicantur in quale per
se prioto et per se secundo et non per accidens ad sensusi lirsitatura.
Et accidena dividituri nam aliquod est accidens absolute®
et aliquod est accidens respectivua. Eicitur aute® accidens absolutura
10 accidens, quod in sua prima denomination© absolute donorsinat suu®
oubiectua, sicut albedo Socratis absolute denominat Sooraten, quia
in eius prima denominations, quae est Socrates esse album, non
comparat Socratem obiective ad aliquod extrinsecura, quia ibidem
expresse non includuntur nisi Socrates et albedo. Sed accidens
15 respectivusi est accidena, quod in sua denomination© prima praeter
subiectum expresse includit obiectumt sicut differentia, qua
Socrates differt a Platone, in sua prima denominations, quae eat
Socratem differre a Platone, express© includit Socrates pro subiecto
et Flatonem pro obiecto.
17* corruption©® (corporis) add.A. 18. manebit A.
C.VII: 2. per accidens in quale CUE. 3* capiatur E. 3-7. per ultlmam
— non per accidens) per ultimas particular "per accidens" differt
accidens a differentia et proprio, quae pr-iedicantur per se et non
per accidens E. 5. illam CE. 6. quae praedicantur per se et non per
accidens CE. 7* limits.turn BCEE, allegatua A. 9« et aliquod respective
BE. 9-10, dicitur quod accidens absolutum ©st accidens in sua
denominations prima C. 10. accidena om.B / quod os.EE / dencminat B,
denomin&ns ACBE. 11. Socratis om.E / absolute oa.B / (scilicet) quia
add.E. 12. in eius denominations prima C / quod est B / quae est
Socrates esse album om.CEE. 13. non comparat illud ad aliquid C,
non concluditur expresse nisi Socrates et eius albedo 5./ extrinaecum
om.BCEE /13*14. quia in eius prima denominations, quae eat Socrates
esse album, non includuntur exprease, nisi f<ocrates et albedo CEE.
15- in sua prima denomination© EE. 18 excludit B, 1$. et per Platone B.
Chapter Seven
Predict!le accident.
Accident, in no far as it is the fifth universal, is described
thus. An accident is a universal which is predicable of substance
in quale and per accidens. And "per accidens" is to be understood
as opposed to "per se". By means of the last clause, accident
is distinguished from genus and species, which are predicated in
quid. And by the clause "per accidens" accident is distinguished
from difference and property, which are predicated in quale per se
in its first and second senses respectively and not per accidens
in the sense given.
Furthermore accident is divided* for there are such things as
absolute and relative accidents. Something is called an absolute
accident, which is an accident, which in its primary denotation,
absolutely denotes its subject, as for example the whiteness of
Socrates absolutely denotes Socrates, because in its primary
denotation, which is that Socrates is white, it does not relate
Socrates objectivel to anything else, because the predication does
not exprestly include anything but Socrates and whiteness. But a
relative accident is an accident, which in its primary reference
expressly includes an object apart fro® the subject, as for exaaple
the difference, by which Socrates differs from Tlato, in its primary
denotation, which is that Socrates differs fro® Flato, expressly
includes Socrates as subject and Plato as object.
(29)
Cap.VII Be Accidente Praedicabili
20 Et utriuaque secbri, aliquod est accidens separabile et aliquod
inseparabile. Bicitur autem aecldene separabile, quod secundum ae
▼el aliquod accidena eiuadea speciei specialissimae potest de esse
suo subiecto, cui prius infuit, suo subiecto mar.ente: sicut nigredo
in pluma corvi, licet sit inseparabilis a pluma. Bicitur tarnen accidens
23 separabile, eo quod accidens eiusdem speciei potest suo subiecto de esse
quia nigredo in ho&ine eiusdem speciei cum nigredlne in pluma corvi
potest de esse homlni, cui prius infuit, hosine anente.
Accidens inseparabile opposito modo dicitur, quod nec secundum
se nec secundum aliquod accidens eiuedecn speciei specialisaisae
50 potest de esse subiecto, cui prius infuit, subiecto manente: sicut
simitas se habet respectu nasi almi, quia nulla siaitas potest de esse
naeo, cui prius infuit, naso peraanente. Et ilia est divisio accidentia
separabilia et accidentia insepar&bilis secundum speciem.
Quodlibet tamen accidens nabens subiectua adaequ&tusi, a quo non
35 potest de esse, subiecto aanente, potest dici accidena inaeparabile
secundum indiviciuumJ sicut nigredo in pluma corvi. Et idem est
accidens separabile quantum ad species. Et ideo accidens inaeparabile
secundum individuum est separabile secundum speciemi sicut nigredo
in pluma corvi.
20. pro utriusque measbri S, aembri (est dupliciter) add.E. 21. quod om.C /
quia secundum A. 23. subiecto suo stante DE, suo subiecto stante C.
23-24 sicut nichil pluma corvi B. 24, lnseparabile AB / dicitur autem A.
25* de esse (etc.) D, de esse suo subiecto etc. E. 26. quae est eiusdes B
/ nigredo in ho®ine est AC. 27* subiecto manente A. 28. dicitur
accidens CDE, dicitur AB, quod BCDE, quia A. 29* aliquod os.B /
nec aliquod accidens CUE. 30. subiecto, cfti prius infuit, subiecto
stante, potest de esse C / suo subiecto manente,ABQ, subiecto stante BE.
31* sicut simitas respectu nasi simi C, sicut si&itas potest de esse
naso eius, cui prius infuit, naso illo manente B, sicut simitas nasi
simi B. 32. naso oanente AB / et lata BB / est om.B. 33* «t inseparabilis
accidentis B. 33* suo subiecto ma^eate B. 36. sicut nigredo est
accidens inseparabile quanta® ad individuum BE. 37-38* et ldeo
accidens inseparabile secundum individuum est separabile secundum
specie® om.B. 38. quantum ad individuua C.
(30)
Chap.VII Practicable Accident.
And in each of the above two cases there is a separable accident
and an inseparable accident. Nov a separable accident is the name
given to an accident, which in virtue of itself or in virtue of another
accident of the same infiaa species can be absent from the subject
in which it was previously present, while this subject remains: as
for exaaple blackness in a raven's feather, even though this black¬
ness is inseparable from the feather. It is however called a separable
accident for the reason that an accident of the same species can be
absent from its subject, since blackness in a man, which is of the
same species as the blackness in a raven's feather, can be absent
from a man, In which it was previously present and the man remains
a man.
On the other hand, inseparable accident is the name given to an
accident, which neither in virtue of itself nor in virtue of any
other accident of the same infima species, can be absent from a subject
in which it was previously present, whilst that subject remains what
it is. For exaaple: snubness in respect of & snub-nose, because
anubness cannot be absent from a nose, in which it was previously
present, if that nose is to continue to exist. And thiB is the
difference between separable and inseparable accidents using the
criterion of species.
However any accident having a suitable subject from which it
cannot be absent, if the subject is to remain, can be called an
inseparable accident in virtue of an individual, as for example
blackness in the feather of a raven. But this same accident may
be separable as far as its species is concerned. And thus an
accident which is inseparable as far as some individual is
concerned, is separable as far as its species is concerned: for
example the blacknees in a raven's feather.
(31)
(Capitulum Octavun)
(SI DIVISIOKE DE>IN IT IGNIS)
Pro praeraissis est notandu®, quod descriptio sive definitio
potest aaaignari de aliquo, ut ipsum est res primae intentionis. It
tunc nor. requiritur definitions® forma liter competere definite in se*
nec cuilibet universal! sub eo, sed cuilibet eius inaividuo, sicut
5 descriptio quantitatis est quod sit accidens absolution de ae divisibile:
et tamen quarititas communis non eat aic foraaliter diviaibilis, nec
linea communis, sed quaelibet quantitas singularis est sic diviaibilis.
Alio aodo potest definitio vel descriptio assignari de aiiquo,
ut ipsum est res sec\n dae intentionis. It tunc non requiritur
10 descriptionem formaliter competere definlto, nec alicui eius individuo,
sed omni universali contento sub nomine illius definiti. Et sic
describuntur hie quinque universalis. V©rbi gratia: descriptio data
de genere non praedicatur foraaliter de hoc cooauni genus* quia illud
non praedicatur fomaliter in quid* quia quaerendo quid est animal*
15 vel corpus* non convenienter respondetur quod est genus. Nec competi fc
ilia descriptio alicui eius individuo* ut constat, cum nec Socrates nec
Plato etc. sic est formaliter genus. Sed haec descriptio cosspetit
omnibus generibus contentis sub hdc communi "genus", siout gene-re
substantias sive genera quantitatis.
g.VMI: i. pru piuaaiBBla 'laiawi notauaua ebig. g. lyau b / im;i oib.b.
3. forme liter def initionera I. 4. alicui universali BC. 5* sicut
descriptusi est in quantitate C / divisibile (etc.) DE. 6. formaliter
sic CDE / divisibile A, sic divisifcilia fonsaliter B. 7. divisibilis
sic D. 8. vel) sive D / de alio D. 9* et sic A. 10. deacripto CD.
11. definiti contento B / et sic om.B. 13. non forssaliter praedicatur B/
illud om.D. 14. non forraaliter praedicatur B. 16. ista BD. 17. sic ons.BE /
et caetera sic om.CD. 18. commune B. 18-19* sicut genere substantias,




As far aa the foregoing is concerned, it should be noted that
a description or de-initon ean be given of something, which is
itself an object of first intention. And in this case, there is
no need for the definition to apply fer.sally to what is defined
or to any universal contained oeneath it, but only to one of its
individual instances. For example, the description of quantity
is that it is an absolute accident divisible per ae. However the general
entity quantity is not thus formally divisible, nor is the general
entity line. However any particular quantity is divisible in this way.
In the second place, a definition or description may be given
of something, when the thing is an object is an object of second
intention and thus there is no need for the description to formally
apply to What is defined, not to any individual contained under it,
but rather to apply to every universal contained under the name of
what is defined. And it is in this second way that the five
universale have been here described. For example, the description
given of genus is not formally predicated of the general entity
genus, because this is not formally predicated in quid. For if
anyone asks What is an animal or a body, it is not correct to
reply that it is a genus. Nor does this description apply to any
individual contained under genus, as is clear, because neither
Socrates nor Plato etc. is thus formally a genus. However this
description does apply to all individuals contained under the general
entity genua, for example to the genus substance or to toe genus
quantity.
Cap,VIII be Division® befinitlonis
(Sed pro differentia inter terminus priisae intentionis et terminum
secundae intentionis est notandum, quod terminus priaae intentionis
est terminufc. significans suum signifies.tura non connotando singularitatea
univers. -iiatea, ut iste terminus "homo" et iste terminus "animal'* etc,.
Et ilia res signlficata ut sic vocatur res primae intentionis. Terminus
eecur;d;.e intentionis est terminus tsignific&ns auum aignif icatusi
oupercor.notando universalii-ateia vel partieularitateoi, ut iste terminus
"homo communis", "hor.o ainsularis", "genus", "species", "individuum",
"singulars", "coasffiunicabile", "incommunicabile". Qjuodlibet ill oruiu
texniinorua slgnif icat suum signif icatua et oonnat&t ultra illud
signif icatuia universalitatea, particularitatesi vel eingularitatem,
ut 1st© terminus "homo communis" signifieat specie® htuusaa et
concotat ultra ilia® comznunicabili tatearn.)
anorimc
22-25. universalitatem vel pnrticularit&tem eive singul&ritate® B,
23. et ora.B. 20. quodlibet enim istorusa B. 29. ultra ill* fangs gj
ft iltfft ilW ememieztiUUtm £•
Chap.VIII Defirdtional Modes
(iowever with respect to the difference between a term of
first intention and a term of second intention it should be noted
that a term of first intention is a tera standing for its significate
without connoting singularity or universality, e.g. the tens "man"
and the terra "animal" etc.. And whatever ie so signified is called
an object of first intention. A tera of second intention is a tera
standing for its significate, however connoting beyond thia
universality or particularity, e.g. the terms "man in general",
"aan in particular", "genus "species", "individual", "singular
entity", "communicable entity", "incommunicable entity". Each of
thes terms signifies its gig ifieate and beyond this connotes
some universal, particular or singular nature. For example, the




Circa praedicta dubitatur priao numquid sunt inflnita universalis
praeter ilia quinque, quod ale arguitur. 111a qulnque universalia
conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt universalis. Igitur praeter ilia est
dare aextum universale can; one labia, in quo conveniunt. Tunc ultima,
5 ilia sex universalis conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt universalis.
Igitur est dare septimum universale, in quo eonveniunt* et sic in
infinitum. Confinnatur consequentia, quia sequitur bene "isti
homines singularee conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt homines". Igitur
praeter illoa est dare honinem cocmunera tills. Igitur confozmiter
10 sequitur in alio. Et conformiter potest mover! numquid Socrates et
homo communis sunt duo homines, slcut hoc cos-rune genus et hoc
commune universale sunt duo universalis iuxta probata.
Quantum ad illud dubiua, negator quod praeter ilia quinque
universale est dare inf inita universalia. Iramo oeme universale per se
15 praeter ens commune est formaliter genus, species, differentia,
propriun vel accidens, secundum prius declarata. Et sic concedendua,
quod praeter ilia est dare sextum universale, scilicet ens in comr.uni,
in quo conveniunt in hoc quod sunt entia. Sed non ultima est procedendo®,
cum illud sit coamunissimura. Tarnen piaster ilia non est dare aextu.
20 universale, in quo conveniunt in hoc quod sunt universalis* quod petit
dubiua. Et sic conceditur, quod est dare universale, in quo ilia quinque
conveniunt in hoc quod sunt universalia et hoc est hoc commune universale.
Hon tarnen est concedecdua, quod ilia quinque et hoc commune universale
sunt formliter sex universalis. Unde nvusqua® concedenda est praedieatio
C.IXt 1. priffio dubitatur CD / infinita sunt B. 2. ista quinque SC /
lata quinque BCD. 4. commune A, commune illis B, commune istis BE,
commune istis quinque C / in quo conveniunt ora.CDE./ tunc ilia AB,
et tunc ultima Ista C, et tunc ultima ilia DE. 6. igitur (praeter
ista) add.CD. 7. confirmatur ratio C / quia sequitur A, quia sequitur
bene CD, quia bene sequitur E, sequitur bene on.B. 3. Isti duo
homines B, isti homines sinfulness sunt homines CD, llli homines
singulares sunt homines E. 9. istos CE / communem istis E. 11. et
homo in communi C / et hoc ora.B. 12. iuxta oa.C. 13. istud BC /




Concerning the foregoing, first of all it is doubted whether
there wight not be an infinite number of universale from those
five* And the argument rune thus* These five universale have in common
the fact that they are uu-iversals* Therefore it is possible to posit
besides then a sixth universal, which is common to them and in which
they agree* And finally these six universala have ih common the
fact that they are universal. Therefore a seventh universal can be
posited, which the previous six have in common* And so on ad infinitum*
The logic of the argument is confirmed., because it is valid to
argue that these individual men have in common the fact that they
axe meni therefore it is possible to posit a man common to them*
Thus the argument is similarly valid in the first case* And similarly
it is possible to ask whether Socrates and man in general are two men
in the same way that genus in general and universal in general are
two universale, as has already been established*
And as far as the particular doubt is concerned, it must be
denied that an infinite number of universale can be assumed besides
the five universale given* On the contrary, every universal per
se, apart from seing in general, is formally a genus, a species,
a difference, a property or an accident, as has been made clear in
the foregoing* And thus it must be admitted, that it is possible to
posit a sixth universal besides these, namely Being in general, in which
the other five agree in so far as they are beings. But we should
not proceed to the end of thie argument, because this sixth universal
is Being in its most general sense* So it is not possible to posit
a sixth universal besides these five, which they all hold in common
by virtue of the fact that they are universale, which is the point
at doubt* Thus we can allow that it is possible to have a universale
in which these five agree in so far as they are unlvo ealo and this
is general universality* But we should not admit that these five and
ttMlvsvaifil L<*anAv>a1 avo frnvscl 1 v aiv nr. ivovoul o
(coat.) 1% citra ens commune B. 16. at est concedandiaa B, at sic est
concedendua CE. 17. praetar iota ci " -v.* tmiveraalia B, praeter lata CE /
aa> ponerc fir /. eexixm om.B / eas coomune ODE. 18. ait procedendua B.
19* praater iata B, praetor lata quxnque C / ncn om.G / est ponere BE /
septiraum A. 21. et tunc CDS / concedatur. 23. qulnqu# universalia B.
24. maaquaH aet cancvdGods CUE.
(37)
Cap. IX IXibiuta iTiraium
25 foxmalis termini secuadae iuteatioais cum texmino rmnerali de aliquibus,
ubi late terminus eecundae Intentionla significat prisarie unum illorum,
licet sit concedenda, ubi non sic.
Exempla primae partis regulae sunt taliai hoc eoEasune animal
et hoc commune genua non sunt foxssaiitmr duo genera, nee ilia quinque
30 et hoc co®iune universale sunt foxmaliter sex universalis, quia
praedicatuas tarn in prima praedicatione quais in secunda significat
prim-arie unuia comparatorum. Exesepls secu dae partis regulae sunt
talis: homo et asinus sunt formaliter duae species, quia hoc praedieatum
"species" non significat pri arie ho. inem nee asinus. Etiass substantia
35 et quant itaa aunt formal iter duae praed ieamenta, quia hoc praedicatias
"praedicaaentam" nou significat priisarie substantia® nec quantitatem.
In praedicatione tarnen secundum essentia* est concedendum, quod
animal cosur,une et hoc commune genus sunt duo genera* too sunt omnia
genera, non teasen formaliter.
40 Et conformiter dicitur ad dubium moturn, quod in pr&edicatione
secundum essentia^ Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines, non
tamen in praedicatione formal!, quia homo communis est omnes homines.
In caau taaen, quod Socrates sit omnia homo, negandu® est, quod
Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines. Unde tertainus numeral la
45 ariditua termino prime intent ion is limitat ad suppositious® personale®.
St sic idem est dicere "Socrates et homo cosasmnis sunt duo homines" et
"aunt duo singulares homines", quod repugnat casui. Bsmo in iato
casu Socrates et homo communis sunt homines, et taraen nec finiti
nec infiniti. lata tamen concluaio foret iapossibills de talibus, quae
%
23* qulnque universalis B. 24. nuiaquora est concedenda CUE. 25. cuts
aliquibus E. 26. ille terminus B./ illorum (comparatorum) add. E.
27* non sit C, non sic (etc,) add.BGE. 28. (et sio) exempla add.B.
29. ista BC, ilia quinque (universalis) add.E. 30. et hoc) in hoc B /
sex 6®.B. 3"> • piaedicatione) propositione A. 33* talia oa.B / et oe.D /
(nec) hoc add.C. 33-34. hoc comi.une species AB. 34. non ora.BC, non) nec DE /
prisarie sign if icat D / etism) et DE. 36. hoc praedicatua om.AB J
hoc primarie sign if icat D. 38. hoc commune animal BD. 39* duo genera
(quia hoc commune genus est duo genera) add.DE. 40. et conform iter obs.B.
41-42 non tamen) seci ;on D, tarnen om.E. 42. homo in comuni B
Chap. Nina First Doubt (38)
And so the formal predication oi a term of second intention with
a numeral is never peraisaable of any group of things when the tern
of second Intention signifies primarily one of those things* although
it is pennissable when this is not the case.
Examples of the first part of the rule are suchi animal in
general and genus in general are not formally two genera* not axe
the five predic&bles and universal in general formally six universale*
because the predicate both in the first and in the second predication
given above signifies primarily one of the parts of the subject.
Examples of the second part of the rule are such: man and ass are
formally two species, because the predicate "species" signifies
primarily neither a man nor an ass. And substance and quantity
are formally two Categories, because the predicate "Category" signifies
neither substance nor quantity primarily. However in predication
according to essence it must be admitted that animal in general
and genus in general are two genera* in fact constitute all genera*
but not formally however.
One could reply along the same lines to the doubt put forward
that in essential predication Socrates and man in general are
two men I however in formal predication this would be i possible, as
man in general constitutes all men. However in the case where Socrates
constituted all wen, it would have to be denied that Socrates and
man in general were two men. Hence the conjunction of a numeral and
a terra of first intention implies a limitation to personal supposition.
And thus it is the same to say that Socrates and man in general ere
two men and that they are two individual men, which la contradictory.
For In this case* Socrates ny><^ general are men and yet they
axe neither definite men nor indefinite men. It would however be
impossible to draw this conclusion with regard to the sort of things,
43* homo Oi?;.C. 44. duo homines (etc.) add.C. 46. communis (tamen) add.C.
47* homines singulares B / casui om.D / into casu PI), in casu isto C*
in casu illo E, in illo casu A. 46. homines ( et sunt duo homines
singulares) add.B / tamer; om.AE.
Cap*IX Dubiuffl Frimum
sunt fonsaliter homines*
(SI haec praedicatio eaaet concedenda "homo comsastis est formaliter
homo", tunc sic forma praedicati est humanitas aire communieabilitas,
quae human itas est convertibilis cum praedieato, ita est in facto*
Sed secundum praedicationera dates, coomunicabilitas esset forma, quae
includeretur in signifiest&e termini "homo"* Et sic homo esset humanitas,
quae tunc non esset forma, sed ipsemet homo, et cosnaunicabilitas, quae
esset eius forma* St sic iste terminus "homo" significaret humanitatem
et eoBHsunicabilitate®, sicut et isti termini "homo communis", cpa dicitur
homo communis, communicabilitas est forma hominia.)
Unde homo com- ur.is non est formal iter homo, sed identitate, quia
tunc esset forma sui ipsius, licet sit fozmaliter homo communis, quia
coamunicabilitas forsaliter sibi ineet*
Et si quaeratur in quo conveniunt omnia universalia in hoc quod
sunt universalia, dicitur quod in hoc comiauni "universale*. Et illud
in se ipso convenit cum omnibus aliis universalibus: et communicatur
sibi ipsi et omnibus aliis univeraalibus, quia praedicatur de se
identitate et de aliis taaquans superius, sicut species huraana et omnes
homines conveniunt specialite in eade® specie, ne sit processus in
infinitum in speciebus humanis*
Et si obiciatur, quod infinite sunt universalia secundum nuaerum,
eo quod sunt infinitae species nuaerorum et figurarua iuxta Boetiumt
iirao fortius, infinitae sunt species animal lues, quia duo animalla
diversarusi apecierum coeuntia generant animal tertiae specie! iuxta
Ffcilosophoa, illud igitur conriixtum cue animali alterius speciei
51* (unde) si add.B* 51-59- Si haec — forma hotninia om.CDE* 55* (Istius)
termini add.B* 56-57- sad ipdemet —• forma oa*B* 57-56* humanitaa et
coifimunicabilitas A, 62. sibi formaliter inest HDE. 65* universalibus
aliis A* 65-66. et commuiiicatur — aliis os.B* 66. universal ibus
aliis A / quae praedicantur AB / se om.B. 6: • specialiter AB. 71*
secundum Boetium AB* ^2* sunt infinitae B / species oa.B / eo quod AB*
73- diversarum specierum om.B / specie tertiae 2). 74- illud) idem BD /
igitur) ante® E, igi ur (animal) add.fi.
Chap. IX First Doubt
which ere formally men.
(For if the predication "man in general is formally a man" is
admitted, then the form of the predicate is humanity or
comamnieability and this humanity converts with man and thus does so
in reality* ait according to the predication given, conaunicability
would constitute the form, which would thus be included in what is
signified by the tern "man". And thus man would be identical with
humanity, which itself would not constitute the form of man, but man
himself, and with coEmunicability, which would be its form. And thus the
terns "man" would signify humanity and communicability, Just as in the
case of the term "man in general", by which man in general is expressed,
cownunicability is the form of man.)
Hence, man in general is not formally a man, but is so by
identity, because otherwise he would constitute the form of himself,
although he is formally "nan in general", because comaunicability inheres
formally in itself.
And if the question were put, as to what all universale have in
common, that makes them universale, the answer is that they have the
universal universal in commont and that this has all the other universale
in common with itself and is common to itself and to all other
universale, because it is predicated of itself by virtue of identity
and of the others in the manner of a superior. In the sare way the
human species and all men have in common belonging specifically to
the same species, otherwise there would be an infinite regression in
the husan species.
And supose the objection were to be made that universale are
numerically infinite, because there is an infinite number of species
of numbers and figures, as Boethius says, and, to give a more concrete
example, because there is an infinite number of species of animals,
because two animals of different opeeies copulating roduce an animal
of a third species, as Aristotle eaya, and this third animal mating
with an animal of another species,••
Cap. IX Bubiua Primuis
75 generabit animal quartae specie!s et sic in infinitum, Secundo sic*
nulla est species specialissima in genere animalis, quia non homo,
eo quod sunt duae per ae species eub hoaine, scilicet vir coemunia et
sulier communis.
Ad prisma dicitur, quod non est inconveniens infinitas esse
80 species accidentium, et hoc saltern quantum ad nos, Kec taraen propter
hoc sunt infinltae species aubstantiarua nec anlmaliua. Et conceditur,
_ <9
iuxta sentential Porphirii, quod animal generaturn ab animalibus
differentibus in specie est alterius specie! quara aliquod illorusa,
Kec potest illud animal generare aliquod animal niterius propter
85 intrinsecas qualitatea latentes ex parte complexionia, sicut nec
Phoenix, Et licet illud animal habeat potentia® generativare, non
tamen potest generare, sicut nec homo, cum devenerit ad certaa
aetaten, potest procedere in actum generandi. Ad secundum dicitur
negando, quod vir et mulier sunt per se species sub hom-ine, cura
90 contir.git idem individuum esse virum et aralieress, ut patet de
hermaphroditism
75. generat CPE / sic (quia) add
eo quod) quia Bfi. 77• per se species oouC, species per se BD / vir in
coremuni B. 76, mulier in oeesmni 3, 79» primus (intorum) add.B,
iillorum) add.A, 80, quantum (pertinet) add.A. 81, conceditur)
est concedendus; B. 83, in.cm.A, specialite BE / est om.B. 84.
aliquod animal ulterius) aliud alterius B, 86, et (sic) add.BCD,
87• devenerit) pervcnerit B. 89, negando cre.E. 90. patet) per C.
91, sicut hermaphrodita B / .
Chap.IX First Doubt (42)
would produce an animal of a fourth species and so on
ad infinitum. And secondly suppose it were to be objected that
there is no lowest-order species in the genus animal, because even
man is not such a one, as there are two species per se of a lower
order than man, namely man in general and woman in general.
To the first objection the reply is that it is not implausible,
that there should be an infinite number of species of accidents,
at least as far as we can know tness. However there are not, by
virtue of this possibility alone, an infinite number of species
of substances or animals and it must be admitted in accordance with
the opinion of Porphyry, that an animal generated by animals differing
in species is of a different species to either parent, however this
animal cannot at a later date generate another animal, because its
intrinsic qualities are latent ae far aa regeneration axe concerned,
as is the case with the Phoenix. And although such an aniioal possesses
a generative potential, it does not reproduce, as neither does man,
for only when he reaches a certain age can he begin to reproduce.
To the second objection the answer is to deny that men and women
are per se species subordinate to man, for it does happen, that the




25 arguendi in talibus terminis, sic est arguendumi homo co&raunis non
currit et homo communis est foraaliter aliquid, quod est homo, igitur.. etc..
Et tunc minor est falsa..
Ad secundaa eonclusionen dicitur negando illaa. St conceditur
regula asouapta et ulterius negatur, quod res universalis est formaliter
30 non quanta, cum ilia non sit praedicatio formalis essentia lis, cum nulla
negatio pura sit de formal! essentia quiditativa alicuius universalis.
Nec ilia praedicatio est praedicatio foraalis accidentalis, cure nulla
talis negatio pura sit accidens formaliter inhaerens universalis
Ex quibus infertur, quod in praedicationesa secundum essentia® sunt
35 concedendae tales prae icationesJ Socrates est aliud ab hosiine at aliud
a Socrate, quia est hoo aliud ab horaine et hoc est aliud a Socrate,
demonstrando animal commune. Capiendo ilium terminum "aliud" in
neutero genera substantivato, taraen negatur, quod Socrates est aliud
a Socrate vel differt a Socrate. Et si arguitur sic x Socrates differt
40 ab ham ine in cammi, igitur non est homo communis, negatur consequent ia
nec arguitur ab exposito ad eius exponenteo. Sed talis propositio
debet sic probari. Aliqua ratio inact formaliter Socrati, quae non
inest hosrini in communi, vel e contra, igitur Socrates differt ab
homine in conaami. Et antecedena patet, quia singularitas inest formaliter
45 ;Joerati et non formaliter homini in comsuni, et e contra universalitas
inest formaliter hornini in coramuni et non formaliter Socrati, igitur etc..
27* saxAx et om.A / est minor C / falsa (etc.) add.C. 28. conclusions om.C /
conceditur) concedatur A. 29* assumpta AD, sumpta BC, assign; ta E /
negatur ulterius E. 30* ilia om.C / praedioatio formal1s esoentialis)
formaliter eatentialis. 31* pura om.BCD£ / universalis) vel B.
32. praedicatio post est cm.ABC / forraalis) formal iter A. 33. pura)
prima C / foraaliter accidens C. 35. tales praedicationes concedendae C /
praedicationes) propositionea B*, praedicationes (scilicet) add.E.
36-39. quia est — a Socrate ota.A. 36. Socrate (vel differt a Socrate)
add.CB, vel quod differt a Socrates add.A / (et) quia add.K / est
om.3* / hoc pest est oo.B./ est o».B. 37* animal in communi B* /
latum B / aliud) animal B*. 38* aliud) alius C. 39* differt a Socrate)
alius ab hoaine C / sic om.C / (quod si) Socrates add.C / (si) Socrates
add.B. 40# homine com;; uni BE. 41. ad (unaa) eiue add.PC. 42. formaliter
inest CD. 43* (formaliter) inest CUE / hcoini coramuni BE /• 44* hoainl
communi BE./ petet) est varum D / formaliter inest CB. 45* formal iter
oat.B* / ho&ini communi BE. 46. formal iter inest C / formal iter inest
B*B£ / igitur) ideo C / igitur etc. om.C.
(44)
Chap.X Second Doubt
In respect of the proposition containing the nub of the argument.
Kan in general does not run and san in general is formally a thing
that is man, therfore... and so on. Thus the minor premiss is seen
to be false,
lb the second argument the reply is to deny it, The rule adopted
is admitted. Finally it is denied that a universal thing is not
formally quantifiable as such, because the predication here is not
formal and essential, since one cannot properly negate the formal
quiditative essence of any universal. Nor is this predication a formal
and accidental predication, because such a negation cannot be
properly an accident, inhering in a universal.
From this it is infered that pj edications such as the following
are to be admitted in essential predication, e.g, Socrates is
something other than nan and something other than Socrates, because
pointing to animal in general, this is something other than xaan
and something other than Socrates, However taking the phrase "something
other than" as a neuter substantive, it is denied that Socrates is
something other than Socrates or that he differs from Socrates,
And if one argues thusJ Socrates differs from man in general and
thus is not identical with man in general, one must deny that the
argument is valid, nor can one argue from what is explained to what
explains it. However a proposition of this type should be -emor,atrated
thuss there is some principle formally inherent in Socrates, which Is
absent from man in general, or to put it another way, Socrates is
different from man in general. The antecedent is clearly true,
because singularity formally inheres in Socrates and not in man in
general. And on the other hand universality formally inheres in man in
general and not in Socrates,
(Capitulmr, Decimua)
(DUBIUM SECUNDUM)
Secundo dubitatur auaquid universale oit auum singulars, quod
sic patet ex declaratis, quod non arguitur. Quia primo sequitur,
quod omnia homo currit et aliquid, quod eat homo, non curriti quia
ponitur, quod omnia homo currat, tunc patet prima pars t et eecunda
5 probatur, quia homo communis non currit et homo communis eat allquid,
quod est homo, iuxta coneessurai igitur... etc.. Patet consequentia,
quia est sillofiismus expoaitoriua.
Secundo sequitur, quod quantum est non quantum. Probatur, quia
iuxta opinioncm, quando sunt duae denominationea oppoaitae, quorum
10 una praedicatur foxmaliter do re comrouni et alia foraaliter de singular!,
tunc concedenda eat praodicntio secundum eaaentiam unius de reliqua.
Ut, quia homo communis est forma liter cost-nun icabil is et formal iter
indivisibilis, et homo singularis eat formaliter singularis et
divisibilis, ideo coneeditur, quod universale est singular* et
\rj Indiviaibile eat dlviolhlle. Igitur, cum reo singularis ait formaliter
quanta et res communis formaliter non quanta, concedenduic est, quod
quantum est non quantum.
Ad primum negatur conclusio reducta in opposition dubium, et adeitt&tur
casus, et negatur secunda pare concluaionia, scilicet* altquid, quod
20 oat homo, non currit. Et negatur consequentia ulteriua facta pro
prv at lone llliusi nec est oillogiomuc exposltorlus nisi mediua
terminus enset aupponens pro ind ividuo, et non pro cosmiuni, vel
alitor terminus Inferior ad maiorem extremitatcra vel ad niriorem.
quorum neutrum hie reperitur. Unde ad hoc, quod teneat modus
C.Xt 1. suura A CD, anud B, unua E. 2. (et) quod non add.CI) /
priiao) tunc 2). 3. quia) quod E» 3-4. quia ponitur) probatur et
ponitur C. 4. ponitur) probatur B / (et) tunc add.B / prima (parte)
add.B, prima para patet C. 7. consequentia) consequent B / expositoriua
(Notandum quod quando alieuod accidena recipit inceptionem, quam
attribuit suo aubiecto, tunc suseipit seipsam mediant* se et non
§ediante alia, ut Socrates, qui iam prirao incipit ease et xxas (?)
aediante alia inceptione, tunc ista inceptio incipit ease mediante
aeipsa, quia lata est aliquod accidena et ± illud accidena recipit
inceptionea quaa attribuit suo aubiecto) add.B. ?. est ota.E / non
est C. 9. quandocuaque A. 10. de re communi fonaaliter 0 / alia) aliud A
Chapter Tea
SHXJJiD BOOTH?
In the second place it is doubted whether a universal is the
saae as its particular, which notion is clear from, tut not discussed
in the foregoing* For the first argument runs thuss every man
runs and something, which is a man, does not run* It is assumed,
that all eon run, thus the first part of the argument is clearly
true* And the second part is seen to be proved, since man in general
does not run and man in general is something, which is a man, as
has been previously admitted, therefore*••• etc.* The validity
of the argument is clear, because it is an expositorial syllogism*
The second argument runs thus, that a thing of a certain formal
character is not of that chaxarcter* This is seen to be proved,
because following generally held views, when one has two accidents
with opposite denominations, of which one is formally predicated
of a general thing and the other of a singular thing, then one must
allow essential predication by one of the other* For example, since
men in general is formally universal and formally indivisible and man
in particular is formally singular and divisible, one must admit that
a universal thing is singular and that an indivisible thing is
divisible* Thus, since a singular thing may be formally characterised
as universal and a universal thing is seen to be characterised as
singular, it is admitted that a thing of a certain formal character
is not of that character*
In reply to the first argument, the conclusion drawn from the point
at doubt cited is denied* The generalisation adduced is admitted, but
the second part of the conclusion, namely "something, which is a man,
does not run" is denied* Then the argument put forward finally to
prove this is denied* Kor can the syllogism be said to be expoaitorial
unless the middle term is seen to stand for a particular thing, not
for a general thing, or unless it be a term inferior to the extreme
term of either the major or the minor premiss* But neither of these
(#•
two cases occurs here* Thus one should argue in the following manner •••
(cont.) formal iter osi.C / de ^re) singular! add. CD. 13* indivisibilisO
divisibilis £ / est can. a / formal iter (homo) add.C* 14* divisibilis)
Indivisfbilia E / concedendua A, conceditur CBE, concedatur B /
singular© est universale A, singular* eat universale o».B* 15* eat as*CDE /
igitur as.B / cusj res singulexis sit formal iter qua. ta) res quanta
singularis sit formaliter B / res (quanta) singularis CDE* 16* communis
(sit) forrcaliter add.B / quod ora.B, 19* scilicet (quod) AC, 20-21*
pro probations illiua om.A, 21* (dieere) sillogismue add.ag.D /
expositorus DE* 22* (tunc) esset add.E / (aedius) sup-onens add.B /




Tertio dubitatur numquid tales praedicationes sunt conceri ndae
d« univeraalibus: scilicet "horao communis currit", "homo communis
est albus" etc.. Quod non patet ex praedictia et quod aic arguitur.
Accidentia talis universally. prisio aubiectantur non in individuis,
5 igitur in communibus. Et per consequens priao denoninant comraunia.
Item ilia eat vera: "homo communis currit", ale primarie
aignlficando probatur homines coramunem currere eat veritaa. Et aic
ilia primarie aignifieat, i&itur.•.etc.. Antecedent probatur sic.
Ilia est vera: "homo currit*, ut supposito, et ilia primarie aignificat
10 hoiainem connranem currere, igitur...etc.. Hinor arguitur sic: subiecturn
lllius aignificat primarie hominem communes et alia para aignificat
currere. Agitur tota propoaitio aignificat prisiarie horn inem commune®
currere, Et per consequena istae propoaitionea airapliciter convertuntur:
"homo currit" et "homo communis currit". Sed una eat vera, igitur et
15 alia.
Pro iato dubio eat dicendum, quod tale accidena universale habet
duplex aubiectum primun, scilicet quo ad dependentiam, et sic universale
eat eiua subiectua prlmua, vol quo ad denominations, et sic singulars
vol aggregatum ex singularibue est eius subiectum prirEum. Verbi
20 gratia: risibilitas communis quo ad dependentiam priao subiectatur
in specie huraana, sed quo ad dencminationem eequae pridem subiectatur
in cuolibet horaini singular! vel in aggregato ex omnibus hominibus.
Et tunc non valet consequently facta:"^-alia universalis accidentia
primo subiectantur in coramunibua, igitur primo denomin&t communia",
C.XI: 1. praedicattones) propositiones A. 2. scilicet oa.C, scilicet)
sicut A / homo communis poet currit ore. AI;. 3. etc om.B / patet)
constat C / ex pr&edictis om.B / quod om.B / aubieciantur (et) add.ABC.
4. In universalibus AB, univerealia CBE / in ante individuis om.B.
5. cosBBunibus) universalibus B. 6. (aecun o) Item add.E / ilia) ista C
/ (pr&ecise) priRarie add.C, (praecise et) primarie add.B, primarie
(praeolae) add.B, (praecise vel) primarle add.E. 7. commune® oas.D.
8. (praeciae) primarie add.CE, primarie (praecise) add.D / antecedens
sic ABC, antecedena probatur sic BE. 9. ilia eat) ista est BC /
ut supposito on.BE / (praecise et) primarie add.B, (praecise)
primarie add.C, primarie (praecise) add.B. 10. etc. oa.C / arguitur





In the third place it is doubted whether predications such as
the following are to be admitted in respect of universale, namely
"mar. in general runs", "man in general is white" etc.. This is not
clear from the foregoing, but is argued as following. Such universal
accidents primarily ta e as their subjects, not particulars, but
common entities. And thus as a result, they primarily denote com on
entities.
further, it is true that man in general runs, thus in its
primary sense, the truth of the proposition "man in general runs"
is proved. And the proposition thus has a primary meaning, therefore
...ana so on. The antecedent is proved in this wayi it is true that
man runs, hut because it has supposition, it primarily signifies
man in general running, therefore...and so on. The minor premies is
argued In this wayt its subject primarily stands for man in general
and the other part stands for running. So the whole proposition
primarily means that man in general runs. And consequently these
propositions directly convert* "man runs" and "man in general runs".
One is true, so the other is also.
As far as the former doubt is concerned, we must state that
a universal accident of-the above king has two types of primary
subject, that is, with respect to dependency, where a universal is
its primary subjet t, and with respect to denotation, where a
particular or a sua of particulars is its primary subject. For
example, in its general sense, the ability to laugh with respect to
denotation has as its subject the human species, but with respect to
dependency finds its subject equally in any man in particu ar or in
the sum of all men. And thus the argument as set out does not stand,
that is that universal accidents of this sort primarily take their
subjects from among com on entities and that ahey primarily denote
common entities.
(over)
(cont.) osi*3. 12. (praeciae et) primarie add.B, primarie ora.S. 13.
istae) 111m E, istae (duae) &dd.B / convertuntur 8laplieiter BC,
elmpliciter ons.E. 14. sed una est vera) sed vera eat B. 16. dicendvsn
est £, est oa.E. 17. primus) primo B / scilicet oa.B. 1u. eius oe.A.
21. pridea) prlao 3 / subieetatur ora.CDE. 22. homini) eius G / in ante
a& regato oe.E. 23. tunc) sic CUE / valet (talis) add.CK / facta oa.G /
talia ora.C. 24. prists oa.E.
(49)
Cap. XI Dubiucs Tertiusa
25 quia antecedens est verua, loquendo de subiectatione quo ad dependent^
iam, et consequens falaum. Vel potest diei, quod talis accidentia
communis laplleant sua aubiecta prima esse per se mobilia. Ideo non
primo denominant communis, sed primo deno;: inant res singularea. Et aie
accidentia remote denominant sua communis, ut in neutero generei "homo
50 communis est album, risibile" etc..
Ad secundum negatur, quod ilia eat vera: "homo communis currit"
sed ilia est vera: "homo currit" in casu posito. Et negatur ulterius,
quod ilia oignificat primarie horn in era coaisunera currere. Et non valet
consequentia ulterius facta "subieetum signifiest prinarie hominem
35 commune® et alia pars signficat currere, igitur*.»ete."* Antecedens
enis est verum in supposition© pergonal i, sed non in suppositions
simplici, quia late terminus "horao" aignific&t primarie naturam
humanam, oui inest comruricabil itas, sed nor. significat primarie
111am naturam, ut ipsa est cosununicabilis. Et hoc oportet addere
40 ad hoc, quod argumentum valeret. Unde iste terminus "homo" significat
hominem commune®, ac ctiaa iste terninuc "homo terminus", sed diopariter.
Ideo non convertuntur, quia primus significat primarie naturam, cui
inest coasBunieabilitae, et alius stgnificat illaai natur&a, ut ipsa
est comriunicabills.
45 Fatet etia® quomodo modus arguendi non valet in assimilii capiendo
illaai propositions® "asinus est hamin is", cubtectum priraxie significat
"asimiss" et verbum "ease" et praedicatum primarie "hominem", igitur
tota propositi© significat primarie asinum esse hoainea. Bato enim
conscquente, istae duae propositiones convertuntur» "asinus eat homo"
25. (et) quo ad add.JB. 26. et consequens falsua om.CDE / vel) unde E /
27. implicantia CDE / ideo om.CDE. 28. ccramunia) sua individua C,
om.DE / sed (sua individua) add.EE / sic (ilia) add.DE. 29. sua coaanunia)
ilia singular!a CDE / ut in neutero genere) sicut accidentia singularit
a contra remote denoainant universalis in talibus praedicationibua CEE.
30. risibile etc. oa.B. 31• negatur) dicitur negando B / ilia) haec C.
3?. sqd) et C / ilia) naec C / in casu posito "homo currit" B /
et negatur) sed negatur B. 35* primarie signifioat E. 34. facta
ulterius C / (ibidem) aubieotum add.C / subiectum (illiusj ada.C /
prinarie oci.B. 35. significat ons.C / et alia pars signilicat currere;
etc.EE. 36. enim oa.B, 57. Iste) ille K. 38. numanaa om.CEE. 39.
oporteret CEE /40. valerate argumentus 8 / valeat E / iste ) ille E.
Chap*XI Third Doubt (50)
so speaking of taking a subject with respect to dependency, the
antecedent is true and the consequent is false* Or one could say
that general accide te of this sort i» ly that their priiaary
subjects are per se mobile* Thus they do not primarily denote
common entities, but singular things* And therefore accidents
secondarily denote their general forms, for example in the neuter
gender: "man in general is a white thing, is something capable
of laughter" etc*.
In reply to the second argument it is denied that "man in general
runs" is true. However "a man runs" is true in the example given.
And finally it is denied that this latter proposition primarily
signifies that man in general runs. And the last argument set out
i*e* that "the subject primarily means nan in general and the other
part means running, therefore.*.and so on" is not true. For the
antecedent is true in personal supposition but not in simple supposition,
because the tens "man" primarily signifies that human nature, in which
universality exists, but does not primarily mean the nature, which is
itself universal. And this limitation should be added to the argument
for it to hold true*
For this reason the term man signifies man in
general and so does the phrase "man in general", but in a different
way. Thus these two terms do not convert, as the first primarily
signifies the entity, in which universality exists, and the other
signifies the entity, which is itself universal*
It is thus clear that any such way of arguing will be false,
and for similar reasons: for taking the proposition "an ass is of
man", the subject primarily signifies "an ass" and the verb "being"
and the predicate primarily signifies "a man". Therefore the whole
proposition i». ittppose* to signify primarily that aa a«* is a man.
§• given that the csrseqwnt is true, these two propositions
convert: **« *«- f- » —" sro? "an ass is of man", which is not true*
But it would be necessary that these two propositions were synonymous
(over)
cont.) 41* iste) ille £• 42. (illam) naturam add.CDE / naturam
humanam) add.A. 43* alius (terminus) add.CDE / naturam (communem)
add. AD / ipsa om.B. 43* (quomodo) quod £ / modus om.A. 46. illam)
istam BE / (ibi) subiectum add.C / significat primarie B. 47 • "hominem"
primarie D. 48. primarie ora.A, primarie (et praecise) add.E /




50 et "aainua est ho®inis", quod non eat veruxs. Sed oportet, quod ilia
duo praedicatc. sunt sinoainaa et eodem modo signlfIcandi significarent
hoiaine®, quod non eat verum,
(Capitulum Luodeciauffi)
(DOBlim quartum)
Quarto dubitatur de coranunicabilitate universalium. Et videtur,
quod una species apecialisaima eat »H* magis comjf.unicabilis, quia
quanto una species cohkuhicatur, tanto est coausunicabilia. Sed una
species specialiesiaa pluribus coranuricatur quae alia, sicut species
5 puncti qua® species humana, igitur...etc,. It per Idea deducitur, quod
aliqua species speoialissiaa est connun lor certo genere subalterno,
quia species puncti pluribus cos&mn icatur qua® genus animalia,
igitur...etc..
Pro illo dubio est notanduas, quod coa&unicabilitas universalis
10 est una passio absoluta, consequens naturara universalem, quae attenditur
penes distant lass universalis ab esse individuali et non penes hoc,
quod tale universale pluri us comsranicatur. Unde aeque coaisunicabilis
est species hearts in casu, quod Gocrates sit omnis hciso, ac si essent
aille mil la ho.olnua, quia tunc jrante d istat ab esse individuali,
15 sicut unquara alias. Lt sic est ordo in coiumunicabilitate universal in®,
quis species speoiallesimas sunt miniaae c<fearunes, delude genera
subaltema per ordinas, deinde rraedicaoienta, et sic usque ad ens, quod
est marine con;, ne, quia maxiae d istat ab esse individuali.
Et per hoc negatur maior argumenti, quod quanto speciea comraunicatur,
20 tan to est commnnicabilis, quia ilia implicat aequalitataa inter
30. ilia) lata B. 51• sunt ainonima) sinonime CBL / et) in B.
52. quod non est verua) quod l&lsua est B / verum (etc,) add.E.
C.XIlt 1. de ess.£ / (nuaquid universale sit suuns universale, quod
aic patets Pro dictaj ooramunicabilitate add.B / de om.B / et ( ic)
add.B. 2. quia) quod B. 3. (in) quanto C / species ante eoNKtnicatur
om.C / (pluribus) coeununicatur add.C / (in) tanto add.C / est (magia)
add.C / una) aliqua C. <6. aliqua) una B / epecialiseiaa oa.C /
genera certo C. 7* communicator pluribus E. 9* illo) isto BC / est
om.A, notandum est B. 10. naturae universalis A. 11. ab) ad C. 12.
universale tale CE / coatnunicabilis) praedicabilis A. 1% humana om.B /
quod) qua £ / ait) essat C / essent ou.E. 14 quia) per B. asaaaataa
16. co- rmnee oa.C. 19* quante 1), (in) quanto add.E / species (sic)
add.C. 20. tante 1), (in) tantc add.C.
(52)
Chap.XII Fourth Doubt
and that they signified man in the same way, which they do not.
In the fourth place the cosmunicability of the universal is
doubted. And it appears that one inf ima species io more coj^unicable
than another, because to the same extent that a species is common,
so it is communicable. But one infima species is common to more
things than another, for instance the species of points than the
human species, therefore.••and so on. And from this argument we deduce
that one infima species is more common than some other subaltern genus,
since the species of points is common to more things than the genus
animal, therefore.•.and so on.
As far as this doubt is concerned, it should be noted that the
eomraunicability of a universal is an absolute affection consequent
on the nature of the universal, which is conceived according to the
distance of the universal from particular being and not according to
the fact that the universal is common to many tilings. Thus species is
equally predicable of the human species, whether Socrates constitutes
all sen or whether there are a million men, because the human species
is as far from individual being in the one case as in the other.
And thus there is an order in the eauranicability of universale,
because the infima species are the least general, then cane the sub-
alter, genera and the Categories in the order, and so on up to Being,
which is the most general of all, because it is the most distant
from individual being.
By this the major premiss of the argument is denied, i.e. that
a species is communicable to the same extent to which it is
communicated, because this implies an equality between.••
(53)
Cap.XII Bubiuffi Quartua.
communicabilitateaj respective illius universalis et fwrnmunicahllitatom
absolutam, quae coapsratio non eat admittenda, eo quod talis communicabilitas
respectlva ousclpit magia et minus secundum diverea tewpora, sou non
ilia commonicabiltaa absoluta. Et sic negatur secundum deductum et
25 arguaentum pro ipso 1'actuE, scilicet species puncti pluribua comj-.ucicatur
qua® genus aniaalis, igitur est magis cojasune.
Et si deducitur sequit csends species special iaeii&as esse eeque communes
et aeque species, eo quod aequaliter distant ab ease individual!,
et per conaequena hoc commune species aequaliter et univoce praedicatur
50 de rebus diversorua pr&edica.sentoru»...dicitur concedendo consequana,
nec inconveniena aliquod universale per accidens praedicari :.c u: litei
et univoce de rebus diversorua praedicaaentorura, licet sit imposslbilia
de universale per se. Verbi gratia: esse figuratum praedioatur
aequaliter et univoce de substantia figurata et quantitate figurata,
35 esse praedicamentun aequaliter praedicatur de qualitate et quantitate*
Et sic hoc comraune species, quod eat universale per accidens aequaliter
praedicatur de honiric, puncto et albedine et sic de aliis singulis speciebus
specialissimas etc..
21 * conmunicabiltate respectiva C / illius) ipsius DE. 22. talis om.E /
coin: .unicabilita.3) comaunicatio CBE, comparatio add.Big.K. 24* ilia)
ista B / secundum orc.C / et ora.B. 25* arguaento C / scilicet om. E,
scilicet (quod)add.B / communicator pluribus D. 26. animal CD.
27. deducatur DE. 29. praedicatur aequaliter et univoce CD. 30«
conse- uens) conclusion's B. 31* inconveniens) universale C / aequaliter
praedicari BC. 32. et univoce on.C / licet (hoc) add.B. J2-35* et
univoce — aequaliter praedieatur om.B. 35* esse f iguarata D*
34* univoce et aequaliter praedicatur B, 35* et (esse) add.D. 37*
sic om.C. 3b. etc. ( cf. Cap.X 1. 34-46: Ex quibua — formaliter
Socrati) add. BC / add.B: Kota, quod non est concedendum, quod homo
in coarauni est unum universale, quae est principium quantitatis
discretae, quia tunc sequeretur, quod universale poneret se in
nujcero cum suo singulars, quod est fa 1 sua. Kota quod duplex est
cosffiunicabilitas, scilicet absoluta et respective.: absoluta est
quaedao passio absolute consequens naturae universalitatis, et
respectiva est quaedam passio consequens naturaa comparamdo illan
ad suo supposito.
A* Expliciunt universalis Myllverley compendioae compilata*
B. Expliciunt universalis Mylverlay utilia, quod B(uxhale), followed
by diagram of tree of Porphyry and inscription *ut lo,:icam, noscaa,
fructue ex arbore poscas".
C. Expliciunt quinque universalis aocundun Mulverley.
D. xpliciunt universalis Hagistri Wiliua Mylvyrley. quod (and what
looks like an erasure effected by applying the tip of a licked
finger vigorously to the page)*
Chap*XII Fourth Doubt
the relative cocreiunicability of this universal and its absolute
oosaunicability. And this comparison should not be admitted, because
such relative coomunicability admits of various decrees at different
periods in time, however absolute corcnuiiicaoility does not. ihus we
isust deny the second conclusion drawn arid the argument put forward
on its behalf* namely tliat the- species of points is communicated
to ©ore individuals than the genus animal and that it is thus more
coeauon*
And if it is supposed to follow that all infima species are
equally common and equally species* because they are equidistant
from individual being, and that consequently species in general
is predicated equally and univocally of instances of different
predicaments, the reply is to admit the consequent, for it is
not implausible that a universal per accidens should be predicated
equally and univocally of instances of different predicaments,
although it would be impossible of a universal per se. For example,
figurative being is predicated equally and univocally of
figurative substance and figurative quantity, and predicaments.!
being is equally predicated of quality and of quantity. And
therefore species in general, which is a universal per accidens, is
predicated equally of mar., a point, and of whiteness and similarly
of each of the infima species.
?
E. Explicit compendium de quinua universalibus secundum ^agister
W. Mylverley. Thomas Chawndler.
(55)
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Cub universalium cognitio, ut iestatur Porphirius in suo
libello, ad logicas caeteriaque acientiis praebet instrumentum,
ideo restat plua veritatia inter caeteras, ut poesidentan peraequi
penitue in praeaenti, eupponendo ei.ua cauaationem huiua termini
^ "universale".
Aliquid enira eat universale causations, eo quod plura cauaat.
Et aic nserito omnia rea, id est universale isto nrodo, dicitur
universale, et quoddam, ut rea, dicitur cauaator. Sic ad isturn
senaum aaaeritur univeraor, ubi constat, quod inter eaeteraa res
^ eat Ueua isto modo universalis, quia est maxiae causatinana.
Secundo modo dicitur universale exemplatione vel ldeale,
quod idra est, quod eat praeauppoaitum ad esse rei, secundum
quod ait rea et quod st&t esse sine tall re.
Tertio est universale receptione illud, quod potest in se plura
^ ansi vitiosua recipere. Et hoc contingit dupliciter* extrinsic#
et independenter vel intrinsice et dependenter. Prir.o modo dicitur
situs universale, cum plura corpora ponsit violasim et independenter
in se reoipere, cum tale locatum ab ipso non dependet. Secundo modo
loquendo dicitur materia prima universale, cum pluree fora&a
OQ
abaolutas dependentes recipiat.
Quarto modo dicitur universale cognition#, quod inducit vel
habet aptitudinem sive dispoeitionem ad i.ducendum aliquid in
cognitions rei. Et hoc contingit dupliciter* vel naturaliter
vel artificialiter. Illud dicitur universale cognitione natural!,
^ quod naturalem inducit vel habet aptitudinea ad inducendua aliquid
naturaliter in cognitions® rei, accidena respectu substantias.
Substantia enira eat lnducibilia in cognitioaem rei, quaavia non prirao
et principaliter. Contingit tanen, quod hususmodi accidentia inducant
■ II II I ■■ ■ " ■" " '■ ■ " JM' ■ 1 OX" " ' ""
2. acienssia. 7. isto modo my reading. 6. causam • 9. uni .
17. scitua. 13. tali. 19* dicitur) de.23* quadrupliciter.
(58)
Cap.II
substantia et accidents. Vel artilicialiter et tale universale
^ praedicatur de omnibus suis inferioribus univoce, Et hoc conting-it
dupliciter: vel quod idem non superveniat alia nature positive simpler,
et Lie est genus generalisaisum, vel quod idem superveniat alia
natura talis. Et hoc contingit dupliciter: nam vel idem praedicatur
de rebus diversarua perfect tonus essentialium, vel solum de rebus
*>5 eiusdeci perfectionis essential is, quod si primo aodo, sic dicitur
genus subalternu®, si secundo modo, sic dicitur species specialissima.
(Capitulu® Secundum)
Pro distinctione tw.ien habendo Inter dicta universalis, scilicet
speciem, differentials, proprium et accidens, est notandura, quod genus
est natura positive, simplex et univoca, quiditative praedicabilia
de rebus diversarura per se perfect iouuza esaerttialiua. lit hoc eontinglt
5 dupliciter: naza vel t&le per se continetur vel sub ge.-.ere get eralissimo
et sic est per se genua, vel est in tali genere per reductionea, et sic
est per accidens genus. Et quod aliquod sit genus per accidens
eontingit dupliciter, quia vel idem est natura jositiva, simplex et
univoca, quiditative praedicabilia de rebus diversarum per se
10 perfectionum essentialiunz, sicut sensibilitas in comment, vel alitor
idem est ag regatu® per accidens, ut animal album.
Species est natura poaitiva, simplex et univoca, solum quid¬
itative prat dicabilia de rebus eiusdesa perfectionis essentialis.
Et hoc contingit dupliciter: nam talis species est per se contents
15 sub genere tali, et sic est per se species, vel est in illo genere
per reduction#®, et sic est species per accidens. Et quod aliquod
sit species per acci ens contingit dupliciter: vel quod tale est natura
positiva, simple* et univoca, solum quiditative praedicabilis de rebus
C.St 2. est) et. 7* per accidens o®.
aliquid in cognitionem rei artificialiter, quia per discursum
30 quantum de se est illud, faciunt naturaliter, quia diversis modis.
Nam vel tale universale praedicatur de sua specie per se primo
qualitative et substantialiter et sic est differentia substantialis,
ut "homo est rationalis". Vel praedicatur de sua specie per se secundo
qualitative et sic est proprium secundo modo dictum, ut "homo est
35 risibilis". Vel tertio modo praedicatur per accidens de inferior!
illius specie! et sic dicitur accidens per accidens, ut "iste homo
est albus". Universale cognitione artificiale dicitur idem, quod
inducit aliquid in cognitionem rei pure artificialiter, vel hai#&
aptitudinem ad sic inducendum, modo quo terminus dicitur universale,
40 cum artificialiter sit in cognitionem rei per ipsum significatae.
Et tale dicitur universale loeatum et aliud universale naturale.
Quinto modo dicitur universale existentia vel praedicatione, cuius
natura non repugnat esse plura individua separatim. Additur enim
ista particula "cuius natura non repugnat" propter unicum solem.
45 Et huiusmodi, quae non sunt, nec possunt esse plura individua
separatim suis rationibus intrinsecis, non repugnat ipsa formaliter
esse plura individua separatim. Et additur iste terminus "separatim"
propter quantitatem discretam, quae est multa coniunctim, cum a
probabili omnis talis quantitas discreta sit realiter suae partis.
5° Et contingit dupliciter: vel quod sit plura divisim non divisa, vel
plura divisim et divisa. Si autem tale universale sit plura divisim
non divisa, sic dicitur universale supponi totum, ut dicuntur ratio,
memoria et voluntas. Si vero sit plura division et divisa, hoc contingit
dupliciteri vel quod praedicatur de pluribus secundum prius et
55 posterius, vel secundum maius et minus. Et sic universale est
aequivocum vel analogum, dicendo idem praedicari secundum maius et
minus, quod participatur de duabus. Be prioris uno solo participatur
per inhaerentiam vel comparation em ad aliud, modo quo ens participatur
33. secundo) de. 34* securdo) quarto. 38. inducit) includit in se/
incognitum / pure my reading. 39. inducender. 40. artificialis. 43*
enim) in.44.unicum my reading. 52. ut om.
(60)
Cap.III
eiuadera perfectionis essentialia, ut riaibilitas in coramuni, vel
20 aliter est «k: regatuai per accidens, ut hosio ssasculua*
Et sic differentia est natura positive, simplex et univoca,
qualitative praadicabilia per se priao de specie*
Propria est natura positiva, simplex et univooa, ex principiis
quid 1tativia egrediens, per se secundo praedicabilia de specie*
2$ Accidens est natura positiva, simplex et univoca, ex principiis
intrinsecis qualitativis e, rediens, per accidens in specie praedicabilis*
Additur enim ista particula "natura positive" in praedictis
descriptionibus ad differentiam negativarum veritatum af 1 irmativarum
de praesenti, praeterixo et de future, ut "hominem non esse aeinura",
sv
q Et sic additur iste terminus "simplex" ad differential!
aggregatorum, quae non sunt per se in genere, iuxta sententiara
Aristotelis dicentis album non esse in genere per se propter suara
dupiicea significationem,
Et additur iste terrainus "univoca" ad differentiara transcendentiua,
^ quae secundum cotnmunea nodura loquendi de auis inferioribus univoce
non praedicantur.
Et causa positionis caeterarum p&rticularura in praedictis
descriptionibus positarura faciliterque advertitur*
(Capitulura Tertium)
Circera istara praecedentem declarations tale ponitur dubium
numquid genus et species, quae inter caetera universalis digniora
reputantur, sua cfnt inferiora, de quibus praedicantur*
20, per) vel / ut) vir / masculus) m&stindua, 29* praesenti) posse*




▼•1 res primarie significatae par subiectua potest large dici
praedicatio essentialis.
Et sic praedicatio essential is est formalis. Possumus taraen
)
distinguere illas ex opposito* vocando praedicatio secundum eseentiam
40 unam, et aliam formale®. Undo tunc ad priorem descriptionem oportet
addere t "duaisodo nulla forma* ut forma incluea in praedicatio vel
existens praedicatum* requiritur denominative inexistere subiecto,
ut sic", vocando praeu cationem termini de texmino* ubi per praedicatum
denovinatur forma forma aliqua, quae est verifioationem propositionis
45 vel secundum talem praedicationaa requiritur non inesse formaliter
rei significatae per subiectust.
Kt praedicatio formalis rei de re est quando ratio praedicati hoc
est forma* ut forma inclusa in praedicato vel existens praedicatum*
ut huiusmodi foxmaliter inest subiecto* ut "homo est animal"* "Socrates
50 eat album". Et dividitur talis praedicatio in praedicationera essentialem
et accidentalem. Fraedicatio formalis essentialis est duplex* ut de
praecadentibus* vis. termini de tezvino vel rei de re. Termini de
termino est quando praedicatum dertominatur aliqua forma etc.* et tale
praedicatum est de quiditate subiecti, ut hoc contingit quando species
55 vel genus praedicatur* et haec pr.&dicatio est in quid* vel quando
differentia substantialis praedicatux et eic est in quale. Kt talis
pr edicatio per se in quale est duplexi cum alia talis sit in quals
per se prime et alia talis sit in quale per se secundo. Praedicatio
in quale per se prlmo est quando pr&edicatur differentia substantialis.
60 Praedicatio in quale per se secundo est quando praedicatur passio vel
proprietor subiecti* quae* licet non sit de esse subiecti* cum sit
ipso posterior, tamen per se ineat, cum subiectua non posset componi
ex suis principiis quiditativis, nisi causaret huiusmodi passionem.
43* praedicationem) praedicatusu 44. denotatur / alia / est om..
53. denotatur.
Cap.IV
alio aodo potest suasi pro vocabuli assertione, et praedicati
de subiecto et termini de teiraino,
tertio rnodo inter caeteros maxirae illud propositura sumitur
praedicari de particular! de multis, vel de multis dici vel eae in
multis. St ponitur ista particula "esse in multis" propter accidentia
cotm'unla, quae propria lnaunt, cum ista sit proprietas eis communis,
ut patet per Aristotelem in praedictis. Et debet iata descriptio
intelligeri cum aptitudine.
xra dicatio enim aecundo modo subdividitur in praedicationem
secundum essentiam et praedicationen secundum forraam vel foxmalen.
Fxaedicatio secundum causes est duplex: alia est termini de
termino, et alia est rei de re. Fraedicatio secundum causam termini
de termino, quando per praedicatum significatur primarie causa rei
slgnificatae per subiectum, ut "haec dies est latio solis super
terramH. Aut praedicatio secundum causam rei de re est quando praedi—
catum a parte rei est causa subiecti. St debet ista intelligeri
principaliter de causia materialibus et efficientibus.
Fraedicatio secundum assentiam est duplex: alia enim est termini
de termino et alia rei de re. Fraedicatio secundum essentiam termini
de termino est quando res primarie significata per preedicaturn est res
primarie significata per subiecturn, et nulla forma connotata principaliter
per praedicatum, ut sic, requiritur inesse re primarie significatae
per subiectum forraaliter et denominative, ita quod iste terminus,
ut sic, dicatur rationem, sub qua propoeitio verificatur. Praedioatio
secundum essentiam rei de re est quando subiectum a parte rei est
praedicatum, licet diversa sit ratio praedicati et subiecti, ut
"singular® est universale", in que exeraplo patet, quod claudit
contradiction®: "cocimunicabilitate® multis suppositis esse
incommunicabilitatem multis suppositis". Ideo singulare non est
universale formaliter vel secundum formam, quaovis easentialiter sit
hoc verum, st quamvis quaelibet praedicatio, ubi praedicatum est subiectum
C.IV: S. et raraedicati)
(63)
Cap. IV
Ad oppositum istiua Forphirium sic dicentem: species specialissima
5 est ilia species* quae nullo modo est genus* et genus generaliesimum
est ita genus, quod nullo raodo est species. Ex quo proces.:u plane
patet, quod non sunt aimuli immo vere strictius repugnaret, quod
genus sit species et e contra.
Item, si sint aliqua duo et aliqua ratio inest uni, quae ab
10 altere removetur, ilia differunt. Sed aliqua ratio lnest speciei,
quae a suo ge ere foraaliter reraovetur, igitur...etc.• Fatet consequentia,
cum minor et maior patent per Aristotelesn sic dicentemi non est melius
medium inveniendi differentials inter aliqua, quam invenire unum
ens, quod uni inest et ab altero removetur, igltur...etc.. Et per
15 consequens, species non est genus, cua ab illo differat.
Item, de ratione singularis est, quod sit unum et non multa,
ut de vi vocabuli patet. Sed si singulars esset universale, tunc
ipsum esset multa. Igitur, singulars non est universale.
Ad latum dubium dicitur concedendo illud et tunc ad rationem
Porphirlum dicitur quod ipse intelligit species non esse formaliter
genus generalissimum, sed essentialiter est. Est verum, quod species
specialisslma est genus generaliaairaum, nam eadern essentia est unum
et relictua. Sed in praedicatione formali est falsum speciem
specialiseimam esse genus et ad isturn gfr-gytf
h&buisse etc..
(Capitul-iKi Qaartum)
Pro qua materia est dillgenter advertendum, quod "praedicari"
sumi potest multipliciter!
uno aodo sunitur pro exerc«,tione ad bonum, ut fides Christi
praedicatur in gentibus,




Praedicatio formalia substantialis rei de re est quando ratio prima
subetanttalis praedtcati inest formaliter subiecto, vel quando
65
praedicatua inest forma substantialia subiecti. Fracdicatio foraalia
accidentalis eat quando per praedicatum denoainatur aliqua forma
accidentalia, quae ad verificationem propositionis, ut sic, requiritur
inesse subiecto formaliter et denoairative, Et talis praedicatio
fonaalis accidentalis sutdividituri nasi alia talis est secundum
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habltudine® et alia secundum motuaa. Praedicatio formalia accideni&lis
secundum habitudineta est quando per pr edicatun denorainatur forma
requisita inexistens subiecto, ad hoc quod propositio capiat veritatea
sic eignificando, quae forma, quamvis alicui insit, non tarnen propter hoc
sequitur euum subiectum primus secundum denominationac per se mobile, Et
75
tales fortnae sunt, quae inexistunt universalibus et individuia
indifferenter corporeis et inc rporeia et in tali "amari" etc,.
Fraedicatio foraalia accidentalis secundum mo turn est e contra quando
aliqua forma accidentalis denominator praeter praedicatum, quae
requiritur inexiatere subiecto, et sic propter quara sequitur suum
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subiectum primus secundum denowinationea esse per se mobile, nt sunt
albedo, nigredo, it sic ex quibus patet quod in praedioatione secundum
essentiam, universale est singulars,
(Uapituiua Quintua)
Contra praesuppooitum in prase,issa declarative, vis, quod
universale non est formaliter singulars, est fo ma respectu cuiuslibet
sui singularis, igitur quaelibet praedicatio universalis de suo
subiecto est formalis,
5 Item, haec est preedtcatio formalis* "iate homo est homo"!
igitur res primarie significata per praedicatua est foimaliter res
79, forma) formalis,









in coonuait igitur...etc.. Antecedena sict lata prspositio est vera:
quilibet homo aingularla eat, igitur, cuius aubiectura supronit
person&liter et praedicatuns sispliciter, sicut in sta "quilibet homo
eat homo". Sequitur, quod eat dare res primarie aignlfioata* per
praedicatum, quae eat rationia ad omrse® real significatam per aubiectum
et nulla est buiuamodi res nisi singular®, cosrunes igitur...etc..
Item, eat dare aingulare in comir.uni et omnia aingularia est aliquod
esse sub tectum singulars! igitur eat dare subiectu® singulare in
com uni. AasumptuiB sic, est dare plurea aingularea, igitur, sicut
respectu hominum singulariu® est ponere hominem illis con;.unem, sic
reepectu huiuemodi sin&ularium eat dare singulars® omnibus illia
com; unera. Conf irssatur ratio! sic aeque vers conveniunt oranee illae
aingulares in hoc,quod aunt aingularea, aicut onr.es homines i hoc,
quod sunt hor.inee. Igitur, sicut reepectu hominum eat dare honinem
ooamunen illia, in quo cdnveniunt, sicut reapectu huiusp:odi singularium
est dare singularem il is comrmnera, in quo deberent convenire. Consimile
arguments potest fieri de incommunibus singularibua. £t patet modus
arguendi specialiter ponere ipsoa, aed de ipso plus in responaione.
Item est dare proprietatem com unem cuilibet singulari, quae non
eat proprietas alicuiua universalis. Et illiue proprietatis nort f*st.
dare aliquod subiectuss commune formaliter, igitur singulare.
Item, ista propoaitio est vera "homo currit" et non verificatur
pro aliquo in communi, cum talis praedicatio ah hornini in communi
removetur. Igitur oportet, quod verificetur principaliter pro aliquo
singulari in coeiuni. Et "eat aainus", "amovetatur", Mridet", dieatur
sic de siailihua, aed de iato plus in responsione.
Item, est dare virura in comrauni, v8^o igitur naturam
absolute acceptaa, prout deprivatur ab huiuaraodi accidents. Et sic
iata essentia, ut sic concepts, est ^*?r se universale, igitur eat
55. dare om. 59. in communi (principaliter) add.
signific&ta per subiectua. Sed res primarie significata per praedicatum
eat homo in eoanoai et rea significata per aubiectum eat homo singularia*.
Igitur universale est formaliter singulars* Confizmatur ratio: nam
10 iuxta istam opinionera, aliquod realiter praedicari de aliquo non est,
nisi urnua esse aliud: igitur aliquod foxaaliter prac-icari de aliquo
eat formaliter esse aliquod*
Item sic: homo communis est formaliter homo singularis: igitur
universale est formaliter singulars* Antecedens sic: homo singularis
13 secundum quod homo communis eat multi homines aingul&res, cum ipsum
esse commune© est ipaum esse aulta de vi vocabuli iuxta banc opinionea,
igitur*..etc..
Item, quicquid est formaliter unum et non formaliter multa, est
formaliter singulars. Sed homo communis est foraaliter multa: igitur,..etc.*
20 Coneequentia patet et aaior aic confirmatur: non enim valet dicere
"quicquid est unum formaliter et non plura formaliter, singulars taruen",
cum e contra quicquid est plura, est universale et per coneequens nuaerua
discretus foret formaliter universale. Et hoc est nuum arguisentum
militans contra opinionem Burlaii* Et ideo est idem: quicquid est
^ formaliter unum et nulio moco plura, est singulars formaliter, ut
patet de ratione singularis. £>ed homo communis est formalitei u et
nullo modo plura: igitur homo com unis eat formaliter singularis. Et
per consequens universale eat formaliter aingulare, quod ab ipsua est
negatum.
30 Item, vOc®tur essentia hominia in comciuni absolute concepta*
Tunc lata essentia, ut sic concepta absolute, est unum individual*,
formaliter igitur, ut ista sic concepta, est singular!**
Itese, homo a insularis est homo communis: igitur ho o communis
est formaliter homo singularie. An ecedens sic: est dare horninem singularem
30* marginal note secundum argu»entua
Gap.VI
est genus vel species specialissima. Et non nisi species specialissima,
igitur est per se species specialissima et non est per se alia species
specialissima nisi species humana. Et sic contingit arguere de femina
in communi et per consequens vir est mulier.
(Capitulum Sextum)
Ad primum respondetur negando maiorem, viz. utrobique, ubi
praedicatum est forma respectu subiecti, est praedicatio formalis. Kaa
ad hoc, quod sit praedicatio formalis, ut praedicatur, est requisitus,
quod praedicatum vel idem, quod se habet per raodum formae, denominat
personaliter, ut sic: "iste homo currit". Sed, cum sic dicatur "singulars
est universale", "homo communis est album", illud, quod se habet per
raoduia forniae, non requiritur, quod insit formaliter subiecto. ham
in primo exemplo, illud, quod se habet per modum formae, est communicabilitaa
vel universalitas, et illud, quod se habet per modum materiae, est
homo. Et ilia comnunicabilitas sive universalitas, sic connotata,
non requiritur sic inesse subiecto. Et sic formaliter et conformaliter
dicendum est de secundo exemplo.
Ad secundum dicitur concedendo, quod hie est praedicatio formalis:
"iste homo est homo", sed ex isto non sequitur, quod res prf arie
significata per predicatum sit res primarie significata per subiectum,
ut manifeste patet. Ex quo sequitur defectus illius consequentiae.
Sed bene sequitur, quod praedicatum vel res primarie significata
per praedicatum inest formaliter subiecto vel rei pri arie significatae
per subiectum in suppositione personali. Et sic patet responsio ad
istam obiectionem cum sua confiraatione.
Ad tertium art,umeritum dicitur negando, quod homo co -munis est
formaliter homo singularis, quod cum quod est i.omo, sed secundum quod
C.VIi 1. marginal note Responsio. 1—12. vide C.V: 1-4* 13-20. vide
C.V: 5-12. 21. vide C.V: 13-17.
(68)
Cap,viI
eat nmlti homines ain&ularea, est com unia. Sed ns^atur, quod homo,
secundum quod eat co munis, est multi homines singularea, cum atat
25 ipsuia esse communem cum hoc, quod non aint multi homines singularea,
Et ulterius, cum aosumitur, quod homines ease coour.unem est ipsum esse
aulta, negatur illud, cum hominea ease com; unem est elus conraunicabl 1 itas,
Horninen ease multa eat homo et multa et sic horninem esse album est
homo et suppositura album, Non tar,en homines esse corar.unem est eius
50 conraunicabilitas, cum ipsemet sit formal iter commune et non sit album.
Ad quartuxa argumentum dicitur, quod conaequentia non valet, Nam
in maiori eat auppoaitio personalis et in minori est supjositio simplex,
Et sirapiiciter minor est vera, cum "esse unura" potest dici multipliciter,
ut dicetur posterius, et consequens falsuiu.
35 Ad qu inturn argumentuns dicitur negando consequent last, ^airi ista
essentia, absolute concepts, non est universalis nec sin. ularis, cum
illae, ut sic conceptae, non inest aliquod accidens, Conceditur, quod
ista essentia, sic concepts, est una transcendentitas, quae universalitas
erit ipsa essentia, sicut universalitas Dei est ipsemet ^eus.
49 Ad sextum argumentum dicitur negando, quod homo communis est
homo singuaria, Et tunc, cum ulterius infertur, quod est dare
hominem singularem in communi, negatur illud et dicitur, quod illud,
quod assumitur pro eius probatione, non est propositio, vis, ista:
"qui!ibet homo est. singular!**, miet?t i&t&t iste k<omo>
45 ***• homo*,
(Capitulum Septimum)
Pro quo notandum, quod ilie terminus "homo singularis" est terminus
discretua, est ex limitatione intellectus, Tripliciter eni® dicitur
terminus discretus. Est enim aliquis terminus diacretua a demonstrationc
31-34. vide C.Vx l7-29t 35-39. vide C.Vt 30-32, 40-45- *id® C.V133-4O,
37» universalitas) uni ,
(69)
Cap.VII
ut pronomina demonstrative. Et aliquia est terminus discretus ab
5 impositions, ut nor,en propriua, quod uni soli a proprietate imponitur.
fit tertio modo aliquls eat terminus discretuo ab intellectua limitations,
ut talis termini "individuum", "singulars" et "substantia prima", et
termini aggregati ex aula partibus et nominia appellativis, ut "aliquis
homo", "quoddaa animal" et sic de caeteris. leraiini en lis particulares
10 ad hoc adduntiir noainibus, ut limitent lata nor,ina ad particulares, quia
aliter superflueret. fit in tertio gradu est iste terminus "homo singularis".
Et tunc dicitur ulterius, quod pronosnen sine demonstratione nihil
significat praeter quod aignificat naturaliter: et tamen sine
demonstratione habet modum vel aptitudinea sign ificandi discrete.
15 Et ex demonstratione haoet significatua, quod discrete significat.
Item, iste tenninus "homo singularis" sine limitations Intel'ectus
nihil si nifieat primarie, quamvis sine limitation® intellectua nihil
significat principaliter istum hominem singularem et nunc latum
principaliter. Sed diflert a pronomine, cum pronomina ex demonstration©
significat sine concitatione rationed eaaentiae eius in genera, non
dicitur significare substantias! etc.. Isti communiter termini
consignifleant rem coniotando proprietatem eesemtiae eius in ge ere et
ordinal itaiis in genere vel in specie. Mffert etiaa a nomine proprio,
quia noraira fuerunt a propriet&te lmposlta ad signif icandvus iudicia
^5 determinate et non quarsdocumque homo voluerit et quotiertseunque per
Intel tectum limitare, sed haec nor ina fuerunt impoaita ad eigriif icandua
discrete vel in particular!, quando homo voluerit sibi ipsi in tali
genera vel specie liaitare: et propter hoc ad differentials aliorua
diseretorum dieuntur termini particulares. fit sic non eat dare homines
^ aingulares in comes ni, quaa is turn horninem in coesmuni. Koraina taaen
propria quandoque pose--w sumi appellative, ut loquitur vulgua
coesuniter. Et ita errando contra natura® terrainorua impositionis
concipit vulgAs frequenter talia noes ina "aliquis homo", animal" etc..
Cap.VII (70)
in contrarietabe et ita da aliia. Et sic secundum Corundam talibus
conceptibua modus aignificandi discretua sine aliquo principaliter
apprehenao vel significant convertibiliter cum talibua nominibua
"homo masculuaM et "animal* aignificando horainera mascuium in com uni
et animal in comsuni. Et patet, quod non intelllgendo tales tersinoa
in contrarietate non distribilea plus quam propria nomina. Et sic
reraanerent omnes tales conclusioneg imperfectae, quibus homo singularis
est homo singularis, sicut talis "quodlibet homo est homo"# Et ex
hac solutione patet clare apud theologos quomodo non est dare
personal!tates in comruni tribus auppoaitis.
Conf innatio indefiniter et per idem patet quoraodo respondendum
sat ad argumenta com; un iter facta in iata materia, quorum primurn eat
hoc. late terminus "homo singu aria" aignificat hominem singularea
primaries at nec latum nec latum, cum tunc haec propoaitio esset
falsa "quilibet homo singularis est homo singuiaria". ^gitur primaria
significat honinem singularea in com iuni. Confirmatur ratio sici ex
hoc, quod omnes homines singulares conveniunt In hoc, quod sunt singularea,
igitur est dare rationem communem oaani hocini singulari, per qua® sit
huiusmodi. St ilia atio iuxta opinionem foret homo singularis in
com uni, igitur...etc.•
Item, ille terminus "homo singuiaris" est terminus univocua, cum
praedicatur univoce. Et per consequens euum significatum prlr,ariua
est unum commune.
Tertio, est poaaibile aliquets horn in em non esse cum hoe, quod
quilibet homo singularis aiti aed ista aunt contradictoria, igitur.••etc..
Ad primurn dicitur, quod iate terminus "homo singulario" aigr.ificat
ex limitations iatellectus latum hominem sin^ularem etc.. Et tunc,
cum asseritur iatam propoaitio em esse falsum "quilibet homo singularis
eat homo singularis", conceditur, quod idem eat dicere cum isto "qui¬
libet iste hoeio est homo". Et ad confirmationem, dicitur, quod sicut
non eat ita, quod omnes homines conveniunt in hoc, quod quilibet istorum
34. corSdP. 57.non (eat; "e8alT1adaT^,^7(eaT™nomol~esT,Tmo~addT*™™~-™*~"
Cap. yii
65 est homo, detsonatrando seipaum. **ec est oncedendum, quod ctanes
homines singuiares coxivu iunt in hoc, quod quilibet homo istorum
est homo singularie in nuasero, cm ciapar sit ratio istius individui
et istius inaividui et istius, quocu»;que demonatrato.
Piatet, quod aequivocum est hoc individut.® ab illo, et sic tales
70 termini, ut communiter aunt aequivoci. JSt si arguitur sic, tantua
JLndividuum est individuuia, igitur osnne individuvim est indiv iduua,
dicitur, quod idea; est, si arguitur, tar,turn hoc est hoc, igitur omne
hoc est hoc, ubi in utroque consequens est lmperfectum.
Et per illam reeponaionaa ad primus, et ad secundum, ad tertiura
75 dicitur, quod hoc est poasibile aliquea hominem non esse cum hoc, quod
quilibet homo singularis sit, et cm hoe, quod aliquis homo non ait.
Admittatur casus et conceditur, quod aliquis homo non est, r.egatur
taraen, quod nullus ho; o est, cuius oppositum est verumi homo masculus.
, \
-•ec contradicit ista "aliquis homo non est" ieio proposition! "qu "libet
60 homo est", eed huic "aliquis homo est", limitando ad eundem datum, et
contrariun istiue "quilibet hor.o est" est homo, non quilibet homo, est,
quae aequipollet huic "homo raasculue non est". Ex isto patet, quod
aicut non est verum, quod necessario "iste horo singularis est", quo—
ouaqus demonstrando, ita nec est dicere, quod neceasario "aliquid
85 homo singularis est", nisi abutantur ad a ignif icanduta convertibil iter
cum illo hossine, sicut comxsunlter utitur vulgus isto termino "aliquis
homo" ad eignif ican.um convertiblliter cum illo teriaino "vir" vel
"uom.o maaculus". Sed illud non est ad propesiturn, cum sic contingit
quocumque termino abuti.
67, individurua. 74* reaponsionea reaponsio/ et cm. 77* non, nam
(72)
(Capitulum Gctavuis)
Ad septifiium dicitur r.egar.do aaiorera, viz* quod est dare singularitate*
in coOTruni. Et tunc ad eius probation©, cum sic arguitur, "est dare
plures singulares, igitur,«*etc«M, negatur consequent!*, cuius causa
est haeoi in nullis negationibuo praeteritionibus, possibilitotibuo
vel privationibus semper raodum privationum habentibus eat dare primarie
singulars aliquibus commune, cu praedicatur declarations prl-a ad
quod aliquid sit universale, prout propoaitio partium, quae praeauppon-
itur ipsum esse naturam poaitivam, sed singuiaritaa est privatlo, cum
idem sit incoomunicabilitas. Non enia est dare homines in coarauni, nec
(singulars* r) in communl nec sic de caeteris, quae se habent per modua
negationia, quamvis privitatem in cornnuni, quietaa in comauni, remission—
em in oommuni At sic de caeteris non se per modum negationum habentibua,
sicut veraciter ponendum est* Ad confirm&tionera ulterius factam, satis
patet responsio ad praemiaais.
Ad octavum a gumentum dicitur, quod est dare proprietateo communes
cuilibet singular!, quae non est proprietas alicuius universalis*
Negatur, quod istius proprietatis non est dare aliquod subiectua
commune formaliter quo ad dependontiam, quausvis non quo ad donorsinationem.
Negandum est tamen iatam proprietatem inesae subiectum, cum tunc idea
subiectum susciperet eius formal em d©nomination©*, quamvio tale commune
propter huiusraodi proprietateo formaliter subiectum, tamen illam
formaliter subiectat, etc,*
Ad nomas dicitur concedendo in casu quod ista propoaitio est
ver&t "homo currit" et dicitur, quod ista verificatur pro suo
primario aignificato, quod est aureus vel hominem currere in oup-ositione
simplici, quod idem est* Significat enlm ista propositio "homo currit"
hominem currere, et taeran nec hore incm singularen nec homines in communi,
sed totum hoc sisul in supposition© simplici hominem currere* H&ec
e.wm >"-i4* »iu« e.v:4>*3g, \y*zu mp e.v» 93^93. *3"^°* ?idg
C*Vi56-6O, 4, po8si^ua, 8,ain*®^, 10, word illegible.
enirs peaec icatio est formalia "homo currit", cum res priuarie
5° aignificata per praedicatum inslt formal iter r^i ui^nificatae per
sub iec turn vel alicul suppo;>ito huius rei. Hon enla inest huius
cursus hoffiini In comusuni fora&liter sed alicui singular!. lata
propositio "homo currit" prisarie significat aggregattsa ex omnibus
hotainibua praesentibus, praeteribus et futuris currere. Secundum
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partem i generaliter m. n huiussodi termini de plurali signif icant
priaarie huiuemodi aggregata. A probablli eni® ponitur, quod est dare
hornincm currcntem in communis sedentern et sic de eaeteris. Consequent*
omnia sunt formaliter "homo communis** contradictus quandoque ad
unum et quandoque ad aliud. Sed "homo comimniB" est formaliter "homo
40 albua", sicut "homo in comrcuni" est foraaliter "homo in comrumi", sed
non formal iter homo. Et enim talis ratio movens ad ponendx:9
hoaincm ourrentem in communi et huiusaodi c •••r it accipere multos
homines currentes distinctos per curaus auos, autem cursentibus et
illorua curs&ua particularua eat "dare unua cureum in communis igitur
45 oat dare illi cursui et non aliud, nisi homines* currentem in comrouni.
Igitur homo enim communis est per accidens homo eurrena in comrouni,
et sicut homo communis est per accidens homo currens et sic tale universale
non eat formaliter generale vel corporal#* Causa enim quare dicitur
homo currens in communi et non homo a ingularis in com uni, quia
50 est dare curaus in comnuni et non singulars in cosmuni.
Ad decimum satis patet solutio ex praedictis.
(dapitulus Honum)
Hie speci&liter obicitur persuadendo tales res communes omnium
accidentiua, tam implicantium sua subiecta per se prima esse mobilia
quaa non : forffia£ea suscipere denorcinationes. Et arguitur priao aic.
51. vide C.Vi 61-67
47* et) eat.
Cap.IX (74^
Sieut se ha bet accidens singular?? ad sutiectum singular©, sic se
habet accidens universale ad aubiectum universale, sed accidens
singular© formaliter et immediate denominat suum subiectum
aliqualiter esse formaturn. Igitur sic denominat aooideco universale
subiectua universale. Et per consequena universalis reeipiunt
praedicationem formalem tarn accidentium ire,licantium sua subiecta
prima ease per se mobilia, quara non implicantia. Confirmstur ratio
;
sic ista tripliciter. Nam aliter sequeretur, quod talia universalis
ad nihil deservirent. Secundo sequitur, quod non essent proportionata
subiecta accident!bus. Et tertio sequitur, quod aliqua est eomparatio,
qua nihil comparator. Ista sunt falsa, igitur.••etc.•
Pr^ma eonfirmatl© sic deduoitur* si talia universalis deservirent,
tunc aliqua facerent, et sicut singular© faclt a Log Tarera actionem, sic
universale faclt universalem actionem. Secunda sic deducitur* nam
dato opposito, huiusmodi universales talium accidentium susciperent
denominatlones foraales.
Item, aliquod universale est formaliter album, igitur...etc..
Antecedent slot albedo in eommuni priue est quam aliqua albedo singularie
et non prius est albedo quam est aliquod ease albun. Et non tunc est
aliquod singular© esse album, cum tunc non est aliqua singularis*
igitur...etc. est aliquod universale album. Kaior probatur: si pro
11lo priori denominat et non si aliquod esse album, igitur pro isto
priori est ista albedo. Homo est rlsibile.
Item, prius homo quera homo aingularis et non prius est homo quam
est animal rationale. Igitur, prius "•et homo rationale qua® est aliquis
homo singularis. Et per consequens, pro isto priori est homo communis
rationalis.
Item, homo in comtnuni est formaliter corpus. Igitur eat formaliter
corporeus. Fatet consequentia, c*an de quocuoque praedicatur definitio,
de eode- ^r^edicatur definitum. Sed esse substantias corporeaa eat
definitio * igiturJ si homo in communi est formal iter corpus, sequ eretur
(75)
Cap.X
35 quod est formaliter substantia oorporea, at per oonoequens corporeus.
Et quod homo communis sit formaliter corpus, patet, oust idea sit per
se superius respectu ham inis in cotununi, et per consequens corporeua
et incorporeum, quod est contradictio.
(Capitulua Deciraum)
Ad prisma dicitur cuacedendo, quod sicut se habet accidens
singulars ad subtectum singulars, ita se habet accidens universale
ad subiectua universale, non tamer, sunt wodo. Nam accidens singulars
taliter se habet ad suum subtectum, quod denominat formalIter et
3 immediate, nec sic facit accidens universale* Conveniunt tanen in hoc,
quod elcut accidens singulars dependet primo et immediate a subiecto
singular!, ita accidens universale primo et immediate depenuet a suo
subiecto universal1.
Hie taaen est distinctio accidentiua* Specialiter notandua...
Aliqua enira sunt accidentia, quae implioant suum subtectum priraum et
immediatum esse per se mobile et talis nussquaa lnsunt formal iter
subleotis, cuiusmodi sunt albedo, nigredo, augmentatio, alteratio,
rislbilltae. Cum ais11ibus non enim est concedendua, quod homo communis
ridet, augmentat, etc.. Generaliter tamen, species et genera huiuemodl
15 accidentiua sunt prius quo ad dependentiam in aliqua substantia in
coomuni, quemvis non secundum fonpalem denorainationeo, ut risibilitao
iato homini in nullo est quo ad foxmalm denominational, nisi in
aliquo homini singular! habente aptitudinea ad ridendum. In homini
singulari est dependenter, cum singular® quolibet tali signo singular*
20 8tat istam esse. Homo enim communis non est risibilis, sed risibile
in neutexo genere substantivato propter hoe, quod est aliquod singulars
risibile.
Alia enim sunt accidentia, quae non implicant suum subiectum
primum et lasted latum esse per se mobile, cuiuemodi sunt relatlonee per
25 accideno in genere et respectu hulusmodi sunt causare, diligere et
C.X« Iff. vide C.IXs 1-19.
Cap.X (76)
huiusraodi. Et talis possunt ineoae formaliter aubiectis universalibus*
Ad priraam partes eoniirmationis, dicitur, quod auiuamo&i universalis
ad fflultum deeerviunt, causant omnia sua supposita, quae et feciunt. Quae—
cumque fa iunt sua aingularia extrinaece, cum causant idea officieater.
Dubitatur enixr. a quibusdas numquid talis universalis, ut puta
homo communis, sit simplex vel corapositum* Pro cuius materia est
notandum, quod aliqua eimplicitaa excludena omnem compos itionea,
scilicet qualitative© sive quantiativam sive quiditativaia, aut
potentiaa cadendi in compositions* Et ilia competit soli heo, cum
35 Ille nor; ietorum modorum coasponitur, ut coaponunt» Aliqua est simplicitas
excludens compositions® qualitative^; et quantitativaxa et potentiaa
cadendi in compositione tali, quae competit intelligentis. Illae
enirn ccaaponuntur ex e,.ere et differentia, cum poesint definiri et
habent commune® quiditatem, vel generale© vel specLalem* Tertia est
^ eimplicitas excludens compositions© qualitative et quantitative®,
sed non potentiaa cadendi in compos it ione* Et isto mode ani :..a
intellective est simplex et fortaaliter universalis, quae, licet
non cadant in compositions® qualitativam nec quantitative®, tamen
cadunt in compositioned quiditativaa* In quarto cradu est eimplicitas
^5 excludens compositionea qualitative®, sed non potentiam cadendi in
compositions* Et isto modo materiae priraae sunt sirapl icitatea*
Quinto modo est siaplicitas excludens compositions® ex partibus
quantitatis disparum specieru®, Et isto modo sunt elenenta simplicia*
Sed in sexto gradu est siraplicitaa excludens cosapositionem ex partibus
^ sensibilibus diversarum apecierum, cuiuamodi sunt iuxta Echromoterna*
Quasiibet habeant partes quartitatis diversarura apecierum, wanes tamen
partes sensibiles sunt eiusdem speciei specialissirnae, cuiusaodi
sunt cor ****«*»#
a?»29* »lile O.IXi 1^1?.
30* tales universales* 42* universales* 53* illegible* ob e(?) sclSs (?)
(77)
Cap.X
lit etiam not&ndum est, quod aliquod oat coenpooitum quiditotive,
55 sicut quodlibet definiMle habens rationes esaent,i*i.i#a, ex quibus
integrator exiatens quiditas. Aliud eat ccsuposituja qualitative,
cuiuamodi aunt conpoaita ex materia et foxsuu Et tertio mod© eat
compooitum quantitative, ut talia, quae habent parten extra partes*
Dicitur ergo, quod talis res communis est simplex tertio gr&du, et
taraen coaponitur quodas: ^do quiditative, cum habet partes qui edam
«
essentiales* Kon tsmen componitur quiditative, sicut nec anima*
Non enlat est inoginandum, quod species faurcana, quartvio dioitur "homo
communis", sit fonaallter homo groseua, compoaltus ex materia et forma,
extensus in situ, datanabiiis aut salvabilie, sicut quid grosee
^5 concipientea aestimatur deriaorie garulanter in hac materia, cum
cio dcficerint arguments, sed eat essentia bufflar.a»"hu»anitas*, sive
natura humanai iar ateriale, indiviaiblls et ad ami es pur.cturn cuiuolibet
hominis, per quaa quilibet homo convenit formaliter cum alio* Kt
ita de aliis universal!bus est dieendue a est enim dare plures tales
70' veritates singuiares "iatum horn inem esse" et praeter tales est ciare
talea veritaten " hotninem esse", fundatw in ill is, qua® oportet
dieting ere tanquam priorea a quacumque tali veritate: ista verit.-s
esse essentia, natura, vel species huntana*
Ad secundum confirrrat ioneo dicitur etiam ne.jando illam et illud,
^5 quod ex illo deducitur sequi*
Ad tertiam oonfinsatloncm dioitur ipeammet negando, ad quoin patet
zesponsio ad praesaissis*
(Capitulum Undecimura)
Ad secundum argumentum dioitur negando, quod aliquod universale
74-75. vide C.IX» 12-15# 17-19- 76-77. vide C.IXM5-14*
C.X1; 1* vide C.lXi 20-26*
Cap.XI (78)
©ot formaliter album. Et aio arguraentum, quando sio arguitur: "albedo
in comnmni priua est quara albedo singularia, igitur...etc", negatur
consequentia propter multiplicem suppositionem minoris. Nam minor
5 potest sum! in suppositione almplici vel in suppositions personal!.
Si sumatur in suppositions simplicl, tunc est verum, cum idem sit
dicers aliquod esse album et albedo alicuius. Et taaen nec pro
tunc devenerat formaliter conmune nec singulars. Si autea Bumatur in
suppositions personali, tunc minor est falsa, cum tunc sign if icat,
10 quod priua est albedo aliquod esse album, quaa est singulars animal
esse album, quod est falsum. cum albedo tunc communis non prius foret,
quaa albedo singularis.
Tunc ad aliud arguraefctum, quando sic arguitur. "pro illo priori,
lata albedo est accidens. igitur pro isto priori inhaeret formae", negatur
15 consequentia. Nam ex antecedents non plus aequitur, nisi quod pro isto
priori idea accidens inexlstlt alicul. quod quilibst accident! est
essentials. Accidens enia inhaerere sublecto sat subiectum accidentia
formalam susoipere denoin inationem. Videtur enim. quod talis albedo
hie non est aliquod esse album, cum tunc esset causa, quare fcjUquod
20 asset album. Per consequsns causaret aliquod esse album. Et ctra id«a
sit "aliquod esse album" et "albedo", ita sequitur, quod causaret seipsaa
et esset prior seipsa* Conforms argument*® potest fieri de quibueoumque
aliis accidentibua, etc.. Hie coramuniter dicitur, quod lata albedo
causat hoc album. Sed contrarie, si causat hoc album, igitur hoc album
25 est cauBatua &b hoc. Igitur hoc causatur ab hoc. Et per coneequens, accidens
causat substantias et sic accidens esset prior substantia.
Item sit per Thilosophua, Septimo Topicorum, "quandocumque sunt
aliqua duo et stat unum esse sine relicto, tunc ilia non sunt eadem".
Sed stat istam albedinem esse cum hoc, quod isturn homines* esse album
30 non sit, igitur istum horninem esse album non est ista albedo.
i% uigfB apisufB to w no ejuci jpmiim mn to mm fapij.
the argument* C.IXI20-26 seems confused towards the end and it may
be that the scribe has accidentia omitted the conclusion of
one argument and the beginning of the following argumnet.
(79)
Cap*XI
$aior patet ex hoc* quod istam albedinam aanere isto homine corrupto*
Ergo sic secundum Ariatotelera in praedictis, Capitulo de Oppositis,
caecum esse noil est caecitas* Igitur conform iter, esse album non
est albedo*
^ Item videtur quod humanitas est albedo* Nam humanitatem esse est
hominaa esse, et hoc. inem esse et est horn inen esse albums igitur, cum
homines, esse albfaa est albedo, sequitur consequens* Minor patet ratio,
sicut hotainem esse est commune ad istua horn inem et ad Ilium, ita i^ua
hohinem esse est commune ad isturn homines esse album, sedentem, patron
et ad iatum homines esse in hoc consequenti* Igitur,,sicut horninem
40
esse est is turn hosinem esse, sic i-ium homir.ea esse est , .fit istum
homines esse album* Et per cdnsequens horn in em esse est homines esse
album*
Item, istum hominem fore est istuxn homines fore per hoc tempus
45 et per hoc etc** Igitur per idem, istum hominem esse est istum esse in
hoc consequenti vel istum horninera ease album et sic de caeteris*
Patet antecedens, tamen istum hominem fore per tempus hoc est
futuritio illius hoc,inia per hoc tempus et istum hominem fore esse
eius futuritio* Bed futuritio illius hominis per hoc tenpus est
50 futuritio simpliciter* Igitur istum homines fore per hoc tempus est
ilium fore, quibus datur, viz* quod istum hominem esse in casu
desinit esse* Et sic beura esse desinit esse et per consequens Deum
non esse inciplt esse* Ex quo sequitur, quod nullua Deus immediate
post hoc erlt* Et per idem sequitur, quod qui desinit esse, desinit
55 esse et sic nihil esset*
Item sequitur, quod singulars est formaliter universale, cum
ilia non distinguantur penes communicabilitatem st incommunicabilitatem,
cum ilium homines sit universale pluribus coamunieabile qua® hominem
esse*
58* sit) scit / universale} vel*
• * v 4 : • -q
Cap.XI
Ad latum argumentusi dicltur coneedendo, quod albedo eat aliquod
ease album et causa aliquod ease album. Et cum ulterius infertur, quod
causaret seipsara, negatur consequentla. Pro quo est ootandum, quod
111a oratlo "aliquod ease album" potest dupliciter sumi, scilicet
abstractive et concretive, SI abaP ctive, tunc "aliquod esse album"
est idem quod albedo alicuius. Si sumatur concretive, hoc contingit
dupliciter: vel quod supponit pro aggregato ex ilia re et albedine
lata, et sic eat una aaneries suppositionis slmplicla. Vel quod
subiecturn aupponit personaliter pro ista rei, cui inest albedo. Si
illo modo, tunc est verura, quod ilia albedo cauaat homines album
et causat homines aggregatum, ex quo est pare illius ag .regati vel
ordine causandi. Kec sequitur, quod causat aliquem partem illlus
agcxegati, quamvis causat aggregatus, sicut non sequitur de linia
bipunetali, cuius punctua causat totam liniam et nulla® eiua partem,
nec sequitur de binario. Si oecundo modo, tunc eat falsum, quod ilia
albedo causat hoc, slcut eat falsum, quod ilia albedo causat iatam rap,
cui inexistlt albedo, vel causat alias rem cum ilia albedine. Secundo
modo est verum, quod ilia labedo causat aliam rem cum ilia albedine,
cum ait idm dicere ad ilium modum loquendi, sicut causat haainem
aggregation, igitur...etc..
Ad secundum dicltur negando consequentiam. Pro intellectu tansen
Fhilosophi eat notandum, quod aliquod esse alicui, idem dato, contingit
dupliciter. Vel secundum accidens, vel secundum substantias. Secundum
accidens, quod est primarie eadem essentia cum eodem, superaddit cum
accidentale sibl, sicut in.Loci albus adest alicui, idem dato.
Secundum substantias vel ex aequo, id est convertlbili, quando est
primarie cades essentias cum dato, non superaddendo aliquod accidena,
ut late homo et hoc anixnal. Et de tali identitate intelligit Ihilosophus.
60-79. vide C.XI: 18-26. bO-87. vide C.XI: 27-31.
Cap*XI (81)
Ad tertium argumentua dicitur negando consequentiam. 3ed bene
sequitur aici concluderetur album esse est albedo. Kao caecum ease
90 est res caeca et album esse est res alba, eed esse caecum est
caecitas et esse album est albedo, igitur...etc..
Ad quartum argumentum seretur negando consequentiami non est
illam humanitatea esse et latum homines esse. Ham sic non sequitur
latum homines esse eat istum bum et istum hominem esse est
95 isturn horn inam ease album, ita nec sequitur aodo. Nam plura sunt
ilium hominesn esse et iliam humanitatem esse. Est enira dare tales;
veritatemj "ilium hominem esse", quae est communis ad esse accidental#
illius hominis et esse substantial# illlus horninis, quae Veritas
est tranacedens. Et ilia Veritas communis est essentialiter ill#
too homo et ilium hominem esse, album esse, p&trem esse in hoc exemplo,
quaavis non formal iter.
Et ad ilia, quae diountur sequi, via. quod hominem esse, desinit
ease, leua esse, desinit esse, dicitur concedendo hulusmodi in suppo¬
sition# personali. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod heum non esse, lnclplt
105 esse, cum ibi negatur esse pro o»ai eensu, sicut non sequitur "isturn
homines, album desinit, igitur isturn hominem non esse, incipit ease*,
ham in casu, quod aliqua albedo Illius homini® desineat esse, est
ai.tecedens verum et oonse^^ens falsum et conform iter est dicendum.
Ad qulntua argumentum dicitur negando, quod risibilltas communis
1t0 prius est quar. homo singularis, cum in nullo ordine prioritatia, nec
in aliquo alio ordine^ bene© coo. unius qua., eat aliquia homo
aii.^ularia, aed til* modus eon defeat. v»"-rf "prius" propria. Bsc
sequitur, quod sit prius, quaavis principia, a quibus procedit, sint
priora, cum homo singularis ex illis principiis quiditative componitur.
11«j Ita tamen risibilit&s solum ex eia procedit. Homo singularis prius
88-91. vide C.XIt 32-34. 92-101. vide G.XIt 35-43* 102-108. vide
C.XIt 51-55, the earlier part of the argument 44-51 is not answered}
it nay be that here again two questions have been conjoined by the
scribe. I09.ff. This answer has no correlate in C.XXi it may be
the answer to a question following C.IXt 20-26, which itself deals
with priority. The occurence of "homo est risibile" following that
question is otherwise inexplicable.
(82)
Cap*XII
ex talibus partibus quiditative componitur quam ex 111is partibus
talis risibilitas proeedit. Conceditur tamen, quod pro aliquo priori
lata risibilitas com unis est, pro quo non est aliquio homo singularis
nec singularis risibilitas* Pec repugnat risibilitatem esse hocinis
120 in comtsuni quo ad dependentiara, quaravis non forraaliter.
Ad aexturn dicitur concedendo, quod prius est homo qua® est homo
singularis. Et negatur rainorea, quod non prius est homo quam est animal
rationale* Kara lata definitio non datur nisi rations singularium
hominuKi* Et sic hoe ini in corumuni non definitur nisi ratlone suorua
125 singulariura*
Ad septiaura dicitur, quod oane corporeum potest duplioiter sural»
vel accidentaliter vel substantialiter* Si accidentaliter, sic dicitur
trinara divisionem. Si substar.tialiter, sic dicitur subatantiara
compositarn ex materia et forraa* Et sic consequitur, quod homo communis
150 est uno aodo incorporeus et alio modo corporeus, ex hoc quod quodlibet
auum individuua componitur ex materia et forma. Et enim imposaibile,
quod sit corporeus substantialiter sumendo ilium terminus, etc*
(Capitulum Buodecimum)
Ad secundum arguraentum in dubio principali primo tactura hoc,
sci icet omne singulars differt ab universale, et sic aliqua res
insit uni, quod ab alio reasovetur, igitur airigulare non eat universale
•••dicitur negando consequentiara. Pro cuius declaratione suptonitur
5 primo, quod quaelibet propositio ratlone huius verbi differt ab
exponent!* Primo debet exponi secundum exigentiara terminorum, ut sic,
dicendo "aingulare differt ab universale"* Verbum debet resolvi sict
isto modo vel lata rations, singular® differt ab universal!, quae
128* tftaa* 121-125* the reply to probiera Cap*IX1 27-30* 126-132*
the reply to position on C,IX» 31-38*
C*XII» Iff. vide C.IV* 11-15* 5* &b ora.
Cap. XII ^
pooteriuo sic exponitur: prirao per duaa affirmativas affirmantes extreme
esse et per istam propositioners negatives neganteas unura extremum
dici de reliquo, sub rations respectu cuius fuit resolutio, saltern
nisi sit differentia ne&ativa. Fstet ille modus exponendi per
Aristotelera sic dicentesni "non est melius medium inveniendi differentisa
inter aliqua quaa invenire aliquod, quod uni inest et ab alio removetur**
Et sciendum est propter ista posita: nihil differt a seipso, quaiavis
a multis ignorantibus idem concedttur et a multis argumentls eiuo
Veritas suadetur.
Prima ratio est haeei aaeignatur homo, tunc arguitur sic: ille
differt a seipso ex hoc, quod iste homo sub rations, qua est albus,
eel aliter accidentius est, et sub tali ratione non est homo* Igitur
sub tali ratione differt ab homine.
Secunda ratio est ista: homo differt a seipso existente in tempore,
et homo existens in tempore est idem, quod homo, igitur.••etc.•
Antecedena: prout isto modo homo est prius sub aliqua ratione quaa
eat existens in tempore.
Ad ista taaen et omnia aimilia respondetur tripliciter. Prirao
apud quoedaa dioltur, quod semper in negative exponents debet deter—
minatua derai, quando ipsum proeedit eubiectum, quod non sint in
propoaito, quare negatur argumentua et consimilia, sed ilia expositio
quibuedaa non placet, eo quod eode® modo debent termini capi in expos-
it ionibua. sicut in proposito. Ideo dicuntur aliqua expositores, quod
si terminus obliquus regatur ex vi causae in viam exponentem, sicut
in exposito est consequentie bona et antecedens falsum. Sed quia ista
via est minus diffusa ratio, dioitur breviter, quod talis propositio
debet probari isto r.odot ilia ratio inest dieti, quae non inest sides,
igitur.••etc.. Et antecedens tunc eat falsua, ut patet, etc..
(85)
(Capituluss Tertium Decimum)
Ad tertiura ar^uraentura tactum in dubio principali, scilicet J
si singulars esset universale, tunc ipsura esset aulta etc*, negatur
conaequentia.
40 Pro quo notandu® est, quod ultra cosmunera modur, suraendi, nurncrura
potest tripliclter sumi. Uno modo auaitur numerua pro qualiumcumque
rerua aingularium sive universaium multituaine. Ait sic homo in coarauni
et as inua sunt raulta. Alio raodo suraltur Humerus pro quaiiuracuEique
reruaa singularium multitudine, ut id, horao et punctus sunt suits*
4^ lertic strictiosime aumitur nuaerus pro qualiuBicuraque aingularium
rerua multitudine per se In genere substantias, aodo quo duo homines
et duo asini dicuntur raulta*
£t est ulterius notandura, quod tripliciter po&sunt aliqua
ponsre se in nu&exo* Uno aodo omnia talis ponunt se in rm ero, ex
30 quibua resultat proprie nur.erus ad modus loquendi priorem* oecundo
raodo ponunt se talis in nu ero, quando de terraino si&nil'icante ills
est plures nuraeri vers et aifirsrative praedlcabilis in recto, ut
"iati sunt homines"* Tertio aodo, quando ex texraino significant®
aliqua est terminus pluris nuraeri adiunctua terraino numerali, sic
33 pr&sdicabilis st affirmative, ut ista sunt duo, vel duo horaines,
duo aniaalia, duae substantias vel duae res* Est sup; oaitio personalis
ilia, quou sit tantura dicert "hie sunt duae substantiae singulares",
quando superrespondetur*
Est notandura, quod numquam est pr&edicatio concedenda terrain!
60 substantialis pluralis in recto de tcrraino signif ic-ante aliqua, nisi
significatura priraariua prasdicati sit unura commune utrisque, in quo
conveniunts ut supposito quod Socrates sit homo* Tdnc non est
concedendura, quod Socrates et hcrao in camrauni sunt homines, quia
ille terminus "horaines" non est superior ad subiectura, sed est
C.XIIIi vids C.IIIi 16-18.
Cap.XIV (86)
"5 concedendum, quod sunt animal la, subatantiae corpora©, aed non duo
animalia nec trie, nec finita nec infinita nec aliqua anim&lia.
Contra igtaaa probationer arguitur sic. Ponendo quod isti sunt
homines et quod sunt duo homines, cum hie sunt duae substantiae,
quarum qu&eque est homo: igitur hie sunt duo homines.
70 Item sicJ homo communis est homo formaIius homo quam iste homo
et non eat formalius iste ideas homo, igitur sint duo homines distinct!.
Item, nego essentials commune®, tunc ieta essentia sub se concepts
eat homo communis, igitur sic concepts est homo singularie et per
consequens hie sunt duo homines.
75 Ad primus enia argunentua dicitur idem negaudo, cum ille
terminus "quilibet* liraitet ad substantias singulars®. Sam imperfecta
quaelibet istarus substactiarua est homo, demonstrando Socratem
sedentem. ^ec sequitur utrumque istorum est, igitur ilia duo
sunt, sicut non sequitur hoc est unuro et hoc est unum, igitur
ilia sunt duo, quamvis addatur terminus discretus ad hoc.
Ad secundum dicitur negando, quod homo communis est formaliua
homo quam homo singularis, quia homo in coramuni non est formaliter
homo, sicut patet ex dietis.
Ad tertium dicitur concedendo, quod ista. essentia sic concepts
®5 eat homo, sed ut sic concepta nec est homo singularis nec communis.
Ham ut sic concepts non inest sibi aliquis accicLens, igitur...etc..
(Capitulum Quartum Beciraum)
Sed circa istarn materlaa de universal ibus non modicum circuitstat
dubium an sit dare ens comi une j)eo et omnibus causatia, et quod sic
arguitur. Fortsalis ratio, concludens quod animal est commune homini
et asino, est, quia uterque istorum est animal, sed causa Deus quaa
5 quodcurique causatum est ens, igitur conformiter foret en3 illis.
71. idem) eld em.
Confirmatur ratio, nam Deus et iete horao conveniunt in hoc, quod
different a tertio homine, igitur cum differentia fundetur in
entitate, ita a fortiori convenirent in hoc costmuni ente, ex quo
sequitur ens fore com une iliia.
10 Item, si non est dare ene huiusmodi in com&uni Deo et sic
omnibus causatis, sequitur, quod nulla propositio de pluri de nihil
esset concedenda, sicut taliu ilia aunt* Et per consequens non esaet
de illis denionstratio assignauda. Antecedensi si ilia est vera, lata
sunt. Tunc ista conveniunt recip endo conaimileai praedicationem et
13 non nisi in entitate, igitur.••etc••
Item, differentia, qua Deus differt ab illo homine, est subiective
in Deo et terminative in illo horaine. Igitur, cum sit in utroque,
sequitur, quod in hoc conveniunt.
Ad oppositus illiua dubii arguitur sic. Nam dato illo, aequuntur
20 tria. Frimura est, quod duplex sunt pr&edicatione, quod eat express*
irapossibile. Secundum est, quod aliquod eat digniua et nobiliua Deo.
Tertdum est, quod Deus incipit esse. Ista stint impoosibilia, igitur
...etc..
Frlauci sic deducitur. Omne in coamtuii formal iter intellectual
25 causat omnia causata, sed hoc solum competit primae causae, igitur
...etc.. "inor e*ci ens in comnuni causat quicquid causat eius
individuua, sed aliquod individuua causat omnia causata, ut patet,
igitur...etc..
Item sic, ens in commoni foxsaliter intellactum est causa
30 vel causatum, sed ipsumreet forraaliter Intellectual non eat causaturn,
quia tunc Deua esset causatum. Igitur ens commune foraialiter
intellectura eat prima causa.
Item, ocine prlus et posterius cauaato eat prima causa, sed ens
in comnuni eat huiuamodi, cum omne universale est prius in auo
16. subiectum
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ordlne et posterius in alio ordine, igitur etc..
Secundo sic probatur. Game universale est prius quocumque suo
supposito et si est priua, igitur, cum ens in couaauni est maxima
universale* sequitur ipsum esse quocunque supposito dignius, igitur
...etc..
Item slot omnem perfectionem, quasi habet Deua, hafcet ens in
coromunl* et aliqua ultima igitur est perfeetlus Eo vel ad minus
aeque perfactum.
Item* nullum prius intendit universalis* quasi aingularia.
Igitur* cum ens in cotaruni sit maxima universale* sequitur quod
ipsummet est prius intenturn a natura et natura semper intendit
nobilius et dignlus. Igitur idem ens in coraiuni est comi;:unisaiaua
et dignissimum* igitur.••etc.«
Tertium sequena sic deducitur. Ens in communl prius omni
indivi uall inclpit esse* et ad inceptionen cuiuslibet universalis
sequitur omnium oingulariura inceptio eiusdem. Igitur* cum Sous sit
allquod eius singulars* sequitur quod ipsum incipit esse.
Item ens in oeamonl fit post eternitatera, igitur inclpit ease.
Antecedena ales si ipsum fuit in «-nitate, igitur* cum ipsum
foraaliter differt a prima causa* sequitur* quod in etemitate
fuerunt duae essentiae et hoc absolute. Consequens falsum* cum solum
fuit in etemitate una essentia* via. Beus.
Item slot in eternitate non sunt plures essentiae* sed una essentia
solum, sed Beuo eat in eternitate. Igitur ens formaliter intellectum






Ad latum dubiusn dlcitur concedendo illud et ad prlroum dictum
aequi negatur ideei, viz, quod sunt du&e prima® causae. Conceditur
tp-fljen, quod ena in com-uni est prima causa, nor. tan;en fonaaliter,
oed c*: entialiter. Nec aequituri "idem, quod causat omnia causate,
eat formaliter prima causa, aed ens in communi causat omnia c&usata,
igitur ens in communi est foxraaliter prima causa", cum maior eat
particularia. Nec valet consequential "wane ct.usans omnia causata
formaliter est prima causa, aed ena in communi eat huiusmodi, igitur
eat prima causa", propter variations supposition is. Kon eniin
est minor lstius conaequentiae neganda, propter hoc quod ens in
casmuni causat omnia causata, igitur est formaliter prima causa.
Kaa *eus causat omnia effective, aequivoce et independenter. Bed ens
in comnuni non sic facit, sed rations alterius et intrinsece. Et
ideo, quia alio modo causat ens tale omnia causata quan Deo, ideo
Deus non est ena cosicune formaliter.
75 Ad secundum argnmentum dieitur ne^ando, quod ena in ccmmani
formaliter intellectual est causa vel causatum. Nam sic intellectual,
nec est c&ua&tu®, nec incausatuat immo ipaum formaliter et independenter
conceptum non eat ens. Conceditur tamen, quod ipsum intellectual vel
conceptual eat ens commune, licet non sit hoc nude.
60 Ad tertium argumentus dicitur negando conaequentiam, saltern
intelligendo consequena formaliter, quia eat mutatio et variatlo
in suppositione. Et conceditur viz., quod ens in coramuni est prius
et posterius quocunrque eius causato vel aupposito. Est enim prius,
quia comaunius posterius, quia causatur ab illo. Ad secundum dictum
c85 sequi, quod aliquod est dignius et nobi ius Deo, negatur. Tunc ad
aliud argumentumi "omne universale eat priua quooumque eiue eupposito"
et tunc conceditur, quod ena commune est prius Deo: non aic prius,
60-74. Tide 24-28. 75-79. 29-5? Tide. yld(! 55.55,
84. ff Tide 21. 85.fr Tide 36-59.
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quia dignius vel nobiiiua, sed quia cos-.r.unius. Utide quia animal commune
sit prius homine, quia cceimunius, non lamen cum est digniua perfectius.
90 Et enim aliquod prius incipit, vel quia comnunius et universalius et
superills, vel quia dignius et posteriua est, quia causa vero mult is
allis modis.
Ad secundum argi me;.turn negatur, quod aliquis est dignius vel
perfectius Deo. Et tunc ad argumentum "omnera perfectionem, quod habet
99 Deus etc.", negator, quod habet aliqua ultima. Conceditur tamen, quod
idem habet oranera perfection®®, quod habet prima causa, lieet alio
modo, cum ens commune solum contentive habet orcneta perfectioneo,
quod habet prima causa, et beds habet formaliter et (multiplice?)*
Conceditur tamen consequens illius consequentiae, vis. quod ens commune
100 est perfectius vel aeque perfectum cum Deo praedication© secundum
essentia®.
Ad tertium argumentum dicitur concedendo, quod natura prius
intendit universalis quara singularia causata. Nature enim non
intendit Deua, sed singularia causata. Et da talibus intenditur,
105 quando dicitur, quod natura prius intendit universalis quam singulaiia.
Et sic conceditur, quod ens coramur" est dignius aliquo singular!
causato.
Ad quartum dictum sequi, vis. quod Deus incipit esse, negatur
idem pro ispossiblli. Et tunc ad argumen turn "ens in coeuauni incipit
110 esse etc.", negatur minor et conceditur, quod sit in etemitate. Son
tamen sequitur ex isto, quod istae easentiae fuerunt in eternitate,
quia Deua et ens commune non fuerunt duae essentia*, ut patet ex prae-
dictis, aed soluf una. Ad a.liud arjumantua conceditur, quod in eternitate
non sunt plurea eseentiae, sed solum una essentia, et tantuo ens in
115 coranuni est in eternitate. AMES.
93-94. vide 21. 94-101. vide40-42. 102-107. vide 43-48. 106-102*
vide 22, 48-51* 109-113. vide 48-51* 52-56. 113-115. vide 57-59.
98. mince. 103. intendit) intenditur.
